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Gottfried Benn's Static Poetry 

1. Introduction 
Gottfried Benn's importance as a poet is to be measured not only by 
his provocative Morgue und andere Gedichte of 1912: bitter revelations, 
in part with a matter-of-fact scientific tone, of bodily decay, the smell 
of cancer wards and corpses, the misery of urban existence. Nor can 
his importance be restricted to his later accounts of the dissolution of 
the self in the light of modern civilization-as, for example, in his 
well-known "Verlorenes Ich" of 1943. Rather, Benn is to be equally 
recognized for his embrace of form, measure, and balance. He is, with 
Rilke, 1 the twentieth-century poet of stillness. 
In a work generally recognized as the best introduction to hermetic 
modernism, Die Struktur der modernen Lyrik, Hugo Friedrich stresses 
the dual incomprehensibility and fascination of modern poetry. Ac-
cording to Friedrich, modern poetry is characterized by predominantly 
negative categories: fragmentation, decay, nonassimilability, brutal 
abruptness, strident imagery, dislocation. The early Benn made a 
name for himself in part by extending this modern tradition into 
uncharted territory. His early poetry-"Mann und Frau gehn durch 
die Krebsbaracke," for example-shocked even those accustomed to 
the negativity, dissonance, and harshness of the modem lyric. More-
over, significant features of Benn's poetry throughout his career are 
captured by elements that Friedrich broadly sketches in Baudelaire, 
Rimbaud, Mallarme, and their twentieth-century European inheri-
tors: the proud isolation of the poet combined with a depersonalized 
rhetoric; the hermetic elements of obscure, if not incomprehensible, 
poetry; the hegemony of form over content and of suggestivity over 
understanding; the poet as representative sufferer; the interlacing of 
diverse fields of language; and finally, an undefinable and seemingly 
empty transcendence that nonetheless serves as a goal. In focusing on 
Benn's static poetry I would like to stress certain moments, which 
become more pronounced in later years, in which he deviates from 
some of the central tenets of the modern lyric. His static poetry is not 
one of agitation as much as it is one of calm, not one of dissonance as 
much as it is one of balance, not a break from as much as it is a 
recollection of premodern traditions, techniques, and definitions of 
beauty. This poetry is of course not without its mark of modernity, but 
it is-true to its own theme-more than merely modern. 
Benn titled one of his poems and a collection of his poetry "Statische 
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Gedichte."2 Many poems outside this cluster of works can also be 
called statisch, in their attempts to embody stillness or stasis. 3 As 
we will see in the analyses that follow, Statik-literally "statics," the 
branch of mechanics that deals with bodies at rest or forces in equilib-
rium-is a complex concept. Though the adjective statisch gives Benn's 
poems a technical coloring, the use of this word in conjunction with 
poetry also takes away from its scientific connotations:4 statisch be-
comes a metaphor for poetic equilibrium and balance, indeed for 
motionlessness and permanence as such. Benn's multifaceted use of 
the term Statik also involves a critique of history and, in particular, of 
national socialism. 5 For him, Statik implies an affirmation of stillness 
in areas as diverse as aesthetics, politics, epistemology, ethics, and 
metaphysics. In his letter to Peter Schifferli of 23 November 1947 Benn 
writes: "Statisch ist ein Begriff, der nicht nur meiner inneren asthe-
tischen und moralischen Lage, sondern auch der formalen Methode 
der Gedichte entspricht und in die Richtung des durch Konstruk-
tion beherrschten, in sich ruhenden Materials, besser noch: in die 
Richtung des Anti-Dynamischen verweisen soll ... Statik also heiBt 
Riickzug auf Ma.B und Form, es hei.Bt natiirlich auch ein gewisser 
Zweifel an Entwicklung und es heillt auch Resignation, es ist anti-
faustisch" (DD, 92-93). 
Recognizing the overlapping dimensions of Statik as well as the 
value of close readings of individual poems, I do not present a sche-
matic study of the different spheres in which the concept plays a role;6 
rather, I attempt to illuminate the concept's diverse meanings by pre-
senting detailed analyses of four works: "Trunkene Flut" (1927), "Wer 
allein ist-" (1936), "Statische Gedichte" (1944), and "Reisen" (1950). 7 
With these four poems, formally diverse yet similar in the richness of 
their cryptic allusions, I hope to show a progression from a more 
dynamic and archaic stillness to a more subdued and cerebral repose. 
"Trunkene Flut," written well before Benn articulated his concept of 
Statik, is on the surface a dynamic work, full of allusions to motion, 
struggle, and transformation; nonetheless, I suggest that the poem 
contains hidden seeds of Benn's later elevation of stillness. "Wer allein 
ist-" is Benn's starkest affirmation of aesthetic stillness. "Statische 
Gedichte," another of his best-known works, extends the concept of 
stillness into the spheres of psychology, ethics, and politics. Finally, 
"Reisen," written after Benn had seemingly moved beyond the con-
cept of Statik, nonetheless reasserts, in its own unique way, some of 
the principal tenets of stasis-above all, indifference toward the exter-
nal world. Other poems also support this thesis of a development, but 
the close analysis of individual works is of more interest to me and, I 
Introduction 3 
imagine, of more help to the reader than lengthy sets of lists and 
quotations. 8 The individual artworks are more at the center of this 
study than is the linear development of Benn's poetry, though reflec-
tion on the latter is made possible as an outgrowth of the former. 
The poems illustrate the wide-ranging spheres in which stillness 
plays a role, and they contain interesting allusions to the tradition of 
thought on stillness. Benn's knowledge of intellectual history was 
extensive and precise. He studied theology and classical philology; his 
letters contain numerous philosophical references; and his poems and 
essays allude to Greek mythology, Roman history, and German litera-
ture. The poems to be analyzed here contain veiled allusions-all but 
a few previously overlooked-to a tradition of stillness informed by, 
among others, Parmenides, Aristotle, Epicurus, Seneca, Eckhart, Cu-
sanus, Goethe, Nietzsche, and Rilke. 
Stillness, or Ruhe, has long been a privileged concept in German 
letters.9 In the mystic-pietistic tradition it was elevated for its religious 
import: stillness was considered not only a characteristic of divinity 
but also a necessary precondition of human oneness with God. Secu-
larizing this tradition and drawing on the writings of the Stoics and 
Spinoza, classical authors such as Goethe, Schiller, and Holderlin 
associated Ruhe with peace of mind. When we achieve repose not only 
are we at one with ourselves, we have the capacity to act in harmony 
with the world. In the late eighteenth century Ruhe also became a 
privileged aesthetic category. Winckelmann, who considered sculp-
ture the highest of aesthetic forms, argued that stillness is a facet of all 
great art. Many authors followed him, elevating stillness as a moment 
of not only the artwork but its production and reception as well. There 
is still another sphere in which Ruhe has significance: politics. The 
association of Ruhe with order and the status quo has been prevalent 
throughout German history. In the nineteenth century this association 
helped undermine the concept's traditionally positive associations. 
Georg Buchner, Heinrich Heine, and others attacked the elevation of 
Ruhe as conservative and reactionary. It is against this complex prehis-
tory of stillness that Benn's concept of Statik merits attention. Benn not 
only alludes to the religious, psychological, and aesthetic dimensions 
of stillness, he gives Statik a political meaning that adds complexity to 
the seemingly simple conservative versus liberal assessment of Ruhe. 
With few exceptions, Benn has been approached from the perspec-
tive of immanent interpretation or new criticism or, conversely, from 
the standpoint of sociological and political criticism. 10 His poetry, both 
dense and hermetic, does indeed require word-for-word analysis, but 
it is only by understanding the intellectual-historical context of the 
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poems-the numerous and veiled allusions---that one can fully com-
prehend their meaning and significance. The "intellectual-historical" 
thrust of this project has three partially overlapping facets: the at-
tempt to situate Benn's embrace of stasis within the history of the idea 
of stillness, the endeavor to view stasis as a form of inner emigration, 
and the attempt to decipher a multiplicity of obscure allusions. 
The unraveling of difficult allusions helps us to understand not only 
Benn's poems and his situation, first within the tradition, and second 
vis-a-vis his own age, but also the inadequacies in his well-intentioned 
critique of the national socialist movement. After analyzing the poems 
as formal constructs, I evaluate their statements. I call my readings 
"aesthetic" and mean thereby an analysis of rhetorical language and 
literary structures, followed by an immanent critique of the texts' 
philosophical statements---that is, a critique that weighs the internal, 
logical consistency of the works' presuppositions and claims. The 
term "aesthetic" is appropriate for such a practice insofar as one views 
art, with Hegel, as a sensuous, if complex and intuitive, representa-
tion of ideas, whose validity presupposes logical coherence. 11 
2. "Trunkene Flut" 
Trunkene Flut 
Trunkene Flut, 
trance- und traumgefleckt, 
o Absolut, 
das meine Stirne deckt, 
um das ich ringe, 
aus dem der Preis 
der tiefen Dinge, 
die die Seele weiB. 
In Sternenfieber, 
das nie ein Auge mafs, 
Nachte, Lieber, 
dais man des Tods vergafs, 
im Zeiten-Einen, 
im Schopfungsschrei 
kommt das Vereinen, 
nimmt hin-vorbei. 
Dann du alleine 
nach grofser Nacht, 
Korn und Weine 
dargebracht, 
die Walder nieder, 
die Horner leer, 
zu Grabern wieder 
steigt Demeter, 
dir noch im Riicken, 
im Knochenbau, 
dann ein Entziicken, 
ein Golf aus Blau, 
von Tranen alt, 
aus Not und Gebrest 
eine Schopfergestalt, 
die uns leben lafst, 
5 
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die viel gelitten, 
die vieles sah, 
immer in Schritten 
dem Ufer nah 
der trunkenen Flut, 
die die Seele deckt 
grofs wie der Fingerhut 
sommers die Berge fleckt. 
(GW, 3:60-61) 
"Trunkene Flut," first published in 1927 and then rereleased in 1949 
as the title poem of a collection, presents a challenge to any critic 
wanting to argue for the priority of stillness in Benn's poetry. Already 
in the poem's title we find a pair of Dionysian images, and the first 
two stanzas introduce still more. Dionysus is the god of intoxication 
and flux, the counterpart of Apollinian stability. At the very opening 
the poet invokes him with an emotional exclamatio: "o Absolut, I das 
meine Stirne deckt." This initial address suggests, first, that the poet 
rivets all his attention on the absolute Dionysian principle; second, 
that the Dionysian moment obliterates the poet's capacity for reflec-
tion-in Benn's work, Stirne approximates the meaning of Gehirn;1 and 
third, that the absolute principle erases the individuality of the poet-
much as the Dionysian element dissolves Apollinian individuality. 
The word Sternenfieber suggests that Dionysian frenzy or fever has 
invaded even the Apollinian realm of light and health. Dionysus, 
whose mysteries are performed chiefly in the dark, represents night 
("Nachte") as opposed to Apollinian clarity and measure ("das nie ein 
Auge mafs"). He negates individuality and temporality ("dafs man des 
Tods vergafs"). Further, he is the god of violent, eruptive sexuality and 
creation ("Schopfungsschrei") as well as of mystical unity and nondif-
ferentiation ("im Zeiten-Einen ... das Vereinen"). It is in this Diony-
sian frenzy that the poet experiences both mystical union and poetic 
inspiration. 
The Dionysian unity passes after stanza 2. Both the poetic inspi-
ration and the sexual act ("das Vereinen") are "vorbei": "Dann du 
alleine / nach grofser Nacht." The imagery of sexuality remains, how-
ever, in such phrases as "die Horner leer" or "dir noch im Riicken." 
The sexual motifs represent the primitive, prerational, and inspira-
tional origins of the poetic process. Such imagery also helps Benn 
avoid any pretense of sentimentality. The mytholo~cal and cosmic 
references, meanwhile, allow the poet to transcend his own subjectiv-
ity. 2 The poem is more than its author. F. W. Wodtke sees in the image 
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of the trance-filled Flut an allusion to the Jungian collective uncon-
scious (SP, 146). For Jung, the most prevalant symbol of the uncon-
scious is water. The Dionysian water or "trunkene Flut" opens the 
poet's eyes to the riches of the unconscious, and thus also of past 
times, from which the poet draws both the inspiration and the content 
of his poem. 
The third stanza parallels the sexual act and Dionysian unity with 
the harvest: bread-com, the gift of Demeter, and wine, the present of 
Dionysus, have been offered. The mystical and religious motifs that 
surfaced in the images of love and union recur here with the idea that 
the poet's creation is also a kind of sacrificial offering. In immersing 
himself in Dionysian intoxication, the poet sacrifices his own individ-
uality. He becomes the mouthpiece of an earlier people: "Wir tragen 
die friihen Volker in unserer Seele und wenn die spate Ratio sich 
lockert, in Traum und Rausch, steigen sie empor mit ihren Riten, ihrer 
pralogischen Geistesart und vergeben eine Stunde der mystischen 
Partizipation ... das Alte, das UnbewuBte ... erscheint in der ma-
gischen Ichumwandlung und Identifizierung, im friihen Erlebnis des 
Uberall und des Ewigseins" (GW, 1:99).3 
With the harvest past, the seasons again begin to revolve. Demeter 
laments Hades' abduction of her daughter Persephone or Core. Dur-
ing this time the earth is barren. Thereafter Demeter, with her daugh-
ter, appears to ascend upward toward the graves of humanity and 
thus out of the depths of the netherworld. 4 Demeter ascends, howev-
er, as a skeletal figure. The idea seems to be that the continual material 
harvest is only the frame for the greater development of conscious-
ness and history. Or, since the syntax is ambiguous, the skeleton may 
refer to the poetic "you," who finds little left of self or of inspiration 
after the Dionysian moment is past. The poet shares with Demeter an 
interest in revival. While "die Horner leer" refers to the end of the 
harvest and of sexual bounty, it also signifies the end of Dionysian 
unity. As Benn notes in his description of the Dionysian dance, the 
maenads often wore horns on their heads. 5 Further, the Dionysian 
moment of sexual unity is related to the function of Demeter. Demeter 
laments not only as the mother of Persephone but as the goddess of 
fertility. 
After his allusion to seasonal cycles and the end of Dionysian ecsta-
sy, the poet moves on to an account of human history. He begins with 
the Mediterranean ("ein Golf aus Blau"), the long-lamented origin of 
Western history ("van Tranen alt"). In Benn's private imagery blue 
also symbolizes the origins of psychic development-that is, the un-
conscious. 6 The poet then introduces "eine Schopfergestalt, / die uns 
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leben lafst." This may refer to Prometheus, who championed and, in 
some versions, created humankind, but for reasons that will follow, 
the figure is more likely Christ, a creator who died ("aus Not und 
Gebrest") so that we could continue to live. 7 Christ is followed by the 
great sufferer and wanderer Odysseus (" die viel gelitten, / die vieles 
sah"), who with much effort finally returned to the shore of Ithaca 
("immer in Schritten / dem Ufer nah"). Anachronistically, Odysseus 
follows Christ. The blending of seemingly diverse and different his-
torical epochs is prefigured in the earlier Dionysian formulation "Zei-
ten-Einen." We see here a montage technique characteristic for Benn 
during this period, the simultaneity of diverse historical epochs. Uni-
versal history is presented in an almost atemporal manner. The chro-
nological becomes simultaneous. Though Benn frequently expresses 
his disdain for history, and does so with increasing emphasis, intellec-
tual history remains for him the least directionless of the various forms 
of history, and his paradoxical, if not contradictory, notion of atem-
poral history is central to his understanding of poetic origination. To 
make things more complicated we can add that "die viel gelitten, / die 
vieles sah" need not refer only to Odysseus: it is equally Christ, who 
traveled about, teaching the masses, and suffered from his crucifix-
ion. 8 The poet, as we will see, not only lets these figures melt into one, 
he himself identifies with the heroes and gods he invokes. 
Parallel to Demeter, the poet brings us the fruits of intellectual labor. 
Much like Prometheus or Christ, he is a creator ( consider the Schop-
fungsschrei). The poet's unity with these mythological and historical 
figures extends still further. Demeter, Prometheus, Christ, Odysseus, 
and the poet share moments of suffering: Demeter mourns the loss of 
Persephone; Prometheus was doomed to perpetual agony for his defi-
ance of Zeus;9 Christ was crucified; Odysseus suffers in his attempts 
to return to Ithaca, and when in book 12 he has his men tie him to the 
mast as they pass the Sirens he, too, appears as a crucified figure; the 
poet, meanwhile, experiences to an extreme degree the suffering of 
modern humanity. 10 Because all but Prometheus share a relationship 
to the revival of the dead, "eine Schopfergestalt, / die uns leben lasst" 
most likely refers to Christ. Dionysus eliminates death through non-
differentiation; in addition, he is traditionally associated with immor-
tality and the cult of the dead. 11 Demeter, with whom the poet most 
readily identifies here, arranges Persephone's return from Hades by 
refusing otherwise to restore the earth to fruitfulness, and in one 
version of the myth she herself descends into Hades to retrieve her 
daughter. The other figures are equally associated with renewal: 
Christ preaches the afterlife, "die Auferstehung der Toten,"12 and in 
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book 11 Odysseus calls from the netherworld the souls of many great 
heroes. 13 The poet, too, awakens images of the past from out of his 
own soul; his mission is to make the Dionysian once again fruitful and 
to overcome temporality by forming a product of eternity. Not only are 
Dionysus and Odysseus mirror images of the poet, they represent the 
very target of the poet's revival. Odysseus is directly linked to Diony-
sus and thus to poetic celebration; he returns to Ithaca in a state of 
sleep or unconsciousness and is therefore, for Benn, immersed in the 
Dionysian (GW, 3:109). In his early writings Benn specifically equates 
Dionysus and Odysseus through this moment of unconsciousness 
(GW, 2:303). 
The title of Benn's poem alludes to the first stanza of Annette von 
Droste-Hiilshoff's "Im Grase." 14 Her poem begins: 
Sii.tse Ruh', sii.tser Taumel im Gras, 
Von des Krautes Arom umhaucht, 
Tiefe Flut, tief, tieftrunkne Flut, 
Wenn die Wolk' am Azure verraucht, 
Wenn aufs miide, schwimmende Haupt 
Sii.tses Lachen gaukelt herab, 
Liebe Stimme sauselt, und trauft 
Wie die Lindenbh.it' auf ein Grab. 
(102) 
Like Droste, Benn stresses the unity of Ruhe and Flut. He also portrays 
in the Dionysian moment the awakening of the dead. Not only the 
content of Droste's poem but also her style is invoked in Benn's work; 
it was Droste who introduced the ellipsis as a stylistic principle to 
Germany. The motion downward to a grave in Droste's poem con-
trasts, however, with Demeter's ascension in Benn's poem: because 
Demeter comes from the depths of the netherworld she ascends to the 
graves. One can say that Benn's poem is consciously concerned with a 
lower, more subconscious level of self and world. There is, however, 
another interpretation of Demeter's movement toward the graves, and 
it brings us to Benn's fascination with Goethe's mythology of die Mut-
ter in Faust: 15 they, like Demeter, are of course mothers; again like 
Demeter, they concern themselves with the preservation of those in 
the underworld; and, most importantly, as Mephistopheles says, their 
realm knows neither up nor down: "Versinke denn! Ich konnt' auch 
sagen: steige!" (6275). We recognize in Demeter's journey Benn's dis-
regard for a realistic perception of space. The verb steigen need not 
mean "to climb" or "to ascend": it can also signify hinuntergehen, so 
that one could easily say, "da.ts man in den Hades steigt." As suggest-
10 "Trunkene Flut" 
ed above, Demeter may be returning from Hades and ascending to the 
graves on the earth's surface, hence making possible the bounteous 
words "dann ein Entziicken,'' but it is also conceivable that she is 
descending to the depths of the netherworld, symbolized by the 
graves, and thus only embarking on her journey. The pertinent lines, 
after all, immediately follow a description of depletion ("die Horner 
leer"). The passage is ambiguous and serves, along with Benn's use of 
the word wieder, to underscore the cyclical structure of the Demeter 
myth. Just as time folds in on itself, so too are the distinctions of space 
(and of language) dissolved in Benn's world of Dionysian unity and 
poetic creation. We are far removed from the clarity and spatial real-
ism of Droste. 
In the final stanza the poet, identifying with Odysseus, slowly 
moves to the banks of the Dionysian trunkene Flut. The poet is com-
pleting his work, "Trunkene Flut,'' which covers the soul the way 
Fingerhut spots the mountains in the summer. The imagery of the 
Fingerhut-if taken in its everyday meaning-is symbolic of sexual 
union, the Dionysian union of Apollinian individuals. But Fingerhut 
does not only mean "thimble": it is a plant-a poisonous (and thus 
Dionysian) plant, but also a plant used for cures (and in this sense 
Apollinian). The imagery has yet another dimension. The creation of 
the poem, the Apollinian moment, releases the poet from his own 
subjectivity; what is important is not his personal suffering but his 
artistic creation. Here the Apollinian moment cures the poetic self 
even as the poet sacrifices himself. 16 The trunkene Flut qua poem is 
paralleled with the Fingerhut and exhibits poetry's therapeutic func-
tion. But the parallel extends to the Dionysian moment as well. In the 
myths of Dionysian cults the votary escapes his tortured individuality 
and overcomes his suffering through moments of intoxication and 
celebration. In Benn's "Heinrich Mann. Ein Untergang" the narrator's 
suffering dissolves into a "Wirbel von Gluck" as soon as he celebrates 
a Bacchanalian festival (GW, 2:12). The trunkene Flut qua Dionysian 
unity and transsubjective surge of images likewise frees the poet from 
his individual pains. 
The proximity of Dionysian and Apollinian in the imagery of the 
foxglove mirrors their conflation in the entire poem. Dionysian dyna-
mism is present throughout. The overriding image is of process. Each 
short line, hardly independent, runs on into the next. The half-sen-
tences frequently end with, and thus highlight, the predicates. En-
jambments surface on almost every line, and the poem leads into the 
final stanza with a strophe enjambment. But the process turns back on 
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itself. The poem is circular as well as linear; its motion is self-con-
tained. The rhyming scheme adds to the circular structure both on the 
level of finite repetition and on the wider level of the poem itself: the 
final stanza's c and d rhymes are the first stanza's a and b rhymes, and 
the words at the end of three of the poem's final four lines ("Flut," 
"deckt," and "fleckt") recall the occurrence of these same words in the 
opening lines. 17 Rhythmically and linguistically, the poem's ending 
binds itself to its beginning. The apparent stress on predicates is 
weakened by the fact that there are only three verbs in main clauses 
throughout the entire poem ("kommt," "nimmt hin," and "steigt").18 
The motion is not finite. The geographical up and down is also circu-
lar-first, in the movement of Demeter and the other figures, and 
second, in the movement from the flatlands to the hills and back 
again. The motion of water implicitly echoes this circularity both in the 
finite wave and in the general ecocycle. The emphasis on seasons (the 
harvest, Demeter, "sommers") adds to the theme of circularity, as 
does the merging of figures from diverse periods. Circles are of course 
traditional symbols of stillness. 19 The repetition evoked by circularity, 
whether historical or natural, conveys stillness. The rhymes, as sug-
gested, convey circularity and stillness as well. In this way the form of 
the poem becomes its content. By transforming the linear movement 
of the poem into a circle, Benn's artwork becomes almost spatial: it 
borders on sculpture.20 The circularity of the work makes it a closed 
and finite form, an Apollinian work, but here, too, the Dionysian 
shows its force. Circularity is also a Dionysian symbol; the circular 
structure of the ring dance is central to the cult of Dionysus. Borrow-
ing from the language of Howard Nemerov, an American poet steeped 
in the German tradition, one can say that in its stillness the poem still 
moves. 21 
The early lines "o Absolut, / das meine Stirne deckt, / um das ich 
ringe" may be said to reinforce the circular imagery by way of the 
nonliteral reference to a ring. However, the verb ringen might also be 
read as invoking openness: it implies struggle and a continuing effort 
to grasp the absolute. The tension between figurative and literal 
meanings seems to undermine closure and may imply that the strug-
gle of ringen has as much to do with representation and the trickiness 
of language as with the difficulties involved in creating or experienc-
ing a moment of mystical truth. The juxtaposition of the nonliteral and 
literal evokes an uncertainty, by which the absolute may be grasped, 
may be removed, or, if one thinks the two together and views them in 
the context of the whole poem, may be grasped in the very moment of 
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dynamic struggle. The fact that the poem portrays both struggle and 
closure reinforces such a synthetic reading, as does the apposition in 
lines one and three, which suggests an identity of the absolute with 
the trunkene Flut-that is, with the poem itself. Finally, the literal 
moment, the struggle, comes early in the poem, while the conclusion 
of the poem returns us via its global rhyming scheme to circularity, 
thus suggesting that the poem itself may lead to an overcoming of 
struggle. The nonliteral, the poetic, prevails, and with it the concept of 
mediation. 
A similar ambiguity arises with the third line from the end, "die die 
Seele deckt," where the relative pronoun refers to "die trunkene Flut" 
and thus, metonymically, to the poem as a whole. The poem's cover-
ing the soul may imply fulfillment, a suggestion that the poet's mes-
sage is comfortably and fully enclosed within the poem. However, 
the verb decken is ambiguous: it also means to cover, to hide, to elimi-
nate from view, so that the soul's desire to express itself in the poem 
may be not fulfilled, but thwarted. Does decken imply in this instance 
fulfillment and union, or erasure and displacement? Is the soul con-
tained within, or concealed from view? One solution to the quandary 
would be to read Seele not just as the poet's message but also as the 
poet's self; in this way the seemingly opposed meanings of fulfillment 
and concealment would be united. We recall the earlier tragic struc-
ture, whereby the poet sacrifices himself for the completion of the 
poetic work. 
In yet another reading of this line, the relative pronoun is the object, 
rather than the subject, of the clause: here "die Seele," viewed as 
subject, covers "die trunkene Flut." This reading must also draw on 
the ambiguity of the verb decken: either the soul-perhaps that of the 
reader as well as that of the poet-grasps the essence of the poem, 
or the poem eludes the soul. The ambiguity in vocabulary and syn-
tax reinforces the complexity of the line's message. The extended 
metaphor ("wie der Fingerhut/ sommers die Berge fleckt") may help 
clarify the interpretation: the foxglove speckles the mountains as the 
poem covers the soul-or, in the variant reading, the soul covers the 
poem. The foxglove speckles the mountains in such a way as to suggest 
a partial covering, but a covering nonetheless. The beauty of the poem 
is conveyed, though the poem is not exhausted by any one soul. 
Because the relative pronoun can refer to either noun, the poem and 
the soul are elliptically identified: there is thus further evidence for the 
suggestion that the poetic self finds its identity in the poem. In addi-
tion, the union reaffirms poetic mediation. The poem and the soul, 
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which are separated by the negative connotations of decken, overlap in 
the verb's positive connotations and in the common pronoun. 
The poem conveys images of mediation and rupture, closure and 
openness, fulfillment and concealment, stability and flux. The promi-
nent reference to blue is also ambiguous. The poem tells of history 
from antiquity, symbolized in the Mediterranean blue ("das Siidwort 
schlechthin" [GW, 1:5121), through Christ, and toward the present. 22 
The mountains speckled with foxglove are, one presumes, those of 
Italy and Germany, as in Herder's and Holderlin's influential schemes: 
first, because the poem treats the development of history geographi-
cally, from the level and horizontal dimensions Benn associated with 
the South23 to the mountains of the North, and temporally from Medi-
terranean antiquity to the present; second, because the foxglove is 
indigenous to the mountains of Central Europe. The Mediterranean 
blue, however, is not just the source of modern history, it is the 
stillness of the sea. An important Greek word for Ruhe is ya)..fJv17 
(Meeresstille). Such idyllic stillness is conveyed in the poem as ideal 
origin and goal; it is not only the beginning, but the end of history. 
Here one thinks of Schiller's and Holderlin's prominent associations of 
stillness and the color blue with the heavens and thus with the ideal. 24 
It is this harmony to which humankind wants to return, "zuriick, wo 
still die Wasser stehn" (GW, 3:224). The longing for the qualities of the 
Mediterranean is of course a prominent idea in Benn, expressed very 
early in poems such as "Gesange" (GW, 3:25-26) and "D-Zug" (GW, 
3:27-28), or in the contemporary "Orphische Zellen" (CW, 3:76-77). 
Finally, "Trunkene Flut" is an individual work of art. The Diony-
sian, which even at the poem's origin was "traumgefleckt,"25 has been 
superseded by the Apollinian. What Benn has thematized-the pro-
cess of creation and recognition, the union of the Dionysian and the 
Apollinian-he has also formed. The poem is not just Dionysian 
Rausch but "Formrausch" (GW, 2:133). In his essay on "Expressionis-
mus" Benn phrases the process thus: "Dionysos endet und ruht zu 
Fiilsen des klaren delphischen Gottes" (GW, 1:252). The Dionysian 
represents the transsubjective and undifferentiated origin that passes 
over into the constructed Apollinian product. The individual recog-
nizes and forms the depths ("die Seele weils"). Like Holderlin, Benn's 
poet makes the Dionysian visible. Creation, even though it is not 
primarily cerebral, is nonetheless a formation out of chaos. The poem 
need not be line-for-line static, but as an entirety it is closed within 
itself. 26 
"Trunkene Flut" was written before Benn articulated his theory of 
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static poetry, but with this reading we can understand why, after he 
was immersed in the principle of aesthetic stillness, he could reach 
back and privilege this poem, making it the title of a new cluster of 
works. In his later poetry, however, the unity of the expressionist 
Schrei or Dionysian Flut with Apollinian form and stasis will clearly 
shift in favor of stillness. 27 
3. "Wer allein ist-" 
Wer allein ist-
Wer allein ist, ist auch im Geheimnis, 
immer steht er in der Bilder Flut, 
ihrer Zeugung, ihrer Keimnis, 
selbst die Schatten tragen ihre Glut. 
Trachtig ist er jeder Schichtung 
denkerisch erfullt und aufgespart, 
machtig ist er der Vemichtung 
allem Menschlichen, das nahrt und paart. 
Ohne Riihrung sieht er, wie die Erde 
eine andere ward, als ihm begann, 
nicht mehr Stirb und nicht mehr Werde: 
formstill sieht ihn die Vollendung an. 
(GW, 3:135) 
"Wer allein ist-" (1936) also celebrates stillness, but in a very differ-
ent way. It is an apodictic poem, spoken laconically from a perspective 
of authoritative distance. The poet's distance from the reader as well 
as his movement beyond his own subjectivity can be seen in his use of 
the indefinite pronoun ("wer") and the third person singular ("er"). 1 
The poet does not offer his personal view of the world; he would claim 
that what he says is a priori true. This moment of abstraction contin-
ues to the end of the poem. When in the tradition general aesthetic 
principles are announced in a poem, they tend to derive from a par-
ticular work of art; one thinks, for example, of Morike's ''Auf eine 
Lampe" (10). Here, in contrast, the poet names no particular work; 
he speaks of the poem or of art as such. Benn is concerned with 
the universal. In "Wer allein ist-" the temporal dimension disap-
pears altogether. Correspondingly, the moment of dynamism is un-
derplayed. In an inversion of what we saw in "Trunkene Flut" the 
poet is removed from the sphere of flux even as the poem asserts that 
he has control over it (stanza 1). The stress is not on dynamism but on 
the Apollinian moment of reflection (stanza 2) and the Apollinian 
product (stanza 3). 
Whoever is alone, is immersed in mystery-not only the copula but 
the common diphthong and the rhetorical figure of chiasmus link the 
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essential words. As in the mystic and idealist traditions, solitude and 
stillness are prerequisites for mystical union or poetic inspiration. 
Geheimnis suggests hermeticism as well as mysticism. The poem ap-
pears to be saying that the experience cannot (or should not) be fully 
articulated and passed on to another. However, the connection to 
those traditions that celebrate the ineffable is only apparent. Benn 
would have us view the poem, in its Vollendung, as the formulation of 
this mystery. Amidst the continuous flow of images and movement of 
everyday life the poet stands still. The passage of time does not dis-
turb his repose. The images of flux in the first stanza allude to Heracli-
tus, of whom Benn once wrote in a clear echo, if not plagiarism, of 
Nietzsche: "die von ihm erblickte Welt zeigte nirgends ein Verharren, 
eine Unzerstorbarkeit, eine Andeutung von Dauer" (GW, 1:386-87).2 
Plato frequently summarizes Heraclitus's philosophy in the epigram 
.navra (JEi or "all things flow" (Cratylus, 401d and elsewhere), a phrase 
with which Benn was quite familiar. Drawing on both Heraclitus and 
Protagoras, Benn writes: "Panta rhei-das ist Natur; der Mensch das 
Mais aller Dinge, das ist Geist" (GW, 4:256). In his famous river frag-
ment Heraclitus states-here in Benn's formulation-"daB alles flieBt 
und dais es dieselben Fhisse nicht mehr sind, auch wenn wir in diesel-
ben Fliisse steigen" (GW, 3:594). 3 Though Heraclitus's doctrine of flux 
seems to apply to all life, the poet is here excluded. 4 Rhyming with 
Flut is Glut, Heraclitus's other image for transformation, namely, the 
restless flame. The flame is so great that it reaches not only what is 
itself ablaze but even the shadows, one step removed. The passage is 
quite playful. Shadows are always separate from the light or flame 
that creates them. Thus an image of all-embracing restlessness is 
conveyed insofar as flux, symbolized in the flames, reaches even the 
shadows. Traditionally, however, shadows convey restlessness: they 
function much like water or flames, and so it is not surprising that 
they, too, as in Plato's cave allegory (Republic, 508-13), represent 
change and becoming. In Benn's poem this world of change and 
development is material, primarily biological: "Zeugung ... Keim-
nis." The second stanza's references to biology become mundane, 
even sarcastic: eating and mating. The poet, who appears to be be-
yond this sphere, focuses in his solitude and stillness on the idea, the 
essence, das Geheimnis. His intellectual creation is of a different, more 
stable order. 
The word Schichtung comes from the realm of geology and has 
the specific meaning of stratification. 5 In Benn's vocabulary, stratified 
spheres are the accumulated layers of mankind's history over which 
the poet has an intuitive grasp: "lhr groBer Gedanke [Benn refers to 
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psychology] ist der Schichtungscharakter des Psychischen, das geo-
logische Prinzip. Die Seele ist in Schichten entstanden und gebaut, 
und, was wir vorhin im Organischen gelegentlich der Bildung des 
Grofshirns entwicklungsanatomisch aus verschollenen Aonen vernah-
men, offenbart der Traum, offenbart das Kind, offenbart die Psychose 
als noch vorhandene seelische Realitat" (GW, 1:98-99). No particular 
history plays a role in Benn's world. History enters his poetry only 
insofar as its general remains contribute to the poet's formulation of 
the absolute. Schichtung is the presubjective realm that in "Trunkene 
Flut" was associated with the movement of water; here, even the 
transsubjective has geological stability. The poet's interests lie not 
with the surface flow of life, but with its depths; not development, but 
stasis: ''Ach, diese ewige Entwicklung, welch eine kommerzielle Kon-
tinuitat! Die Seele hat andere Tendenzen, sie hat eine Schichtungs-
und Riickkehrtendenz" (GW, 1:409). 
Schichtung nonetheless remains subservient to spirit. History, even 
in its accumulated layers, is still expressed in the language of nature-
that is, with geological metaphors-whereas the poem is represented 
through privileged allusions to the intellect. For Benn, the poet ap-
proximates the role Hegel grants to the philosopher in his Phiinome-
nologie des Geistes: the poet inherits and has command over past his-
tory, and his task is to articulate this history in its relationship to the 
absolute and to the present. In fact, the combination of erfiillt and 
aufgespart captures two of the three meanings conveyed through the 
Hegelian aufheben: raise or fulfill; save or preserve; and cancel or 
negate. 6 The only meaning dropped is the third one, which brings 
forth images of flux and temporality-of this the poet will have noth-
ing. Immersed in thought, he raises the images of human history to a 
final poetic formulation. With his focus on the mysteries of the abso-
lute, the poet is beyond the destruction that inevitably befalls humans 
in growth and love. In "Trunkene Flut" poetic creation was associated 
with sexual union; here the speaker, stressing the unique and cerebral 
dimensions of creation, distances himself from the all-too-biological 
analogy. Whereas the individual's material nourishment and repro-
duction belong in time, the poet's pregnancy of thought supersedes 
material and temporal spheres. Denkerisch is a key word here. The 
moment of gemination in stanza 1 passes over into a moment of 
reflection, and the poet contrasts his own intellectual work with the 
general biological sphere of humanity. Subjective consciousness tran-
scends concrete moments of intersubjective experience. 
Riihrung was not formulated in its present sense until the eigh-
teenth century. Its original meaning is simply "motion," a denotation 
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that is especially infrequent today, although the German for "At ease!" 
is still Riihrt euch! Riihrung primarily means "with affect." In its broad-
est sense the verb riihren is related to the Latin movere and commovere 
or the English to move and to be moved. The advocate or politician tries 
to move the public, change its position, influence its action. The poet, 
who is "ohne Riihrung," not only lacks affect, 7 he has no desire to 
create an effect. 8 Not an actor in life, he is an observer, a voyeur. 
The poet looks on while the earth changes, but the earth's motion 
does not disturb him. The earth is the sphere of nature and (as it 
revolves) the sphere of history. The reference to the moving earth 
might well be read as an allusion to the Kusmitsch episode of Rilke's 
Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge. 9 Rilke's character Nikolaj Kus-
mitsch, having assumed he will probably live another fifty years, has 
decided to change his years into days, hours, minutes, even seconds, 
and has calculated the total. Though he tries to save time by rushing, 
he notices that at the end of each week there is nothing left of all his 
saving. As Kusmitsch senses time passing by, he feels the earth mov-
ing. He cannot tolerate this movement, so he decides to lie down and 
keep quiet: "Liegen und ruhig halten, hatte er einmal irgendwo gele-
sen. Und seither lag Nikolaj Kusmitsch" (161). Though he admires 
those who can bear "die Bewegung der Erde" (162), Kusmitsch him-
self wants to be as stable as possible. He finds his solution in the 
reciting of poetry. Though Rilke ironizes Kusmitsch's thoughts, Benn 
seriously adopts a similar stance as his own. Benn's poet is oblivious to 
the movement of the earth, and with poetry he would overcome the 
flux of change and becoming. 
The poet is not immersed, as are nature and history, in the dynamic 
decay and regeneration, the "Stirb und Werde" of Goethe's "Selige 
Sehnsucht," a poem that celebrates those who perish in flames. 10 
Goethe's "Stirb und Werde" implies integration into a greater life, an 
organic whole. Benn's poet withdraws from this broader sphere. He 
does not portray, as in "Trunkene Flut," a montage of historical reality. 
He does not move into a dynamic world that nonetheless includes a 
moment of duration; he remains in a realm of stability and stasis. One 
does not get the sense that the poet laments this loss of regeneration; 
on the contrary, he is content with absolute stasis. Goethe's Mut-
ter, who orchestrate "die ewige Metamorphose des irdischen Da-
seins, des Entstehens und Wachsens, des Zerstorens und Wiederbil-
dens" (Eckermann, 385), are no longer the heroines of Benn's poetry. 
Without completely denying a moment of origination to the poem 
(consider the implications of the word triichtig), Benn moves beyond 
Goethe and the dynamism of his own "Trunkene Flut." In an anti-
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Goethean passage of a letter to his friend F. W. Oelze, Benn writes: 
"Die Verwandlung ist das Gesetz des Lebens, die Erstarrung d.h. die 
Formwerdung das Gesetz des Geistes" (emphasis in the original, Oelze 
no. 88 [28 July 1936]). Instead of the content of dynamism, Benn 
stresses stasis. Instead of the rhythmic form of dynamism, he pre-
sents gnomic assertions. 
The word sieht surfaces twice in the final stanza. The poet not only 
sees the world decay, he is seen by perfection. The artwork has liberated 
itself from the subject. The poem, no longer a part of the poet's 
subjectivity, has an objective status. The poet looks indifferently at 
nature and history; he does not concern himself with the problems of 
the world, or of the individuals in it. The object, meanwhile-the 
artwork-seems to have more vitality and purpose than the poet. The 
poem is not only autonomous and active as its own subject, it is more 
powerful than the subject who created it. The moment is reminiscent 
of the poet in the age of idealism. Though Theo Meyer cites Novalis 
(330), the autonomy of the artwork for Novalis has less to do with 
stable perfection than with the romantic polyvalence of meaning that 
necessarily transcends the intentions of a work's creator. One would 
do better to think of Holderlin-for example, the poet's sacrifice in "An 
die Deutschen" (2:9-11), or the crisis of "Wie wenn am Feiertage" 
(2:118-20). The created poem is greater than the poet; and the poet, as 
in "Trunkene Flut," would gladly sacrifice himself for such perfec-
tion. 11 What looks quietly back at the poet is his poem, a creation of 
eternity; not the motion and strife of the world, but stillness. This 
stillness is an embodiment of artistic perfection. 
One is reminded of a passage in Hegel's Aesthetics where the philos-
opher, arguing for the unity of form and content, suggests that, if the 
eye is the window of the soul, then the great artwork turns every point 
of its surface into eyes, "zu einem tausendaugigen Argus, damit die 
innere Seele und Geistigkeit an alien Punkten gesehen werde" 
(13:203). The work of art looks out at its viewers as an organic being, 
revealing its inner essence. 12 The questioning of language and the 
awareness of ambiguity that we saw (at least momentarily) in "Trun-
kene Flut" disappear in this confident assertion of artistic realization 
and autonomy. Time is sublated-not in the Dionysian unconscious, 
as in "Trunkene Flut," but rather in the artwork itself. The stability of 
perfected form is the poet's answer to the dissolution and transforma-
tion that rule history: "Strome und Gegenstrome, Strebungen und 
Gegenstrebungen, nichts Sicheres, nichts Festes, wohin er blickt. In 
der Welt hat jeder und jedes recht, alles flielst, so sinke denn, man 
kann auch sagen steige ... alles hin und her, alles ambivalent. Dage-
20 "Wer allein ist-" 
gen erhebt sich sein inneres Gesetz. Er hat seinen Zwang sich auszu-
driicken, Gebilde zu schaffen" (GW, 4:436). The poet counters the 
contemporary breakdown of values and the chaotic senselessness of 
historical movements with ideal stillness, "Ruhe und Statik" (GW, 
4:436). 
The poem's rhymes suggest stasis as well. The poem does not move 
on as much as it returns to its earlier stages. The middle stanza, 
stressing repetition, even adds an initial rhyme: miichtig and triichtig. 
The rhymes are helpful for an interpretation of the poem's content and 
can be evaluated for their semantic similarities and dissimilarities. 
Geheimnis pairs with Keimnis but is also its opposite: the first is the 
sphere of stable poetic being, the second refers to the origins of the 
images of appearance. Flut and Glut bring us back to a common unity: 
they are the water and fire of Heraclitean flux. In the second stanza 
Schichtung and Vernichtung are juxtaposed as two forms of history: 
static culmination or preservation, and the decay that befalls individu-
als within the process of history. The contrast continues with the 
rhymes in lines two and four of the second stanza: the poet saves 
images, intellectually, while those who biologically unite will eventu-
ally pass away. The word paart thematizes what it does, even as 
it underscores the differences between poetic and worldly spheres. 
Since paart refers not only to mating but also to the poet's act of 
rhyming words, the poet is here transformed, perhaps unwittingly, 
into the context of human temporality. While the poet creates, he 
represents a principle of stillness (stanzas 1 and 2). After his creation 
he enters the sphere of human temporality (the transition to the final 
stanza); the poem alone would seem to stand still. In this last stanza 
Erde and Werde are united. The earthly realm is the realm of becoming. 
Meanwhile, "begann" and "Vollendung an" contrast, the first repre-
senting temporality, the second the timelessness of the poem. Origi-
nation passes over into perfection. While the a rhymes in the a b a b 
stanzas are unaccented, the b rhymes-including the final syllables of 
each stanza, and of course of the poem-are accented; this conveys, 
linguistically, a certain finality to the work. 
Not only its ending but the poem as a whole is formstill, static and 
permanent. The work almost passes over into silence; it does not 
speak, it sees. Though one may want to read this as a reference to 
the ineffable, it is more likely an allusion to the poem's wholeness. 
Seeing, unlike speaking, does not demand a narrative; it is immedi-
ately whole. Not only is our experience of the poem one of stillness, 
the poem itself embodies this quality. Benn counters the organic con-
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cept of the never-completed, fragmentary art of the Romantics (the 
"Nachstens mehr" of Hyperion, the "Stern-bald" of Tieck's Wanderun-
gen, etc.) with absolute poetry, in which all elements are final. 13 
Where the secondary meaning of Vollendung is "perfection," its prima-
ry denotation is "completion." In looking ahead to the etymological 
games of "Reisen" we can say that the fragmentary poetry of the 
Romantics, Faustian poetry if you will, is immersed in the infinite 
(anEt(!ov), whereas Benn's poetry of self-sufficient form and finality 
asserts and embraces the concept of a limit (ni(!ai;-). 14 As in Plato's 
Philebus (25b-27e), it is the limit that creates measure, balance, beauty. 
In dismissing from the perfected artwork any element of flux, Benn 
approximates the stance and rhetoric of Heraclitus's Eleatic counter-
part Parmenides, the philosopher of stable being. Indeed, Benn often 
refers to his art-as he does here only implicitly-as a closed, round, 
perfect, and resting sphere: "ich kenne namlich eine Sphare, die ohne 
diese Art von Beweglichkeit ist, eine Sphare, die ruht, die nie aufge-
hoben werden kann, die abschlieBt: die asthetische Sphare" (GW, 
4:159). One hears in the background the perfect and self-limiting 
repose of Parmenides' famous mpai(!a, 15 though Benn's sphere of 
stable and perfected being is exclusively the sphere of art. 16 
In German Klassik, where the ideal aesthetic form, like Benn's, calls 
for stillness, Ruhe and Vollendung are frequently intertwined. 17 Benn 
draws on this classical ideal of perfect stillness, voiced most famously 
by Winckelmann (20-21 ). Not only does he, like Winckelmann, elevate 
stillness to the forefront of aesthetics; in consequence, he also reestab-
lishes sculpture as an ideal form of art. 18 It would seem unlikely for a 
twentieth-century poet to view sculpture (or architecture) as an elevat-
ed art form when one considers the influence of Hegel's aesthetics, in 
which Hegel argues that poetry is the superior art form to the extent 
that its primary content is spirit. But one must remember that for the 
later Benn, poetry has no content; it is pure form. Moreover, one can 
view Benn's elevation of sculpture as a critique of postclassical aesthet-
ics, in which sculpture is disparaged for its alleged timelessness and 
association with historical-political indifference. For Heine, to take 
one of the earliest and most prominent examples, sculpture lacks 
temporality; the following passage documents his critique of Goethe's 
writings as a kind of apathetic sculpture: "Sie [die Goetheschen Mei-
sterwerke] zieren unser teueres Vaterland, wie schone Statuen einen 
Garten zieren, aber es sind Statuen. Man kann sich darin verlieben, 
aber sie sind unfruchtbar" (3:395). Benn, who stands opposed to the 
liberal inheritors of Heine's position, returns to what he sees as classi-
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cism's embrace of timelessness and autonomy in art, and he does so 
by transforming poetry into a kind of sculpture. Benn, however, mod-
ulates the classical concept of aesthetic stillness in three ways: first, he 
idealizes, not the heroes or gods embodied in sculpture, but beautiful-
ly crafted and stable stone as such-a "Marmorstufe," for example 
(GW, 2:346); second, he replaces dynamic stillness with an increas-
ingly constructed and static stillness; and third, he suggests that the 
stillness of art is not the sensuous portrayal of the absolute, but the 
absolute itself. 
4. "Statische Gedichte" 
Statische Gedichte 
Entwicklungsfremdheit 
ist die Tiefe des Weisen, 
Kinder und Kindeskinder 
beunruhigen ihn nicht, 
dringen nicht in ihn ein. 
Richtungen vertreten, 
Handeln, 
Zu- und Abreisen 
ist das Zeichen einer Welt, 
die nicht klar sieht. 
Vor meinem Fenster 
-sagt der Weise-
liegt ein Tal, 
darin sammeln sich die Schatten, 
zwei Pappeln saumen einen Weg, 
du weiBt-wohin. 
Perspektivismus 





auch Schwarme, Krahen, 
auswerfen in Winterrot von Friihhimmeln, 
dann sinken lassen-
du weifst-fi.ir wen. 
(CW, 3:236) 
The poem "Statische Gedichte" (1944) opens with the unusual word 
"Entwicklungsfremdheit." Benn associates the wisdom of the sage not 
with disdain for development but with imperviousness to it. 1 The 
poem conflates the poet and the wise man of Stoic philosophy: both 
incorporate the virtues of ami0sw ("absence of passion"), draQa;ia 
("unperturbedness"), and avUXQXeta ("independence"). The sage, in 
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Benn's reading, is indifferent to the social and communal order, which 
seems to concern itself with insignificant affairs. In the reference to 
children and children's children Benn associates development-as 
he did in "Wer allein ist-"-with the material sphere of biological 
reproduction. While the intellect remains static, the material world 
changes. The repetition in the phrase "Kinder und Kindeskinder" 
implies, however, that this change and apparent development might 
easily be reduced to continuation of the same. Traditionally, children 
are symbols of original innocence and future greatness. In the three 
metamorphoses of Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra children rep-
resent motion, a new beginning, a yes to life (2:293-94). The sage, by 
being impervious to children, is beyond not only the material but also 
the temporal world. 2 Development and the setting of goals, be they 
valid or invalid, do not interest him, nor do the intersubjective rela-
tions that result in children. Material, evolutionary, and intersubjec-
tive concerns appear shallow in comparison with the depth of the 
sage's own singularly ahistorical and asocial wisdom. 
In the second strophe stillness is not just a psychological ideal but 
an epistemological one as well. The wise man knows; he sees clearly. 
The world that fails to achieve such wisdom is represented, first, by 
the adoption of positions-battling for one side against another; sec-
ond, by action-doing one thing and necessarily not doing another; 
and third, by travel-literally, from here to there and back, and figura-
tively, through the development of time. The modern world is in 
motion and desirous of ends; it undergoes constant metamorphosis 
and believes in progress. "Richtungen vertreten" suggests, in general, 
a firm concern with goals; and in particular, active participation in the 
political process. The world that fails to see clearly is embroiled in 
finite, political clashes. The sage's stillness and imperviousness to 
progress preclude all action, which to him must appear mindless, 
directionless, and meaningless. 
The twentieth-century negation of intellect and glorification of those 
secondary virtues such as discipline, loyalty, and sacrifice which help 
bring about concrete results in history originated in part from the 
sense that intellect-specifically, a Nietzschean intellect-serves to 
undermine the validity of all values, such that we must either avoid 
reason and embrace primitive life or acknowledge that insofar as all 
actions are equally invalid they also become, in a perverse sense, 
equally legitimate. 3 Both positions helped pave the way for the na-
tional socialist elevation of action. In addition, socioeconomic and 
political factors conduced to the twentieth-century distrust of intellect: 
population growth and rapid urbanization, increasing industrializa-
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tion, world war and national humiliation, a series of devastating eco-
nomic crises, the chaos of a democracy unable to protect itself, all 
undermined the German's faith in an intellectually ordered and stable 
world. The resulting tendencies were either blind activism-the sense 
that one can will a new order-or withdrawal, the desire to isolate 
oneself from historical upheaval and disarray. 4 Benn, in distancing 
himself from the national socialist option, abandons activism entirely: 
"Nur nicht handeln! Wisse das und schweige. Asien ist tiefer" (GW, 
2:151). 5 It is a long way from Fichte's optimistic "Handeln! Handeln! 
das ist es, wozu wir da sind" (6:345) to Benn's withdrawal from a 
world in which action can mean only the perversion of intellect. Benn 
rejects Western culture's embrace of development and glorification of 
action for the depth and stability of wisdom-Asiatic or Stoic.6 In his 
abandonment of goals the poet dismisses all responsibility for the 
course of the world. The transformation of ideas into action is not only 
undesirable, it is impossible: "Verwirklichung von Geist im Leben ist 
nicht mehr" (GW, 2:145). Benn admits of no absolute truths for which 
he would sacrifice his idyllic existence. All positions relativize each 
other, except of course the sage's recognition of this relativism and his 
insight into the futility of all action. 7 Reminiscent of the passive ob-
server and poet depicted in "Wer allein ist-" and of the disconcern 
for history in "Statische Gedichte" is the passage of Benn's radio 
dialogue "Konnen Dichter die Welt iindern?" in which he states that 
the poet "sieht zu, der weils, dais der schuldlose Jammer der Welt 
niemals <lurch Fiirsorgemalsnahmen behoben, niemals <lurch materi-
elle Verbesserungen iiberwunden werden kann" (GW, 4:216-17). 
There is a complex, even contradictory, tension in "Statische Ge-
dichte" between the fatalist suggestion that history cannot and should 
not be altered and the poem's unambiguous critique of a particular 
view of history and implicit call for change, albeit change in the direc-
tion of stillness. Benn does not just proffer a general critique of en-
lightenment optimism and modern disorientation, he directs his com-
ments quite specifically at the national socialist Bewegung. "Statische 
Gedichte" counters the National Socialists' condemnation of Statik, 
their antiintellectualism, their elevation of heroic action and historical 
destiny along with their exaltation of the collective, of youth, and of 
the future. The poem is not just an open-ended affirmation of with-
drawal and negation of history; it endorses withdrawal as the nega-
tion of a particular moment in history. I will not marshal detailed 
evidence for this historical reading of the poem until my later section 
on "Statik and Inner Emigration": in part because the evidence is 
multifarious and would take us on too long a digression, in part 
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because the connection between stasis and the critique of national 
socialist ideology illuminates more than this one poem alone. At this 
point I would merely suggest that stasis implies not only an abandon-
ment of history and a negation of change but also the negation of a 
particular form of history-namely, the national socialist elevation of 
change, action, and movement. As such, it is a call for change in the 
direction of all that is anathema to change. 
Before we return to a detailed reading of the poem, we might briefly 
consider another tension, though I view this tension as paradoxical, 
rather than contradictory: the tension between the poem's rootedness 
in history and its timeless references to action, development, and 
wisdom. This timeless element invites one to read the poem indepen-
dently of its historical origins, which can in part be done-first, be-
cause the poem's abstractions encourage it; and second, because the 
poem's reaction to, and critique of, the historical present conduce to 
an evocation of the timeless. The poem, as we shall see, is both 
transcendent and contingent. 
In German letters, travel is often linked with education-as, for 
example, in the concept of a Bildungsreise. Travel implies an encounter 
with the particularities of different cultures, with historical traditions. 
The sage, in contrast, would learn by turning his gaze inward. In true 
Stoic fashion (more on this later) the sage prefers to rest at home and 
travel only in his mind. He lives in the country, not the bustling city. 
His window overlooks a valley, an idyllic image of contentment. Al-
ready the view from the window suggests a narrowing of perspective, 
"einen Ausschnitt aus dem Leben," to cite a parallel formulation of 
Benn's (B, 36). The valley, the shadows, and the poplar trees evoke 
images of the locus amoenus. Shadows, particularly of the poplar tree, 
are a frequent topos of idyllic poetry-as, for example, in Vergil's 
Georgics, Horace's second Epode, Opitz's "Lob des Feldtlebens," or 
Holderlin's "Andenken" (2:188-89). The poet seems less concerned 
with the direction of the path (its Richtung) than with its having a 
border. The image of a beautiful spot for contemplation and inspira-
tion unites the tradition of psychological-moral Gemutsruhe with aes-
thetic stillness: by removing himself from the distractions and vices of 
the city, the poet can find the repose and centeredness necessary for 
creation. The valley suggests both depth and fertility of mind. The 
path, which leads to no determinate destination, evokes images of 
idyllic stillness. It is not the path to some heroic endeavor that would 
take the self out of its solitude. The reference to a wohin-one that is 
never answered, never given specificity-is conceivably ironic. The 
path simply encircles the valley, and the stanza's vision is atemporal. 
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But there is a secondary reading of these lines. Perhaps the poet is 
not immersed in the valley but rather looks down on it from the 
heights of his insight. The shadows, no longer idyllic, become the 
negative principle opposed to his enlightenment. Filled with shad-
ows, the valley resembles the depths of Plato's cave. What the poet 
seeks is not the shadows but the essence, not the ephemeral but the 
eternal. In this reading of Plato and his doctrine of dv6.µvrJm~, 8 Benn 
can exhibit his lack of concern for the historical. The path is now 
headed downward, perhaps to death, the ultimate image of tran-
sience (and, in a sense, of stasis as well). One remembers that in 
antiquity the leaves of the poplar tree were used to cloak the dead. 9 
The nonanswer to the question of where the path leads might be said 
to support both readings, but a look at parallel passages lends still 
further support to the second reading. In three poems, "Entwurzelun-
gen" (GW, 3:118), "Epilog 1949" (GW, 3:345), and "Die Heimat nie-" 
(GW, 3:411), the phrase "Du weilst" is a gravestone epitaph and signi-
fies knowledge of death. The Ruhe of the valley becomes a kind of 
graveyard stillness. The poet knows the futility not only of action 
but of all life that is not centered on the locus of eternity: wisdom 
and poetry. What unites the divergent readings is the concept of limit 
or perspective. The limit in the first reading is spatial; the idyllic 
horizon enhances reflection. In the second reading the limit is tempo-
ral; awareness of death implies knowledge of the transiency of all life, 
and thus encourages focused reflection on what is eternal. 
Perspectivism is a Nietzschean word, 10 and Benn's poem contains 
much that reminds the reader of Nietzsche. The connection between 
stillness and wisdom recalls Nietzsche's description of Apollo's "weis-
heitsvolle Ruhe" (1:23). Moreover, the poet's disinterest in history 
makes his postion a combination of what the early Nietzsche calls 
the unhistorical and the suprahistorical:11 while the unhistorical 
individual simply lives with a limited horizon, the suprahistorical 
individual looks away from progress and focuses on what gives en-
durance to life, above all, art. 12 The poet wants to return to the perma-
nence he associates with art. The sage, who lives quietly, sees clearly, 
has wisdom-so too the poet, the artist. For Benn, in fact, art alone 
assumes the position of purveyor of the absolute, which for Hegel 
belonged in ascending order to art, religion, and philosophy, and 
which for the early Nietzsche still encompassed art and religion. In 
Weinhaus Wolf Benn contrasts persons of action and persons of depth; 
the latter are not philosophers but artists (GW, 2:139). The philosophi-
cal world of the philosopher has been subsumed under the guise of 
aesthetics. The wise man is the poet. 
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Nietzsche's perspectivism, associated less with stable truth than 
with motion and the shifting of values, teaches the relativity of all 
perspectives. Our positions are illusions and might at any moment 
easily be different. Perspectivism suggests that truth can be reduced 
to arbitrary moments of our own subjectivity and historicity. Indeed, 
Nietzsche encourages us to continually overcome our current per-
spectives in the name of vitality and change. Benn's perspectivism still 
implies the illusory nature of finite truth ("Richtungen vertreten," 
etc.), but his position nonetheless differs from Nietzsche's. Benn sug-
gests that we abandon the fluctuating truths that rule our lives and 
turn to the one locus of stability: poetic wisdom. With his allusion to 
perspectivism he would place the poet, not in the tradition of Nietz-
schean relativism and flux, but rather in the much older, less apparent 
tradition of perspective as the representation of reality (and truth), 
even from a point of limited and stationary orientation. 13 The sage or 
poet sees what is essential; what is not essential recedes from the eye, 
diminishing in size and importance. 
The poet draws contours out of his own self "nach Rankengesetz": 
he carefully lays out and plots the borders of his existence, extending 
them like tendrils or feelers, in a circular fashion. Out of the kernel of 
his self, which might again be said to include the various Schichtungen 
of mankind, he is forming words that will express and envelop this 
kernel. Where "Linien anlegen" and "sie weiterfiihren" imply careful, 
constructive work, "Ranken spriihen" suggests a less conscious, more 
inspirational moment. 14 Benn italicizes the seemingly neglected mo-
ment of inspiration. The poem is not the mapping out of logical 
categories recognized by the sage; it is an aesthetic construct. If in 
"Trunkene Flut" stillness was veiled behind a comprehensive dyna-
mism, in "Statische Gedichte" it is movement ("Ranken spriihen") 
that takes a subordinate, if still legitimate, position in relation to an 
overarching stasis. Construction and inspiration overlap not only in 
the creation of the poem but also in the poet's specific use of the 
metaphor Ranken. With its envelopment of construction and sponta-
neity as well as its circularity, Ranken implies self-sufficiency and 
wholeness. 15 The poet sprays his tendrils, runners, climbers, shoots, 
then lets them fall. He has made a poem. One is reminded of Benn's 
well-known formulation: "Kunst ist der gelungene Ausgleich zwi-
schen Zentrum und Peripherie" (B, 104). The poem is dynamic (note 
the five verbs of motion in this stanza), but also centripetal. 
The poet's circular motion ends with a product that would tran-
scend time. Unlike the philosopher Nietzsche with his desire to ex-
press a will that serves life, Benn adopts a perspectivism that would 
enable him to transcend life. 16 Another turn away from Nietzsche 
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comes in the poet's use of the word Kriihen, a central image in 
Nietzsche's well-known poem "Vereinsamt," from which Benn quotes 
in other contexts. 17 The third stanza of Nietzsche's poem reads: 
Die Welt-ein Tor 
Zu tausend Wiisten stumm und kalt! 
Wer das verlor, 
Was du verlorst, macht nirgends Halt. 
The poem concludes with an image of depravity, the loss of stability, 
orientation, and community: 
Die Krahen schrein 
Und ziehen schwirren Flugs zur Stadt: 
Bald wird es schneien,-
Weh dem, der keine Heimat hat! 
For Benn, the poet is just as impervious to degeneration as he is to 
development. The sage's solitude, his lack of a home in the world, 
seems not to threaten his existence; on the contrary. In a further 
reversal of Nietzsche's model, the crows are let out and they return. 
There is in "Statische Gedichte" neither progress nor decay. Disregard 
for progress and temporality is further expressed through the juxtapo-
sition of Winterrot, implying death and decay, and Friihhimmeln, a 
suggestion of dawn and new adventure. The two images cancel one 
another. The poem invites us to think, not of linear development, 
whether progressive or regressive, but of the images of return and 
stasis, roundedness. The poem rejects the apparent linearity of the 
person of action and history and replaces it with circularity and depth, 
concepts that Benn frequently links. 18 
"Statische Gedichte" concludes with words that return the reader to 
the poem's center: "du weiBt." The formal structure of repetition and 
return parallels the poem's disregard for progress. The final "fur wen" 
echoes the ambiguous "wohin." The one person recognized as knowl-
edgeable is of course the poet or sage. The poem, then, is directed not 
outward-it has no sense of other or of history-but back toward its 
creator. The phrase "sinken lassen" suggests movement directed not 
historically downward but privately inward. 19 The "du" in "du weiBt" 
is the wise poet, as is the seemingly nebulous "wen." The poet is his 
own audience. He can reach for the heavens ("Friihhimmeln"), but he 
would do so only for himself. Almost as if commenting on this poem's 
narrowing of perspective and its element of closure, Benn writes in 
Doppelleben: "der Kreis ist in mir beschlossen, ich blicke nicht iiber 
mich hinaus" (GW, 4:166). 20 
5. "Reisen" 
Reisen 
Meinen Sie Zurich zum Beispiel 
sei eine tiefere Stadt, 
wo man Wunder und Weihen 
immer als Inhalt hat? 
Meinen Sie, aus Habana, 
weill und hibiskusrot, 
brache ein ewiges Manna 
fur Ihre Wiistennot? 
BahnhofstraBen und Rueen, 
Boulevards, Lidos, Laan-
selbst auf den Fifth Avenueen 
fa.lit Sie die Leere an-
Ach, vergeblich das Fahren! 
Spat erst erfahren Sie sich: 
bleiben und stille bewahren 
das sich umgrenzende lch. 
(GW, 3:327) 
"Reisen" (1950) opens with two questions addressed to a stranger or 
group of strangers. Wunder and Weihen directly refer to the wonders of 
travel, but they derive from a religious realm; travel and religion are 
mutually undermined as forms of diversion that take attention away 
from the self. The second stanza continues the critique of religion and 
travel. The two adjectives weifi and hibiskusrot are placed after the 
noun they modify. The syntax, together with the stark and increasing-
ly intense contrast between accented and unaccented syllables, con-
veys to the reader that the speaker is quickly moving toward an 
answer. 1 Manna, the food God gave the people of Israel, is trans-
formed into a twentieth-century context: the modern self hungers for 
the exotic as a filler for the emptiness of the self. The poetic "you" 
would leave, not the desert of Egypt, but the Wustennot of the psyche. 
The goal is not a religious pilgrimage but its modern counterpart, a 
tourist's travels to famous and exotic lands. Manna, relieved of its 
transcendent implications, becomes purely material-something for 
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the physical, not the psychic, self. 2 Though the poet might seem to 
abandon religion with his ironization of Wunder, Weihen, and Manna, 
the word Wiiste returns him to a religious context, to the tradition of 
German mysticism. 
In Nietzsche's poem "Vereinsamt," quoted in the previous chapter, 
we saw that Waste implies the emptiness of a subject at loss in a world 
that is void of intellectual nourishment or stability. Wiiste, however, 
has another, positive meaning. Meister Eckhart calls the center of the 
soul into which the Godhead enters a "wueste" :3 "Dirre vunke ... 
wil in den einvaltigen grunt, in die stillen wueste, da nie underscheit 
ingeluogete weder vater noch sun noch heiliger geist . . . dirre grunt 
ist ein einvaltic stille, diu in ir selben unbewegelich ist, und von dirre 
unbewegelicheit werdent beweget alliu dine" (DW, 2:419-21). Benn 
was familiar with this mystical reading of the word Wiiste. In Der 
Ptolemiier he specifically refers to Eckhart and his concept of "die 'stille 
Wuste der Gottheit'" (GW, 2:222).4 Angelus Silesius, who also stands 
in the tradition of German mysticism, likewise describes the God-
head (and ideal soul) as a desert: "Jch mufs noch Ober GOtt in eine 
wt'.iste ziehn" (1:7). For the mystics, the stillness or emptiness of the 
desert soul is a necessary condition for union with God and ultimate 
self-fulfillment. In this stillness God speaks to us. Eckhart writes: "In 
der stille und in der ruowe . . . da sprichet got in die sele und sprichet 
sich alzemale in die sele" (DW, 1:317); and in another passage he 
asserts: "ibi est quies et silentium, ubi pater loquitur verbum" ("there 
is quiet and silence, where the Father speaks the word" [LW, 4:228, my 
translation]). 5 Travel and tradition lead away from the self; rooted-
ness, mysticism, and stillness lead back to the self. In his "Epilog 
und lyrisches Ich" Benn writes of his own strong desire for a desert, 
which, however, is not available to him through travel: "immer wieder 
... ging ich auf Reisen, immer wieder mufste ich zuruck, da ich in 
Europa keine Wuste £and" (GW, 4:10). The "you" in the poem is being 
challenged in regard to the belief that an exploration of the depths 
and wonders of life requires a confrontation with the unusual, the 
exotic, the distant. By emptying out of the self all false concerns and 
leaving only a desert, the self is ready to receive truth. In Benn's 
"Verlorenes Ich," the self loses itself in a world of objectivity, exter-
nality, and technology, a realm from which religion and mystical 
meaning have disappeared; in "Reisen" the self comes to itself and its 
mystical dimensions by isolating a sphere of private, subjective, spiri-
tual enclosure. 
Though the poem objects to literal travel, it does evoke a kind of 
intellectual journey. Zurich and Havana might initially be viewed as 
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parallel: both travel destinations, they are introduced with religious 
rhetoric; each is associated, directly or indirectly, with red and white 
imagery; and finally, each gives a nonanswer to the dilemmas of the 
modem self. Reflection on the two cities tells us only what the poet 
is not offering as a solution. The two stanzas present us with a mes-
sage ex negativo, or a via negationis. In this sense the travel-motif is 
reinvoked, as a journey of the mind, a dominant structure in the 
mystic tradition-as, for example, in Bonaventure's Itinerarium Mentis 
in Deum. Counseling against distractions and concupiscence, Bona-
venture, like Benn, asks the reader to enter into the self as a means by 
which to reach stillness and immutability. Benn of course stops at the 
self and does not pass beyond it, as does a religious thinker like 
Bonaventure. For Bonaventure, God is center and circumference; for 
Benn, center and circumference are occupied by the self-limiting sub-
ject. Benn's journey is secularized and could be described as an in-
ward path that avoids not only dispersive travel but also what is 
associated with religious spirituality and exotic sensuality. 
Zurich and Havana, though in many respects parallel, can also be 
viewed as opposites. The religious rhetoric of the first stanza serves to 
reawaken for the listener the religious associations of Zurich, namely 
Zwingli and Calvinism. 6 In contrast, Havana, with its tropical climate, 
evokes a world of the flesh. 7 This association is reinforced by the 
inversion of Manna as well as by the term hibiskusrot, which has decid-
edly sensual and sexual implications. Neither religious spiritualism, 
as evoked by the older city, Zurich, nor sensual materialism, associat-
ed with the newer city, Havana, is Benn's answer. Rather, the poem 
endorses secularized reflection on the locus of the self, as developed 
by the modern prophet, the poet. The two cities and their associations 
are introduced, no less than the religious rhetoric, only to be discard-
ed and overcome. 
Since every element in a poem should be weighed for its potential 
meaning, 8 one is tempted to pursue in greater detail the question, 
Why Zurich?9 Several hypotheses beyond the religious associations 
come to mind. Zurich is located in a neutral country, where, it is easy 
to imagine, everything must be in harmony. The references to depth 
and wonder may evoke Zurich as the city of Carl Jung. In addition, 
Zurich has the most famous of all Bahnhofstraj3en, and it is the city of 
the new and outrageous, the Dada movement. Though the poem as 
poem invites these kinds of associations, the particular context would 
seem to undermine such a search. First, Zurich is hardly an ideal: it 
does not represent depth or create wonder, it only appears to do so; 
the Bahnhofstraj3en are seen to be insignificant. Many cities fail to give 
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the self precisely what Zurich cannot offer; one recalls the simple but 
telling words "zum Beispiel." Second, the thrust of the first two stan-
zas is toward the arbitrariness of the tourist's travels; the selection of 
Zurich may mirror this process. In fact if Zurich were chosen because 
of Dada, the choice would appear contradictory: Dada is ruled by the 
laws of chance. Finally, the rhythm of the poem takes us from the 
arbitrary content of travel to the poet's affirmation of the self; "Zur-
ich" finds its truth in the poem's final word, "lch." This reading of 
Zurich suggests that the city was selected not only because of the 
above associations, and not only because it contains the word Ich and 
thus allows for a playful association with the self, but also because the 
city contrasts with-and veils, even as it contains--the self. In Ger-
man "Zurich" is written "Zurich": it is thus twice removed from the 
self-first, by way of the wrong gender, and second, by way of the 
umlaut. Even from a linguistic standpoint, travel does not lead "to-
ward the self." The poet's choice of Zurich, the one city that ends with 
"ich," appears, like much in Benn, above all formal. However, the 
play on "Ziir-ich," along with the earlier connections, does reveal that 
the choice is meaningful; it becomes in a complex way both arbitrary 
and significant. 
Though the poem affirms the private stillness of the self, it does not 
suggest that one leave the restless city for its other-for, let's say, the 
country. The poem differs in this way from "Statische Gedichte," at 
least from a particular reading of that poem. 10 If disorientation were 
restricted to city life, one could travel to the country or to foreign 
lands, to Cuba, for example, and escape chaos; but "Reisen" under-
mines this option. The city's restlessness serves as a metaphor for the 
general disorientation of modern individuals, who, independent of 
location, have no objective structure-no "-ism," as it were-to guide 
their lives. The Nietzschean sense of Wiiste, though overridden by our 
primary reading, is still apparent. The modern self, in its Wiistennot, is 
at the juncture of meaninglessness and self-realization. While the 
poem seems to open with a series of gestures to the world, the first 
two stanzas serve mainly to bring us back to our own selves. What is 
significant is not the geography or history of the world, not its spiritu-
al or sensual attractions, but the solitude and strength of the indi-
vidual. Though "Reisen" may be said to counter the affirmation of 
idyllic existence in "Statische Gedichte," this later poem nonetheless 
upholds Benn's view of perspectivism as knowledge located in the 
subject's particular view of the world. 
In the third stanza motion becomes ever more hectic. Streets are 
named in languages from around the world. 11 The poet, while appar-
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ently not speaking from extensive experience (the reliability of which 
is undermined in the course of the poem), nonetheless seems to imply 
that his message is somehow universal. Within this motion, confu-
sion, and mass of people-the streets named are for the most part 
busy ones: Bahnhofstrafien, for example, which suggest even further 
travel, and Fifth Avenues-there is emptiness. 12 Even in the world's 
liveliest city the void is present. The lack of direction-the sequence 
seems random-must be read symbolically, ideologically. Motion cre-
ates a chaotic emptiness, and this void not only threatens and invades 
the self ("fa.Ht Sie die Leere an"), it seems to crash in upon the stro-
phe.13 The poet implies-almost in the language of contemporary 
existentialism-that instead of diffusing one's attention and experi-
encing a flood of images, it is necessary to concentrate on the stillness 
of one's own conscience or consciousness and listen to the desert or 
nothingness of the self before reaching an awareness of authentic 
selfhood. Negating both travel and the contemporary tendency to 
occupy oneself with whatever is current, Benn writes in another con-
text: "wer mit der Zeit mitlauft, wird von ihr iiberrannt, aber wer 
stillsteht, auf den kommen die Dinge zu" (GW, 1:428). 14 Stillness 
brings an emptiness from which the self surfaces intact and in which 
meaning, however mysterious, is revealed: "Die Leere ist wohl auch 
von jenen Gaben, / in denen sich der Dunkle offenbart" (GW, 3:252). 
By conceiving of travel as a failed attempt to flee from the self, 
Benn again aligns himself with Stoic tradition. As Seneca said of the 
wealthy Romans who took trips in order to escape their problems, the 
psychic self always travels along with the physical self. 15 In his twen-
ty-eighth letter Seneca writes that one needs "a change of character, 
not climate": "How can novelty of surroundings abroad and becoming 
acquainted with foreign scenes or cities be of any help? All that dash-
ing about turns out to be quite futile. And if you want to know why all 
this running away cannot help you, the answer is simply this: you are 
running away in your own company. You have to lay aside the load on 
your spirit. Until you do that, nowhere will satisfy you."16 In his 104th 
letter Seneca adds that the sights of exotic places hold our attention 
only momentarily, much as children wonder at the unfamiliar. In the 
long run the motion of travel only increases the restlessness of a 
troubled mind: 
What good has travel of itself ever been able to do anyone? ... 
All it has ever done is distract us for a little while, through the 
novelty of our surroundings, like children fascinated by some-
thing they haven't come across before. The instability, moreover, 
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of a mind which is seriously unwell, is aggravated by it, the 
motion itself increasing the fitfulness and restlessness. This ex-
plains why people, after setting out for a place with the greatest 
enthusiasm, are often more enthusiastic about getting away from 
it; like migrant birds, they fly on, away even quicker than they 
came.17 
In both Seneca's reading and Benn's, problems cannot be overcome 
through travel, through merely physical change. 
The last stanza unambiguously states what the slightly ironic tone 
and the increasingly intense questioning have implied: travel and 
experience are of no help to the individual seeking identity; one must 
look inward. The poem addresses not an intimate du but a distanced 
Sie. The Sie conveys depersonalization and lack of involvement; it 
signifies a break from the tradition of Erlebnislyrik, with its stress on 
intersubjective relations and the self's desire to experience the world. 
The distance created by the use of Sie corresponds to the poem's 
message: create a border between self and world so that you can 
reflect on the self. "Reisen" appears as a poem of distance, not intima-
cy. Toward the end of the poem, however, the tone shifts: with the 
word "Ach" the poet abandons any pretense of poetic indifference 
toward the issue at hand. 18 The use of "Ach" has an additional pur-
pose: it invites the reader to compare "Reisen" with another famous 
poem on travel, Eichendorff's "Sehnsucht," in which we find at the 
close of the first stanza the suggestive lines, ''Ach, wer da mitreisen 
konnte / In der prachtigen Sommernacht" (21). 19 The Romantic long-
ing for the unity of self and world, the enchanting idea of exotic, 
meaningful travel is broken by Benn, who suggests, rather than 
movement into the world, a stationary and self-sufficient closure. 
Benn's elegiac ''Ach" refers not to lost travel but to time lost through 
travel. 
In this final stanza Benn sets up a series of etymological relations. 
Travel ("Fahren") and experience ("Erfahren") are juxtaposed. Origi-
nally, to experience the world meant not simply to perceive or become 
aware of the world but to travel. Benn implies that the etymology 
reveals an error in world view. Travel has little to do with true experi-
ence. 20 One frequently associates a frontier or Grenze with travel. 
Odysseus, for example, traveled to the outer limits of the world. Benn 
counters with the concept of a self-limiting subject: "das sich umgren-
zende Ich." The Grenze becomes not the frontier of outer lands, but the 
limits and properties of one's own self. The self comes to itself through 
the recognition of its own limit (niQa~), not through travel and experi-
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ence (eµnn(!ia.); the poem's etymological play is not restricted to Ger-
man. As in the early cultural criticism of the Ronne stories, here too 
the empirical world, the world of collecting experiences and facts, the 
world of pure activity, lacks meaning. 21 The self's recognition of this 
comes late-presumably when external circumstances, rather than 
inner awareness, bring the self out of a world of dispersion and travel 
and toward solitude and reflection. Typical of Benn's disdain for ac-
tion, the last two lines of the poem avoid the use of the finite verb. 
Benn's position vis-a-vis travel is not unique, even within the Ger-
man tradition. Adalbert Stifter, the most diligent of nineteenth-cen-
tury spokesmen for stillness, lets the hero of his novel Der Nachsommer 
come to himself-and the reader to his name-not after extended 
travels to remote parts of the continent, but after repeated visits to a 
single location. The narrator treats Heinrich Drendorf's eventual Bil-
dungsreise in just two paragraphs of a novel that lasts a good 700 
pages. 22 Heinrich's development unfolds in an almost still-life atmo-
sphere. 23 The narrative technique of circling back to elements previ-
ously introduced and presenting them in ever-new light, rather than 
racing on to novel adventures, reinforces this point, as does the 
work's self-reflexive elevation of aesthetic stillness, particularly in Ri-
sach's discussion of the marble statue. 24 Benn was of course familiar 
with Stifter's text. 25 
Any poem in German literature that ends with the word "lch" 
invites comparison with Goethe's "Prometheus" (1:44-46). Benn's 
"lch" is not the powerful and outwardly rebellious self of Goethe's 
poem, but he is a rebel: first, against religion, insofar as it directs our 
attention away from the self and toward the otherworldly or the after-
life; and second, against the modern enthusiasm for motion, travel, 
and materialism. Benn's ego embraces restrictions and finite limits; 
not so Prometheus, whose concept of self encompasses the entire 
earth. The poetic rhythm mirrors this deviation from the Titanism of 
Goethe's poem: the metric stress lies not with the self but with the 
concept of a limit. The Grenze, however, is conveyed in a slightly 
ambiguous light. It may be a strong marker that confidently asserts 
the stability of the self, or it may be a defensive border, a mode of 
escapist withdrawal. For Seneca the self that is at peace with itself 
does not seek travel but nonetheless remains tranquil even when it 
finds itself in the busiest of surroundings: "Could there be a scene of 
greater turmoil than the Forum? Yet even there, if need be, you are 
free to lead a life of peace."26 Benn's self, on the other hand, seems to 
require a physical distance from the world. The ambiguity of the 
limit-a self-assertive marker, or a defense mechanism-is left open. 
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While the poem's apodictic tone seems to speak for the first reading, 
the context and lack of assertive stress in the particular line open up 
the second reading. 27 The nonresolution of the ambiguity implies that 
the multiplicity of readings must be preserved and viewed together on 
a higher level: perhaps the poet is himself unsure of his strength, 
perhaps he is so withdrawn that the reader is by necessity unable to 
determine the exact contours of his self. Either way, it is clear that 
Benn's ego is no longer the dynamic "Ich" of Goethe's poem, 28 nor as 
in Greek mythology the servant of mankind; he is tranquil and with-
drawn. 29 The tone of the poem, clear and confident but subdued, 
the poem, clear and confident but subdued, confirms this point. 
Like Prometheus, the poet is a creator. Just as the eighteenth cen-
tury regarded the poet-in Shaftesbury's famous phrase-as a "sec-
ond Maker; a just Prometheus under Jove" (1:136), so is Benn's poet a 
second god-not, however, in the tradition of the dynamic Prome-
theus, but rather in the tradition of Aristotle's unmoved mover. 30 
While all around the poet the world is in motion, he himself is still: 
"bleiben und stille bewahren." The poet is a god not so much in his 
productivity as in his stillness and self-suffiency. In "Trunkene Flut" 
the poet also takes on the role of a god: like Christ, he is a great 
sufferer; in "Reisen," the god is not Christian but Aristotelian, 31 and 
he is characterized by repose and constancy, not suffering and sacri-
fice. Aristotle's god is contemplative, not active; while objects around 
him move, he himself remains motionless. The only motion the poet 
admits is a·motion-the creation of his poem-that does not disturb 
his inner peace; moreover, he is in need of nothing outside himself. 32 
By stressing the proximity of god and poet, of religious and aesthetic 
self, Benn unites in this poem the two traditions of religious stillness 
(Aristotelian and mystical) with the concept of aesthetic stillness, just 
as in "Statische Gedichte" he combines Stoic and aesthetic stillness. 
The last line of each stanza is interesting. The first stanza invites 
speculation as to the content of travel to a foreign city. The middle two 
stanzas introduce two words for emptiness, Wiistennot and Leere. Only 
in the last stanza is a positive category explicitly invoked. The linear 
movement of travel, represented in the first three stanzas, leads no-
where. The stillness and stability of the self, on the other hand, ex-
pressed in the circular imagery of umgrenzen, lead to self-fulfillment. 
The equation of stillness and circularity, with which we first became 
familiar in our analysis of "Trunkene Flut," has become an image of 
not only the excellent poem but also the authentic self. 33 The negation 
of linear thought in "Reisen" is complemented by the return to earlier 
world views: in particular, the Stoic and mystic stilling of outward 
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activity, and in general, the anti-Faustian embrace of limits. 34 When 
Benn writes that his "Statische Gedichte" are "anti-faustisch" (DD, 
93), he implies, at least in part, that they take us back to the Apollinian 
or Greek principle of the limit, with which Oswald Spengler contrasts 
the modern, Faustian world of the infinite. 35 
6. Statik and Inner Emigration 
At the beginning of this study I mentioned my desire to focus on a side 
of Benn's poetry less known than his shocking and innovative early 
works, namely his movement toward a concept of formal balance and 
stillness. I would like to analyze this side of Benn from another angle 
and illuminate a dimension of his poetry that 'readers of German 
literature have consistently overlooked. Nonspecialists, even German 
scholars, are more likely to know that Benn openly supported the 
e~rly national socialist regime than that his poetry of the late thirties 
and early forties might be viewed as a form of inner emigration. 1 
Benn's association with nazism is a biographical fact, evidenced in 
part by his writings from the first year and a half after Hitler's assump-
tion of power-above all, by his two radio broadcasts "Der neue Staat 
und die Intellektuellen" and ''Antwort an die literarischen Emigran-
ten." The issue of Benn's relationship to nazism has been analyzed 
most thoroughly by Reinhard Alter, 2 who views Benn's affirmation of 
the Third Reich as a consequence of primarily two factors: first, his 
desire for the separation of art and politics-a position he held consis-
tently, which also led, ultimately, to his disassociation from the re-
gime; and second, his misjudgment of the national socialist view of art 
and politics, which derived in part from his lack of interest in empiri-
cal details. 3 
Falsely associating the politicization of art solely with the left, Benn 
sided with the National Socialists in 1933, believing that they would 
free art from political influence or purpose. His adulation of the re-
gime was, in this respect, neither forced nor passive, Benn was instru-
mental in bringing the prestigious PreuBische Akademie der Kiinste, 
into which he had been accepted in 1932, into alignment with the Nazi 
regime. 4 He did so, according to Alter, primarily with the intention of 
preserving the purity of art. 
Yet there was more. In national socialism Benn also saw the nega-
tion of materialist values, whether capitalist or Marxist (he was, as 
suggested above, not given to finite distinctions), and the develop-
ment of a metaphysically oriented view of history. 5 An advantage of 
nazism as opposed to Marxism was, for Benn, the turn "vom okono-
rnischen zum mythischen Kollektiv" (GW, 1:441), To echo another 
conservative irrationalist, Moeller van den Bruck, one could say that 
Prussia-Germany had finally received its myth, 6 Of this myth and its 
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metaphysical depth Benn writes: "Welch intellektueller Defekt . . in 
diesem allem [the Third Reich] nicht das anthropologisch Tiefere zu 
sehen" (GW, 1:440). 
In Benn's eyes national socialism became a creative act, something 
spontaneous and irrational, and in this sense more artistic than politi-
cal. It was, in Benn's own words, formal. In his preface to "Kunst und 
Macht," he writes "was wir heute rassenmafsig verlangen, ist Form" 
(GW, 4:399). In his "Rede auf Marinetti," he states that this "form" is 
realized in Italian and German fascism: "die beiden Symbole der 
neuen Reiche" are "Form und Zucht" (GW, 1:481).7 Benn's comments 
on the Fuhrer reinforce this image of a formally innovative and creative 
impulse at work in contemporary history: 
Das Neue, Aufruhrerische, aber gleichzeitig auch Synthetische 
der Verwandlung zeigt sich in dem spezifischen Fuhrerbegriff. 
Fuhrer ist nicht der Inbegriff der Macht, ist uberhaupt nicht als 
Terrorprinzip gedacht, sondern als hochstes geistiges Prinzip ge-
sehen. Fuhrer: das ist das Schopferische, in ihm sammeln sich 
die Verantwortung, die Gefahr und die Entscheidung, auch das 
ganze Irrationale des ja erst <lurch ihn sichtbar werdenden ge-
schichtlichen Willens, ferner die ungeheure Bedrohung, ohne die 
er nicht zu denken ist, denn er kommt ja nicht als Muster, son-
dern als Ausnahme, er beruft sich selbst, man kann natiirlich 
auch sagen, er wird berufen, es ist die Stimme aus dem feurigen 
Busch, der folgt er, dort muB er hin und besehen das grofse 
Gesicht. (GW, 1:214-15) 
Because Benn recognizes no valid content, the formal transference 
from chaos to order, from stagnation to creativity, is sufficient crite-
rion for the acceptance of nazism. The everyday concerns of compet-
ing political parties disappear before a metaphysical, antiintellectual, 8 
antiempirical view of politics. In his preface to "Der neue Staat und 
die Intellektuellen" Benn writes: "Alles, was heute politisch und em-
pirisch sichtbar wird und Form gewinnt, ist ... jenseitig, kausallos, 
transzendent, eine innere Macht st6Bt in ihr vor" (GW, 4:393-94). In 
heralding the creative irrationalism of the regime he writes, "daB es 
sich bei den Vorgangen in Deutschland gar nicht um politische Kniffe 
handelt, die man in der bekannten dialektischen Manier verdrehen 
und zerreden konnte, sondern es handelt sich um das Hervortreten 
eines neuen biologischen Typs, die Geschichte mutiert und ein Volk 
will sich zuchten" (GW, 4:242). Politics gives way to biology and myth. 
Benn continues: "es handelt sich hier gar nicht um Regierungsformen, 
sondern um eine neue Vision von der Geburt des Menschen, viel-
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leicht um eine alte, vielleicht um die letzte grofsartige Konzeption der 
weifsen Rasse" (GW, 4:243). The value of the vision derives not from its 
coherence but from its formal desirability and its strength. Power 
renders the party legitimate: "in einem zehnjahrigen, offentlich ge-
fiihrten, vor aller Augen sich abspielenden Kampf haben sie [the 
National Socialists] gemeinsam das Reich erobert, keine Macht konnte 
sie hindern, keine Widerstande sie zuriickhalten, es war uberhaupt 
keine andere Macht mehr da-, auch hierin zeigt sich das Elementare, 
Unausweichliche, immer weiter um sich greifend Massive der ge-
schichtlichen Verwandlung" (GW, 1:215). 
Writing to Gertrud Hindemith in the fall of 1933, Benn describes his 
choice for national socialism in decisionistic terms:9 
Man mufs sich entschliefsen, Sie mussen sich entschliefsen, in den 
heute vorliegenden Fragen des Volkes u. seiner Regeneration 
Grundlegendes zu sehen. Es hat mit Politik, Schiebung, Wirtschaft 
nichts zu tun ... Man sieht das jetzt plotzlich so exact, es kommt 
doch vor, dafs sich plotzlich Durchblicke offnen, neue Einbet-
tungen ergeben u. ob Sie wollen oder nicht: hier ist der letzte 
Versuch, ein Volk zu regenerieren, ich weifs nicht, ob die ange-
wandten Methoden richtig sind, das bezweifle ich sogar, aber ein 
bewundernswerter Wille ist doch da ... Hier ist Stoff u. inneres 
Erlebnis-ran! Hier ist Geschichte-ertrage sie. Hier ist Schick-
sal-frifs Vogel oder stirb! Gefahren, Untergang-liebe sie! Amor 
fati-"dennoch die Schwerter halten." (H, 67-69) 
As the Fuhrer is chosen, so the German must also choose. The ques-
tion of rational criteria is left unaddressed. Instead, Benn calls on an 
aesthetic sense of experience, the manifestation of will, the nearness 
to an abyss. 
In addition, Benn was attracted to the assertive and authoritarian 
dimensions of nazism. He praises the new state for being "moni-
stisch, antidialektisch, uberdauernd und autoritar" (GW, 1:214). The 
national socialist regime is not to be questioned with arguments or 
facts. This helps explain Benn's proclivity to overlook contradictions 
within the program as well as between the program and historical 
reality. The irrationalism of his view derives in part from his inheri-
tance of Nietzschean historicism. The national socialist movement has 
brought forth new structures that cannot be judged by the old stan-
dards, for these have no transhistorical validity (GW, 1:445-46). 
As Benn eventually recognized the political thrust of nazism, the 
same principle that had led him to support the movement motivated 
him to disavow it. 10 Though he was eager to aestheticize politics, he 
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was not willing to accept a politicized art. National socialism subordi-
nated art to the interests of the state. Benn's sense of priorities dif-
fered: form was superior to the state and thus to both propaganda 
and censorship. 11 Art was subservient not to the state but to totality, 
to which the state itself was also subservient: "Der totale Staat selbst 
ist ja ein Abglanz jener Welttotalitat, jener substantiellen Einheit aller 
Erscheinungen und Formen, jener transzendenten Geschlossenheit 
eines in sich ruhenden Seins, jenes Logos, jener religiosen Ordnung, 
zu der die Kunst aus sich heraus mit ihren konstruktiven Mitteln, also 
aus ihrem eigenen aufbauenden, hinreifsenden und reinigenden Prin-
zip unaufhorlich strebt, die sie verwirklicht, die sie iiberhaupt der 
Menschheit erst in Erscheinung brachte" (GW, 1:260). 
In Benn's turn away from national socialism two moments are thus 
dominant: first, his consistent belief in the nonpoliticization of art and 
his slow recognition that the National Socialists would not, any more 
than the Socialists or Communists, grant him the freedom and legiti-
macy of pure poetry; second, his disenchantment with specific dimen-
sions of the national socialist program12 and the eventual rift between 
his own view of transcendent harmony and his recognition of national 
socialist reality. 13 These two moments resulted in his returning to an 
earlier view, according to which spirit should not or cannot be realized 
in history-not just the national socialist vision of history, but history 
as such. As early as September 1934, Benn denies in a letter to Ina 
Seidel the possibility of any unification of "Geist und Macht. Das ist 
vorbei. Es sind zwei Reiche."14 Benn's negation of nazism is a turn 
away from history and the public sphere, but it is a turn informed by 
politics and can be viewed in the context of that part of the resistance 
known as the inner emigration. 
In an enlightening introduction to an anthology of essays on the 
German resistance, Richard Lowenthal describes three basic types of 
resistance: political opposition, social refusal, and intellectual dissi-
dence. While the first counters the monopoly of political power and 
the second the monopoly of social and organizational control, the 
third attempts to undermine a monopoly of thought. In Germany, 
political opposition included, for example, the early illegal activities of 
Communists and trade unions, the leaflet campaign of the "White 
Rose," and the attempted assassination of 20 July 1944; less direct and 
open, though in some instances highly effective, was the refusal of 
institutions and individuals to adhere to the regulations of the regime. 
The church-the Catholic church more than the Protestant-provides 
us with instances of social refusal; to a degree one can also consider 
here the army and the bureaucracy, in the sense that they consciously 
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reacted against the penetration of their ranks by National Socialist 
intruders or, in individual cases, illegally helped potential victims. 
Also within the category of social refusal are the activities of non-Nazi 
youth groups. Independent of any institutional framework, social 
refusal surfaced in such acts as the illegal reception of foreign radio 
broadcasts. 
Though virtually all opponents of Hitler's regime were also oppo-
nents of the national socialist world view, one can speak of cultural 
dissidence as a third and distinct form of resistance. It is here that the 
concept "inner emigration" surfaces. Because the more liberal and 
politically active writers were not tolerated in Germany, the authors of 
the inner emigration-Rudolf Alexander Schroder, Werner Bergen-
gruen, Reinhold Schneider, and others-tend to fit either a conserva-
tive or an apolitical profile. These authors do not present detailed 
analyses of the contemporary political scene; instead, they focus on 
universal values that transcend time and space. Their goal was to 
preserve traditional norms in an intellectual manner at a time when 
reality denied these norms. Though their efforts had little, if any, 
direct political effect, the norms they embraced seemed necessary for 
the reestablishment of a humanistic Germany. The goals, in compari-
son with most instances of political and social resistance, were mod-
est, but no less compelling for that. In an age where what was timeless 
gave way to what was expedient and instrumental, the writers of the 
inner emigration addressed not so much the Third Reich in its social 
and political dimensions as the moral disorientation and spiritual 
crisis out of which the Third Reich in part developed and the extent to 
which national socialism was continuing to undermine and further 
dismantle the Germans' adherence to traditional values. 15 Benn, with 
his embrace of stasis, of that which abides, belongs among these 
writers. 16 
In suggesting that Benn's concept of stasis be viewed as a form of 
"inner emigration," I recognize the difficulties associated with this 
term. 17 Extreme positions have been taken with regard to the con-
cept, ranging from Thomas Mann's initial condemnation of anyone 
who published in Germany during the national socialist era to Frank 
ThieB's suggestion, adopting a figure of thought ironically not unfa-
miliar to Mann, that only those who suffered, and indeed suffered in 
Germany, have the most valuable new insights for Germany and the 
world. 18 Both positions miss the mark: Mann's insofar as it overlooks 
the hidden meanings of opposition poetry; ThieB's insofar as it ig-
nores the consistency of the emigres and bases intellectual and moral 
truth solely on experience, an antinormative and potentially fascist 
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position. 19 Within the literature of inner emigration one can draw a 
distinction between non-Nazi poetry-poetry that refuses to deal with 
the privileged themes of national socialist art (heroic optimism, the 
call for battle, the cult of the flag and of the nation, the elevation of 
Germanic blood and of secondary virtues such as loyalty, obedience, 
sacrifice, and courage)-and anti-Nazi poetry, poetry that directly 
confronts the positions of the National Socialists. 20 The distinction has 
some heuristic value, though it is not always clear into which group a 
work should fall. It is best to draw these distinctions along a spec-
trum. 21 Benn's static poems are proof of this point: while they do not 
confront the National Socialists as directly as a work like Jan Petersen's 
Unsere Strafle, they are not merely poems that refuse to deal with the 
prescribed topics of national socialist art. The poems-as I will at-
tempt to demonstrate below-are anti-Nazi, even though the effec-
tiveness of their opposition is limited, first, by their elliptical critique 
of the movement, 22 and second, by internal deficiencies in the concept 
of stasis. 23 
The distinctly oppositional connotations of Statik can be recognized 
in three ways: first, in the necessarily political ramifications of a twen-
tieth-century German poetry that views itself as anti-Faustian; second, 
in Benn's stress on the contrast between Statik and Bewegung when 
viewed in the light of national socialist rhetoric; and third, in the 
function served by such principles as stillness, interiority, and tran-
scendence in Benn's poems of this period, principles embraced by 
other writers of the inner emigration as well. 
In its particularly German reception, the adjective Faustian took on 
nationalist and optimistic connotations, especially during the Second 
Reich. 24 The nationalist associations persisted into the Nazi era. 25 In 
his study of the Faustian theme Hans Schwerte notes, for example, a 
gruesome, if almost amusing, title from 1933: Faust im Braunhemd 
(279). 26 Benn's anti-Faustian poetry is by definition a negation of politi-
cal (and nationalist) optimism. His "Wer allein ist-" subordinates a 
Heraclitean-Faustian view of the world to a position that embraces 
stillness and emotionlessness. Geological stability stands fast against 
the volcanic and eruptive forces of both nature and history; the dy-
namic elements of Goethe, his "Stirb und Werde," give way to a stasis 
that is openly anti-Faustian. The Entwicklungsfremdheit of Benn's "Sta-
tische Gedichte" likewise counters notions of historical destiny and 
inevitable progression into the future. Moreover, it opposes the Titan-
ism of striving and action, 27 of great deeds, and ultimately-in the 
national socialist reading of Faust-the hero of the Gemeinschaft. 
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Benn's criticism of the Faustian present becomes explicit in his essay 
"Zurn Thema Geschichte," where he writes of the ruthless acts of his 
contemporaries in their search for external salvation: 
Sehr verdachtig in dieser Richtung ist der Erlbsungsgedanke, 
der ihre Musik- und Buhnendramen durchzieht. Tannhauser und 
seine Variationen, Fliegender Hollander, Parsifal, nicht "Faust", 
aber die faustischen Motive-: erst benehmen sie sich wie die 
Schweine, dann wollen sie erlbst werden. Von irgendeiner "hb-
heren" Macht, die ihnen ihr tumbes, stures Weben und Wabern 
vergibt. Sie kommen gar nicht darauf, sich selber <lurch einen 
Gedanken innerer Erziehung, <lurch Einfugen in ein Moralprin-
zip oder eine prophylaktische Vemunft in Ordnung zu halten 
oder wieder in Form zu bringen, sie haben ihre "Drange", das ist 
faustisch-und dann wollen sie erlbst werden. (GW, 1:376) 
Benn suggests that the Faustian impulse be tempered with self-denial, 
self-discipline, and moderation, that the national socialist present be 
countered with inwardness, morality, reason, or form. "Statische Ge-
dichte" and the later "Reisen" negate reckless action and recognize 
that salvation must come from within; both imply the need for moder-
ation; both embrace the order of form and the value of self-restraint. 
These works, together with "Wer allein ist-," override the tendency 
toward dynamism that we saw in "Trunkene Flut." The embrace of 
Grenze in the later "Reisen" is, moreover, a thematic extension of 
Benn's elevation of thought in "Wer allein ist-" and "Statische Ge-
dichte," a position he associates with his own anti-Faustianism. The 
promotion of limits is stylistic, but not only stylistic: 
Nur der darf zugelassen werden zum Denken, der diese unge-
heuerliche Kraft einer einzigen spaten, massenmaBig geringen 
Art auch <lurch die auBerst erreichbare Formulierung, die ge-
spannteste Wendung bandigt und stahlem begrenzt, der das Ge-
fuhl hat fur diese Grenze und die Ergebenheit vor dieser Grenze. 
Es ist wie in der Kunst. Der auBerst erreichbare Ausdruck muB 
erkampft und gehalten werden mit einer Scharfe, die aufs riick-
sichtsloseste alles teilt und scheidet, aber man muB wissen, ob 
man zu weiteren Formulierungen noch berufen ist. Verliert man 
den Instinkt hierfor, wird man titanisch ... man wird ruckfallig 
in die ... infantile faustische Welt. (GW, 4:61) 
The anti-Faustian element not only undermines nationalist optimism 
and reinforces a stylistic and thematic elevation of clarity and re-
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straint, it conveys to us the broad interdisciplinary connotations of 
Statik. The one writer who did the most for the revival of the Faustian 
motif in early twentieth-century Germany was Oswald Spengler. As I 
suggested in the last chapter, Spengler contrasts Faustian boundless-
ness, expansion, and dynamism with Apollinian closure, restraint, 
and "Statik" (234). The terms were available to Benn; he had only to 
develop them. 
There can be no doubt that Benn's selection of the term Statik as a 
specifically twentieth-century form of stillness was due not solely to 
its scientific connotations. Not long after the fall of the Third Reich 
Benn writes: "Natiirlich wird schon allein der Titel 'Statische Gedichte' 
AnstoB erregen in einer Zeit, die sich in einer-wenn auch sinnlo-
sen-Bewegung zu befinden als ihr besonderes Verdienst u. ihre po-
litische Forderung ansieht" (emphasis in the original, Oelze no. 315 
[12 September 1946]). Statik was a highly charged concept within 
national socialism itself. In Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts, a work 
Benn owned, 28 Alfred Rosenberg, the major philosopher of national 
socialism, 29 introduces Statik and Bewegung as two of his leitmotifs. He 
proposes "zwei Arten des Lebensgefuhls: dynamisches Wesen oder sta-
tische Wertsetzung" (emphasis in the original, 126).30 In the course of 
his numerous allusions to Statik Rosenberg speaks disparagingly of a 
"statische Weltbetrachtung" (127), "das statische Weltbild" (133), "das 
statische Ideal" (134), "plastische Statik" (305), and "die Sehnsucht 
... nach Ruhe, nach Statik und Monismus" (323). 
Rosenberg links Statik with Greek, Jewish, Christian, and Asian 
world views. In his discussion of Greek culture he focuses on "die 
Statik des griechischen Lebens" (emphasis in the original, 151). Stasis 
is monistic and stagnant, the realm of eternal, universal truth to which 
Rosenberg contrasts the Northern, dynamic notion of race. Greek 
culture cannot compete with contemporary Germany's dynamism: 
"Das artbedingte Schone als iiuf3ere Statik der nordischen Rasse, das ist 
Griechentum, das arteigene Schone als innere Dynamik, das ist nordisches 
Abendland" (emphasis in the original, 293). Greek beauty is static, 
not dynamic.31 Even Greek literature borders on the stillness of sculp-
ture (305), whereas Germanic art, even its architecture, is dynamic 
and Faustian (351-52). In a distinctly anti-Semitic passage Rosenberg 
speaks of "die fremde Statik alles Jerusalemitischen" (130), and he 
contrasts the Jewish and Christian world views with Northern dy-
namism: "Diese statische Selbstbehauptung ist der metaphysische 
Grund fur des Juden Ziihigkeit und Starke, aber auch fur seine abso-
lute kulturelle Unfruchtbarkeit und sein schmarotzerhaftes Wirken 
... Diese triebhafte Statik bildet auch das Riickgrat der romischen 
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Kirche" (128). Meister Eckhart, who is more German than Christian, is 
praised for his defiance of stasis: "An Stelle der judisch = romischen 
Statik setzt er die Dynamik der nordisch = abendlandischen Seele" 
(252).32 Statik is also related to the inferior, Asian world: "Die Freude 
an Lao= tses Weisheit ist die Sehnsucht nach einem seelischen und 
geistigen Gegenpol. Sie ist aber keine Obereinstimmung und nichts 
ist falscher, als uns die Weisheit des Ostens als auch uns gemaB oder 
gar als eine uns uberlegene zu preisen, wie es miide und innerlich 
rhythmenlos gewordene Europaer heute zu tun belieben" (264-65). 
Rosenberg adds: "Hier stehen wir denn vor der Frage, ob diese 
scheinbar schone grofse Ruhe des Chinesen nicht eine innere Re-
gungslosigkeit der Seele bedeutet, nur die Kehrseite des wenig leben-
digen Inneren" (266-67). Just as Rosenberg contrasts Germanic ac-
tivity with Jewish restlessness, so does he set Germanic centered-
ness apart from Asiatic peace: "die Ruhe Goethes ist nicht die Ruhe 
Lao= tses und die Tat Bismarcks ist nicht die Tatigkeit Rothschilds. 
Die germanische Personlichkeit hat nicht ein Stuck von chinesischer 
Ruhe und ein Stiickchen jiidischer Geschaftigkeit" (266). 33 
According to Rosenberg, Germanic art should embody the Nordic 
"Kraft des Heroisch = Willenhaften," which is to be found in figures 
such as Siegfried and Faust (434). Rosenberg calls this active, heroic 
principle that ideally dominates both creativity and reception "aes-
thetic will."34 He contrasts it with the Greek ideal of Ruhe and the 
Kantian concept of disinterested contemplation: "Es entsteht dann 
der Lehrsatz von der 'willenlosen Kontemplation,' gefolgt von der 
Leugnung des aesthetischen Willens. Der griechische Mythus der 
Harmonie und gewollten Ruhe iiberschattete den germanischen In-
stinkt, den Anlauf zum kraftvollen Selbstbekenntnis und auch kiinst-
lerischer Willensentladung" (320). In Greece and later in classical Ger-
many the willful act of creation gave way to "eine geistige Bandigung 
der Form," "Selbstbeherrschung," and "eine 'kontemplative' Stim-
mung" (318), categories Rosenberg disdains to the same degree that 
Benn embraces them. For Rosenberg, every act of creation presup-
poses the forming will of the artist. Traditionally one has ignored "die 
Tatsache ... dafs hinter jedem Kunstwerk, so wie hinter einem reli-
giosen Bekenntnis eine Kraft steht . . . dafs jeder Kunstschopfung 
ein gestaltender Wille zugrunde liegt" (319). In addition, every good 
artwork sets as its goal "eine Tatgewalt der Seele zu wecken" (319). 
For Rosenberg-to cite the same idea in a different text-dynamism 
is both the origin and the purpose of art: "gerade die willenhafte 
Bewegtheit [ist] Ursprung der Kunst und deshalb auch Sinn des Endef-
fekts: in der Seele des Kunstempfangers" (emphasis in the original).35 
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Benn, in direct opposition to Rosenberg, favors stasis over Nordic 
dynamism not only in his view of the ideal artwork but in his aesthet-
ics of production and reception as well. Moreover, he specifically 
alludes to the Greek and Asian roots of Statik. 36 Viewed as implied 
opposition to Rosenberg's theories, Benn's seemingly pure poetry of 
stasis becomes a poetry of engagement and so offers an interesting-if 
(as I will suggest below) nonetheless not entirely adequate-answer to 
the central tension of modern poetry, the tension between formal 
autonomy and political purpose. 37 It is of course ironic that a figure 
banned from publishing partly because of his efforts to reconcile ex-
pressionism and national socialism should find his strongest anti-Nazi 
voice in a variant of classicism, in "schopferische Biindigung" (DD, 
92). In his panegyric of Julius Evola's Erhebung wider die moderne Welt, a 
book that assails modernity and elevates "die Traditionswelt," Benn 
writes: "Es gibt zwei Ordnungen, eine geistige und eine naturhafte: 
der Geist, <las ist die Askese und die Form; die Natur, das ist der 
Mangel an Begrenzung" (GW, 4:256). For what abides, Benn turns not 
to nature or the experimental avant-garde, not to frenzy or future 
prophecy, but to classical form: "Was objektiv bleibt, ist nicht die 
Prophetie von Zukiinften, sondern es sind die abgeschlossenen hin-
terlassungsfahigen Gebilde. Was bleibt, ist das zu Bildern verarbeitete 
Sein. Der Erfolg der Dynamik: Klassik! Hier halten wir, es ist 1940" 
(GW, 1:298). Throughout his earlier national socialist essays Benn had 
spoken approvingly of "die Bewegung" ;38 in his embrace of classical 
form, and of stasis in particular, a counterposition is evident, the 
details of which are discernible only against the backdrop of Rosen-
berg's theories. Considering the numerous studies on Benn, it is re-
markable that a book which sold over one million copies by 1943, the 
second bible of national socialism, has previously been overlooked in 
discussions of Statik. 
Benn's embrace of stasis, as much as it derives from his encounter 
with Rosenberg, transcends Rosenberg and can be viewed as a coun-
terposition to national socialist art as such. 39 One thinks first and 
foremost of national socialist poetry, which heralded the historical 
march into the future, elevated heroic and frenzied action, and cele-
brated Fuhrer and Volk. 40 Benn's poetry, in contrast, thematizes still-
ness instead of historical progress, idyllic withdrawal instead of heroic 
action, cerebral indifference instead of storm and destiny, and the 
isolated individual instead of the collective. Benn's increasing distance 
from national socialism can be measured in part by his receding an-
tiintellectualism. Rather than immersing himself in frenzy, he with-
draws into his own self and coldly observes. In place of Lebensraum 
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and the breaking of frontiers, he calls for a wall around the self. 
National socialist poetry is, on the whole, communal poetry: first, it 
promotes collective participation and a common fate, as, for example, 
in Baldur von Schirach's "Gemeinschaft: Das Lied der Getreuen"41 or 
Heinrich Anacker's "Auch du, auch du mufst mit" (71); second, it is 
designed for the group activities of singing and marching. The second 
national anthem of Nazi Germany, the "Horst Wessel Lied," is a good 
example: it is a song for and about marching, a march into an idealized 
future. The second and third stanzas read: 
Die Strafse frei den braunen Bataillonen! 
Die Strafse frei dem Sturmabteilungsmann! 
Es schaun aufs Hakenkreuz voll Hoffnung schon Millionen, 
der Tag der Freiheit und fiir Brot bricht an. 
Zurn letzten Mal wird zum Appell geblasen, 
zum Kampfe stehn wir alle schon bereit. 
Bald flattern Hitlerfahnen iiber allen Strafsen, 
die Knechtschaft dauert nur noch kurze Zeit. 42 
The recipient of the national socialist marching song, which contem-
porary literary historians referred to by the generic term "das Lied der 
Bewegung,"43 is invited to become part of a historical progression. 
The recipient of Benn's poetry, on the other hand, is encouraged to 
ignore or transcend history. Benn's reader is ideally passive, not ac-
tive. The instrumentality of art is replaced by an assertion of artistic 
autonomy. Where the National Socialists stressed youth,44 the wise 
man of Benn's "Statische Gedichte" is oblivious to the emergence and 
claims of new generations. The Nazis employ stereotypical images, 
phrases, and metaphors; Benn, on the other hand, coins new phrases 
and presents elliptical allusions. A linear and heroic style gives way to 
an elusive, intellectual style that demands nonlinear rereading. A 
poetry aligned with the linearity and temporality of music is coun-
tered by a poetry more akin to the negation of time traditionally 
associated with sculpture. 
The national socialist elevation of the communal and of linear 
marching is not restricted to poetry. Benn's circular recollection of 
what abides can also be seen in contrast to other national socialist 
artworks. A good example would be Hans Steinhoff's popular nation-
al socialist film Hitlerjunge Quex (1933). 45 This film, based on a novel by 
Karl Schenzinger, is a story of the German nation's choice, concretized 
in the figure of Heini Volker, between communism and nazism. The 
Communists are criticized not only for their actions and thoughts but 
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also by way of their association with circular images: their sphere is 
that of the fair, with its merry-go-round, its lottery wheel, and the 
spinning targets of a shooting booth. This circularity represents direc-
tionlessness and dizziness, the lack of future vision. The associations 
are reinforced by the fact that the Communists are, on the whole, 
older individuals, while the Nazis are uniformly young. The one do-
mestic scene among the National Socialists excludes the parents. In 
contrast to the circular imagery of the Communists, the National So-
cialists are associated with the linear motifs of marching and flag 
waving. Baldur von Schirach's "Unsre Fahne flattert uns voran," offi-
cial song of the Hitler Youth and overture to this film, reveals the 
motifs of direction and purpose, of youth and the future, in the eight-
fold repetition of "Vorwarts!" in its first stanza and of "Jugend" in its 
second. The song's "heroic" refrain reads: 
Unsre Fahne flattert uns voran, 
in die Zukunft ziehn wir Mann fur Mann. 
Wir marschieren fur Hitler <lurch Nacht und <lurch Not 
mit der Fahne der Jugend fur Freiheit und Brat. 
Unsre Fahne flattert uns voran. 
Unsre Fahne ist die neue Zeit. 
Und die Fahne fuhrt uns in die Ewigkeit! 
Ja, die Fahne ist mehr als der Tod!46 
The eternal (the song's melody reaches its high point with the word 
"Ewigkeit") is not a timeless present but a sacrifice of the present for 
an unending progression in time. 
Movement is also central to the most famous of national socialist 
films, Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph des Willens. The figures depicted in 
the film are generally in motion: one thinks of Hitler's entrance to 
Nuremberg, the morning activities of the rally participants, or the 
seemingly endless parade of marching soldiers. Moreover, when the 
subjects are not in motion, the camera is. The viewer has a sense of 
being caught up in the Bewegung. The Weimar mood of drift, of pur-
poselessness, of ethical confusion is replaced by a sense of direction 
and purpose; one feels that one is part of historical destiny. An alto-
gether different effect of the camera movement is the spectators' loss 
of orientation: with their eyes never at rest, they lose their grasp of the 
objective world. The film, through formal means, creates perspectival 
disorientation and a loss of objectivity. In an epistemological sense as 
well, Benn's embrace of Statik can be viewed as a counterposition to 
the Bewegung of national socialism. 
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While Benn's specific concept of stasis, as a counterstance to Rosen-
berg, appears to be a unique form of inner emigration, the elevation of 
form and clarity and the general embrace of stillness and stability as 
opposed to national socialist expediency and disorientation are com-
mon to a number of poets. 47 Fritz Diettrich, for example, addresses his 
own poetry as "still" and "abseits," as what brings "Klarheit" "in 
diesen Tagen, / Da alles schwankt": 
Du gibst uns in chaotischem Gedrange 
Die unbequeme Weisung, die uns frommt 
Und uns zuletzt versohnt mit deiner Strenge. 
(1:358-59) 
Friedrich Georg Jiinger, in his oppositional poem "Der Mohn," first 
published in 1935, laments the feverishness and drunkenness that 
leads to sacrifices and casualties; in contrast, he elevates existential 
stillness and epistemological clarity: 
Schmerzend hallt in den Ohren der Larm mir, rnich widert der 
Taumel, 
Widert das laute Geschrei, das sich Begeisterung nennt. 
Wehe! Begeisterung! Silbemer Brunnen der Stille, du klarer, 
Du kristallener Born, nennt es Begeisterung nicht. 
Tiefer schweigen die Toten, sie trauem, sie horen das Larmen, 
Horen das kindische Lied ruhmloser Trunkenheit nicht. 
(1:45) 
Hans Leip takes a slightly different approach, heralding the stillness 
not of poetry but of the humble opponents of the present regime, 
those figures who are not seduced by power or rhetoric. He writes in 
1942: 
Hab Achtung vor den Stillen, 
die im Larmen 
derMenge 
unbeteiligt 
scheinen und ungeriihrt. 
(52) 
Also akin to Benn's position is the stress on what abides and on 
what is inwardly attained. Rudolf Hagelstange writes in his Venezia-
nisches Credo of 1945: 
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1hr miiBt es wieder lernen, Euch zu trauen. 
Und Euer sicher sein, wo Sicherheit 
aus Tiefen kommt. Denn miiBig ist der Streit 
um Wechselvolles. Und wir bauen 
Unsterbliches und Bleibendes hienieden 
nur aus dem geisterzeugten Stoff, dem nicht 
an Dauer, nicht an Herrlichkeit gebricht. 
Von ihm ist der vergangliche geschieden 
wie Ton von Marmor. Jener schafft Figuren, 
und mit Figuren fiillt er seine Welt, 
die Welt der rasch verwehten Spuren, 
die sich dem FluB der Zeiten zugesellt. 
Doch dieser wirkt aus trachtigen Basalten 
die Gegenwart unsterblicher Gestalten. 
(26) 
Like Benn, Hagelstange contrasts the flux of temporality with a spirit 
able to transcend time and in this transcendence linked to the fixity of 
sculpture and the timelessness of art. 48 
The Rosenberg connection is again significant. In claiming legitima-
cy for his racial theories, Rosenberg denies the supremacy of reason 
and traditional philosophy's claims for universal truth. 49 For Rosen-
berg Statik signifies the transcendence of time and race. Benn, in his 
critique of Rosenberg and his affirmation of stasis, expresses a prefer-
ence, not for history, but for the timeless; not the expedient, but the 
universal. Though Benn's poems are formally more interesting and 
stylistically more elusive than most writings by the authors of the 
inner emigration, the similar elevation of universality and stillness 
should not be overlooked. 
The elevation of stillness is especially clear in Ernst Wiechert, a 
writer known first, perhaps, for taking the boldest public stand 
against national socialism of any poet who remained in Germany, and 
second, for writing sentimental, back-to-nature works that may seem 
to celebrate, as much as to undermine, national socialism. Wiechert's 
two university addresses-"Der Dichter und die Jugend" (1933) and 
"Der Dichter und seine Zeit" (1935)-are interesting not only as docu-
ments of his open resistance to the Third Reich but as reflections on 
the poet's relationship to what is still and eternal. In "Der Dichter und 
die Jugend" Wiechert writes of the poet, "daB er in einer lauten Welt 
der letzte und stille Bewahrer der ewigen Dinge ist" (10:361). He 
continues: "Sie sind die Bewahrer des Unverganglichen und die stil-
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len Mahner in einer lauten Welt. In allem Wandel der Zeiten und 
Meinungen ruht in ihrer Hand das Unwandelbare. In allem Verirrten 
und Angstvollen der Welt losen und binden sie die Faden der gro-
lsen Ordnung, machen das Triibe klar, das Verwirrte einfach, das 
Schmerzliche heilig" (10:362). Wiechert heralds solitude and immer-
sion in nature as catalysts to such reflection. He advises, "kehrt auch 
ein wenig zuriick aus dem Larm der Welt in die stillen Walder," such 
that his listeners, like the poet, will learn "das Stille zu bewahren" 
(emphasis in the original, 10:367). In "Der Dichter und seine Zeit" 
Wiechert admonishes his contemporaries for being caught up in their 
own finite concerns and failing to recognize what is eternal. Here, too, 
the poet would lead the way: "unter allen lauten Worten und Liedern 
des Tages sucht er nach dem Stillen und Unverganglichen" (10:371). 
In indicting the contemporary world's loss of clear values, Wiechert 
writes: "Ja, es kann wohl sein, dais ein Volk aufhort, Recht und Un-
recht zu unterscheiden und dais jeder Kampf ein 'Recht' ist" (10:379). 
In the light of such crimes, tranquil reflection on eternal truth is, he 
concludes, not to be mistaken for simple silence (10:380). 
The thoughts in these two famous addresses can be found devel-
oped and refined throughout Wiechert's writings. In Jahre und Zeiten 
he counters "das Vergangliche der Zeit" and sees himself, the poet, as 
"ein Sohn der Zeitlosigkeit" (9:702, 773). He suggests that one find the 
inner strength to counter "Meinung oder Geschrei der Zeit," includ-
ing nationalism and aggression, by such acts as withdrawing into 
nature or history, or reading authors like Goethe and Stifter (9:702-3). 
In the short, programmatically Christian essay "Laut und Leise" Wie-
chert associates Christianity and salvation with stillness, while sug-
gesting that the contemporary world, concerned with material prog-
ress and technological advancement, has turned its soul over to 
meaningless noise:50 
Laut und leise. Das sind die Pole der Zeit. Und es ist, als 
schwanke die Achse des Lebens langsam auf und nieder zwi-
schen ihnen. Da sind laute Jahrhunderte und laute Jahre und 
laute Stunden, und es will uns manchmal scheinen, als baume in 
ihnen und in ihnen allein die Woge des Lebens sich auf und 
umfasse allen Glanz unseres Daseins. Und wir vergessen, wie 
still das Grolse ist: Der Baum, der wachst, die Blume, die sich 
erschlielst, das Tier, das aus abendlichen Waldern tritt, das Ge-
dicht, das aus dem Schweigen steigt, der Tod, der i.iber eine Stirne 
fallt. (10:610-11) 
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"Die Stillen" are able to see clearly, to recognize when mankind has 
taken off in a false direction (10:611). Associating himself with the 
same tradition as does Benn, Wiechert suggests that it is "die Stillen 
... denen Gott im Schweigen erscheint" (10:609). A review of Wie-
chert's poems, works such as "Nur wer allein ist" (10:529-30) or "Ab-
seits" (10:535-36), reinforces this image of a poet who embraces soli-
tude and idyllic immersion in nature as the proper conditions for 
reflection on stillness and eternity. Wiechert's numerous novellas and 
novels only substantiate this claim. 51 
The differences between Benn and Wiechert are of course enormous 
and readily visible to anyone who has read both authors. Benn's 
poetry carries with it not a trace of the sentimentality that pervades 
Wiechert's; the alleged timelessness of Wiechert's art does not origi-
nate, as does Benn's, from an elevation of form; Wiechert's moral 
critique of fascism cannot be confused with Benn's conscious avoid-
ance of the categories of content and morality; and finally, Benn's 
poetry differs from Wiechert's and virtually all other opposition poetry 
in its avoidance of any overtly didactic element. These and other 
differences, however, do not overshadow a moment shared by both 
authors, as well as by others writing during this era: the attempt to 
negate national socialism in part by pointing to a transcendence char-
acterized by timelessness and stillness. 
There is another dimension at play here: stasis, and the corollary 
negation of travel, as a justification for nonemigration. 52 Charles Hoff-
mann has cogently argued that "inner emigration" is a biographical 
rather than a literary concept;53 yet in Benn's case one can use the 
biographical to help explain the literary, and vice versa. Stillness has a 
biographical or existential function: this is clear from "Reisen" and, to 
a lesser extent, from "Statische Gedichte" as well. Whatever comfort 
or salvation may be available amidst the chaos of modernity, and of 
the Third Reich in particular, is to be found in withdrawal and in 
poetry-specifically, poetic form and closure. 54 For Benn, the embrace 
of a static, self-enclosed aesthetic sphere derives more from existential 
disorientation and the desire for stability than from a programmatic 
philosophy of l' art pour l' art. 55 The absolute poem, as much as it 
purports to be autonomous vis-a-vis the world, fulfills a function for 
the poet's own attempts at centeredness. Benn mocks the wanderer 
and traveler, who feels the need to search elsewhere for the self. The 
emigrant, according to Benn, lacks stability and the strength to en-
dure. 56 Rather than leaving Germany, Benn remained and employed 
poetry as a medium through which to sublimate his suffering and to 
survive under even the most chaotic circumstances. As in the tradi-
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tion, art and Ruhe act as a kind of therapy-in Benn's own words, "ein 
katharisches Phanomen" (CW, 1:561)-though for him the therapy is 
individual, not universal. 57 For Benn, the external is secondary: this 
frees him to live his double existence under the most difficult condi-
tions; however, it also gives him no reason to protest a nation that is 
itself on a destructive path. To the degree that the poet or sage is 
impervious to progress, he is also impervious to injustice. 
One can, by way of external reflection, criticize the inner emigrants 
for not analyzing social and political structures, but one cannot criti-
cize them for reflecting on structures of transcendence. 58 The two 
areas of inquiry-historical analyses and normative reflections-do 
not, in principle, exclude one another; on the contrary, they are mutu-
ally reinforcing. 59 One can analyze the inadequacies of the present 
only against an ideal other, even if this other remains merely implicit. 
What is timeless, meanwhile, becomes meaningful only insofar as it 
relates to what is finite and present. 60 Benn's unfortunate reduction of 
stasis to what is merely transcendent, merely formal, need not color 
the validity of his insight into the need for transcendence or his valid 
recognition, late as it was, of the untenability of history and experi-
ence as exclusive grounds of legitimacy. 
7. National Socialism and 
Transcendental Norms 
In his essay "Nach dem Nihilismus" Benn speaks of "die Auflosung 
aller alten Bindungen, die Zerstorung der Substanz, die Nivellierung 
aller Werte" (GW, 1:156). This loss of absolute norms was diagnosed 
not only by Benn but by a large number of intellectual figures of 
various persuasions--Robert Musil, Hermann Broch, Helmuth Pless-
ner, Georg Lukacs, Eugen Guster, to name only a handful. Though 
the causes were not always studied in detail-social, economic, and 
political factors generally received less attention than intellectual 
ones1-the diagnosis of a loss of traditional or transcendent positions 
was widespread2 and, it seems, accurate. 
Hermann Broch coined the phrase Zerfall der Werte and meant there-
by the loss of a coherent, systematic world view, from which all indi-
vidual positions derive. 3 Twentieth-century society has lost transcen-
dent standards on which to base moral and political decisions and has 
replaced universal norms with partial value systems. The result is the 
absolutization of the relative in the form of such phrases as "war is 
war," "business is business," "art for art's sake," or, in the historically 
most devastating partial value system of all, the identification of the 
absolute with the nation-state, with Germany, rather than with the 
universal-the subordination, therefore, of universal norms to na-
tionalist laws and duties. In order to substantiate my claim that the 
loss of an absolute world view contributed to the emergence of nation-
al socialism (and the corollary stance that Benn was justified in search-
ing for an absolute perspective, even if his methods were inadequate), 
I offer here a brief critique of Nietzsche and Rosenberg. I argue that 
the national socialism of Rosenberg originated out of the Nietzschean 
affirmation of perspectivism and suspension of the law of noncontra-
diction-that is, Nietzsche's claim that an internal contradiction is no 
argument against a position. Benn's own affirmation of the regime in 
1933 can also be viewed, at least in part, against this backdrop. 
It is not my intention to enter the debate on whether Nietzsche 
was himself nationalist, imperialist, militarist, or anti-Semitic. (Walter 
Kaufmann has, I think, sufficiently disproved the picture of the proto-
Nazi Nietzsche as it was promoted through the unethical editorial and 
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exegetical work of Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche and Alfred Baumler. )4 
Rather, I would link Nietzsche with the historical possibility and logi-
cal necessity of power positivism, the view that truth is the privilege of 
the stronger-a position realized in the Third Reich. 5 
There can be no doubt that whatever Nietzsche's assertive stances 
may have been, his most fundamental claim-in the sense that it 
undermines all others-is that all positions are ultimately illusory, 
untenable, and ungrounded. Nietzsche insists on the impossibility of 
a first principle. All truth is perspectival, all knowledge is hypotheti-
cal, and all categories are historically conditioned. For Nietzsche there 
are no transcendent norms, "keine ewigen Horizonte und Perspekti-
ven" (2:135). He writes: "Es gibt keine 'Wahrheit'" (3:497).6 In a well-
known passage the philosopher redefines truth as a form of error that 
serves life: "Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrtum, ohne welche eine bestimmte 
Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Der Wert fur das Leben 
entscheidet zuletzt" (emphasis in the original, 3:844). All evaluations 
are based on the preservation of a particular entity, be it an individual, 
a community, or a race (3:441). Values are measured by the strength 
and richness they give a particular valuing will. Nietzsche assumes 
the stance that the falseness of a judgment is no argument against it; 
indeed, false judgments that promote a particular life or species are to 
be privileged (2:569). 7 Contradictions are to be endured or embraced, 
not overcome (2:175).8 
Nietzsche's perspectivism may appear at first glance to be liberating: 
because one's own truth is not final, one is free to listen to other 
positions, to develop "Tastorgane" for other perspectives (3:441).9 
This is a possible consequence, and it is surely the position of the mild 
Nietzsche and that of many attracted to the Nietzschean world view. 
One must ask, however, not what may be a contingent response to 
relativism, but rather what is its logical consequence. 10 A tolerance for 
other positions-without a transcendent measure by which to judge 
them-means that one has no valid argument against that position 
which itself denies tolerance. If no perspective is grounded, then why 
should I bother taking any perspective seriously other than my own? 
If there is no absolute, my own particular interests or those of another 
gain a stature they could not possibly have in a philosophy where the 
particular is subordinate to the universal. If universal standards of 
good and evil are abandoned, anything goes: "Nichts ist wahr, alles ist 
erlaubt" (2:889). 11 If everything is permitted, then so, too, is one 
individual's assertion of power over others. No legitimate argument 
can be made against those who assert the freedom to decide what is 
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valid and what is invalid life. 12 Values, not being derived from a logical 
system, have no basis other than the arbitrariness of the individual 
will and the contingencies of the historical present. 13 
Nietzsche's personal notion of will to power may have little to do 
with the concepts of power and injustice developed by Thrasymachus 
and Callicles in Plato's dialogues Republic I and Gorgias, but that-even 
if it is true14-is not enough to counter the fact that power positivism 
is the ultimate consequence of Nietzschean perspectivism. Relativism 
cannot argue against power positivism; indeed, it passes over into it. 
This transition is not unrelated to Nietzsche's own view of the shift 
from passive nihilism (there is no truth, everything is equal) to active 
nihilism (there is no truth, therefore I am free to assert my position at 
the expense of others). 15 Because the values of the power positivist do 
not stem from any rational principles, they become whatever serves 
the power of the individual or group: secondary virtues such as disci-
pline or sacrifice. Whatever goals these secondary virtues themselves 
serve remain ungrounded, and since reason has been abandoned-it 
makes universal claims that are untenable-it is not surprising that 
the power positivist turns to nature, blood, instinct, and race. The 
question of highest values becomes a purely decisionistic matter, one 
in which reason gives way to nature. 
Both relativism and power positivism are philosophically untena-
ble.16 The statement "there is no truth" involves a pragmatic contra-
diction, 17 a contradiction between its content and its form, between 
the statement made and what is presupposed in the act of making the 
statement. 18 The proposition claims ahistorical truth even as it denies 
such truth. 19 One cannot, without refuting oneself, assert as true the 
claim that nothing is true. Since Nietzsche's own measure of evalua-
tion is itself without foundation and since it can be asserted only 
insofar as one abandons the law of noncontradiction, philosophy be-
comes for Nietzsche not a matter of reason and rational debate but one 
of likes and dislikes. Injustice, or the prerogative of the powerful, 
becomes a principle of justice. One is free to choose and implement 
whatever position advances one's own power. 
Power positivism, however, like relativism, cancels itself. 2° First, 
injustice always presupposes justice. For any number of individuals to 
get the strength to be unjust they must act justly by one another. The 
thought is not new to literary critics familiar with the real or expected 
loyalty within the robber bands of Schiller's Die Riiuber (act I, scene 2) 
or Brecht's Die Dreigroschenoper, or with the legalistic mentality of 
Goethe's Mephistopheles (Faust, 1410-17). Taken on its own terms, 
injustice becomes an enemy not only to justice but to itself. Second, 
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the unjust individual cannot attempt to convince others of the validity 
of his or her position in dialogue form without falling into a contradic-
tion between the eristic theory of injustice and the conditions of dis-
course: fairness, consistency, and communicability. Dialogue is possi-
ble only within a framework of justice; it is therefore impossible to 
make a case for injustice without assuming the position one would 
deny. Insofar as the unjust individual remains a partner in dialogue, 
the victory of justice is decided a priori. Third, after denying the 
possibility of objective discourse to the unjust individual, it might be 
thought that such an individual could try to persuade others rhetori-
cally and irrationally of the virtues of injustice, avoiding any direct 
confrontation with the arguments or structures of justice-but here, 
too, the unjust one would only lose the power that forms the core of 
the injustice. Insofar as unjust individuals encourage belief in the 
validity of injustice, they justify the violation of their rights by others. 
The unjust individual, therefore, "who attempts injustice rightly must 
be supposed to escape detection" and must support-theoretically at 
least-the idea of justice, under whose shield it is possible to remain 
unjust only by seeming to be just. 21 In short, to defend injustice is 
to place the unjust individual and injustice itself in danger. Unjust 
individuals not only presuppose what they would deny, they cannot 
make a case for injustice without canceling their own position. Relativ-
ism and power positivism are philosophically untenable because they 
contradict the conditions of their own truth; in short, they are self-
canceling. 22 
One does not refute a position philosophically by drawing attention 
to its historical consequences;23 nevertheless, an understanding of the 
historical, not merely the logical, proximity of Nietzschean perspec-
tivism and national socialism is enlightening. Though national social-
ism is often viewed as a closed or absolute system, it must be recog-
nized as an arbitrary absolute and therefore one that arises not from 
an absolute philosophy (there are universal truths) but from a relativ-
istic position that has passed over into power positivism (because 
there are no universal truths, one subject or group of subjects has the 
right to assert its irrational truths over others). If one relativizes the 
absolute, one is free to absolutize the relative-and that, not absolute 
philosophy, is what national socialism was: an absolutization of the 
relative, namely power and race, as a result of the undermining of the 
absolute. 24 
This is clearly demonstrated in Rosenberg's highly successful Myth us 
des 20. Jahrhunderts. 25 Here, along with his elevation of dynamism over 
stasis, Rosenberg rebukes those systematic philosophers who assert 
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the viability of a priori or absolute truths and who base values on logic 
and the law of noncontradiction. 26 He denies the existence of absolute 
norms or values: there are "keine absoluten Werte" (22); moreover, if 
there were any absolute values or eternal truths, it would be impossi-
ble for us to grasp them (681). He discredits "blutleere Werte, die 
das Naturvolle iibersehen" (23). All positions are determined by his-
torical conditions: "Es gibt keine voraussetzungslose Wissenschaft, son-
dern nur Wissenschaft mit Voraussetzungen" (emphasis in the original, 
119). Rosenberg criticizes the philosophical search for absolute truth: 
"Gleich der hoffnungsvollen Antike sind auch alle heutigen Zunft-
philosophen, im Ernst und aus Geschaft, auf der Suche oder auf der 
Jagd nach der sogenannten einen, ewigen Wahrheit. Diese Wahrheit 
suchen sie auf rein logischem Wege, indem sie von Axiomen des 
Verstandes weiter und weiter schliefsen" (681-82). Any philosophy 
that teaches logically deduced transcendent values errs (127). Values 
are to be created by the individual race or will; they cannot be discov-
ered, nor can they be refuted, by logical analysis. Socrates, who spoke 
of "'das Gute' an sich" and claimed that virtue was universal, de-
stroyed Greek culture (285); in recognizing only individuals and uni-
versals, he failed to understand the significance of race (286). 27 Even 
German philosophers have been prone to this mistake; Hegel's well-
grounded assertion, "die Logik ist die Wissenschaft von Gott,"28 is for 
Rosenberg "ein Faustschlag ins Gesicht einer jeden echten nordischen 
Religion, einer jeden echten germanischen ... Wissenschaft" (287). 
Believing that logic is no criterion for truth, Rosenberg admonishes 
"den nur logischen Wahrheitssucher" (692). 
Any claim to universal truth is, in Rosenberg's view, invariably false 
and dogmatic (125). He opposes knowledge of race to all universal 
philosophies: "Diese Erkenntnis ... setzt uns ... in scharfsten Ge-
gensatz zu allen 'absoluten' 'universalistischen' Systemen, die von 
einer angeblichen Menschheit aus erneut auf eine Unitarisierung aller 
Seelen fiir alle Zukunft hinaus wollen" (136). Rosenberg contrasts 
empty, universal, logical truth with the organic truths of blood and 
race: "Damit ist jedoch auch schon eine ganz andere Auffassung von 
der 'Wahrheit' angedeutet: dais fiir uns Wahrheit kein logisches Richtig 
und Falsch bedeutet, sondern dais eine organische Antwort gefordert 
wird auf die Frage: fruchtbar oder unfruchtbar, eigengesetzlich oder 
unfrei?" (emphasis in the original, 690). In another passage he asserts: 
"Das ist der andere-'wahrere'-Strom des echt wuchshaften (or-
ganischen) Wahrheitssuchens entgegen dem scholastisch = logisch = 
mechanischen Ringen nach 'absoluter Erkenntnis'" (691). Humanity, 
dissolved of racial origins and considerations, is a meaningless fiction 
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(22), yet one that must be countered insofar as the concept of hu-
manity dissolves racial identities and leads to valuelessness, "rasse-
lose Wertelosigkeit" (120). Rosenberg's fear of this raceless universal-
ity is softened by his claim that there is really no communication 
among races. 29 He likens race to Leibniz's monads: "jedoch wird die 
Monade einer Personlichkeit ganz fremden Blutes gegeniiber erneut 
'fensterlos'" (694). Having abandoned universal, coherent, and posi-
tive categories, Rosenberg absolutizes the negative figures of differ-
ence and otherness. 
If values are not derived from reason, then surely from nature:30 
"Heute ... beginnt ein ganzes Geschlecht zu ahnen, dais nur dart 
Werte geschaffen und erhalten werden, wo noch das Gesetz des 
Blutes Idee und Tat des Menschen bestimmt, sei es bewufst oder 
unbewufst" (22). Nature becomes a supreme value (140-42). In this 
respect Rosenberg and the Benn of 1933 have much in common. 
Though Benn was not anti-Semitic, he, too, believed in the failure of 
reason and so embraced a biological foundation for his view of not 
only historical motivation but also historical evaluation.31 The thinker 
who abandons reason turns, quite consistently, to nature. For Nietz-
sche, the historical genesis of an idea proves its invalidity-that is, 
since all ideas are historically conditioned, all claims to ahistorical 
truth are invalid. Rosenberg draws the consequences of Nietzsche's 
position. 32 If all positions are historically conditioned, the better con-
ditions must generate better truths: race usurps reason, history tran-
scends philosophy. 33 Also Nietzschean in spirit is Rosenberg's asser-
tion that ideas are determined by the body: "die 'Wissenschaft' ist eine 
Folge des Blutes" (120). Likewise based on perspectival philosophy is 
his justification for asserting that values should be affirmed in order to 
ennoble "das deutsche Volkstum ... die Rasse zu kraftigen" (545). 
Because reason is no measure, the question Rosenberg asks is not 'Are 
the goals of the Nordic race legitimate?' but rather 'How can the 
Nordic race achieve power?' 
Even if organic truth is erroneous, errors may still serve life (685-
86)-and life is higher than reason, organic truth higher than the law 
of noncontradiction (683): "Dem Leben wird-abgesehen von alien 
Vernunftgesetzen-ein Eigenwert zugesprochen" (690). Rosenberg 
cites Nietzsche's argument: "nur das, was Leben schafft, hat Tugend, 
hat einen Wert" (691). It is in this spirit that Rosenberg can affirm any 
"truth" that serves the Germanic race: "im Dienste der organischen 
Wahrheit" means "im Dienst des rassegebundenen Volkstums" (684). 
Each culture, each race has its own "Hochstwert" (116), but if the 
highest value of one race calls for the elimination of another race, 
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any protest is conditioned by the inferiority of the race that is to be 
eradicated. Without external restraints, the Germanic race has the 
right to assert its own superior path over others: "Heute verlangt 
diese echt organische Weltanschauung inmitten der zusammenbre-
chenden atomistischen Epoche mehr als fruher: ihr Recht, ihr Herren-
recht" (emphasis in the original, 694-95).34 The myth of blood must 
assert itself, and in doing so it need recognize no other highest values: 
"es fordert eine Weltrevolution und duldet keine anderen Hochst-
werte mehr neben sich" (699). Because the highest values of other 
cultures restrict one's own, they must be eliminated (700). Rosenberg 
lays down the gauntlet against all who fail to recognize the supremacy 
of blood, specifically German blood: "die Ehre des deutschen Namens 
... kampft gegen alle Machte, die sie als ersten und hochsten Wert 
nicht gelten }assen wollen" (701). He is quite clear on the issue of 
might and right: both are subservient to Volk. As there are no univer-
sal standards for determining the good, justice is subordinate to the 
practical goals of race (571). "Recht ... ist ... fur ewig an ein 
gewisses Blut geknupft ... mit dem es erscheint und mit dem es 
vergeht" (572). Since reason is not supreme, no argument against 
the Germanic world view is valid: "Der neue Mythus und die neue 
typenschaffende Kraft, die heute bei uns nach Ausdruck ringen, kon-
nen iiberhaupt nicht 'widerlegt' werden" (700). 35 
The early twentieth-century failure to recognize and ground tran-
scendent truths was not restricted to academic philosophy. A judicial 
corollary to perspectival morality and power positivism is the positive 
law theory of justice, a theory dominant in the Weimar era. 36 More-
over, the Weimar Constitution, as has been noted by thinkers as di-
verse as Carl Schmitt and Hermann Broch, lacked any absolute foun-
dation. 37 It was a document dependent on legal positivism and a 
relativistic, consensus theory of truth. A two-thirds majority in parlia-
ment could change not just ordinary legislation but the most funda-
mental elements of the Constitution; thus, minorities were susceptible 
to majority rule. Still worse, a two-thirds majority could make arbi-
trary changes, and then conclude that the Constitution could never 
again be changed. 38 It was not merely Article 48 that gave Hitler a legal 
map to power; the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933, based on Article 76, 
guaranteed the lawful passage from Weimar to the Third Reich. A 
constitution without inalienable rights or absolute duties stems from 
a relativistic, rather than absolute, philosophy, and, as history has 
shown, such a constitution passes over into the tyranny of power 
positivism. 39 Either there are normative values that transcend demo-
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cratic consensus, or it is illegitimate to protect, constitutionally, any 
position from shifts in consensus. Only a political structure based on 
logically coherent transcendent norms can guarantee individual rights 
when majority opinion opposes this or when historical changes occur. 
An adequate solution to the problem of relativism and partial value 
systems could originate with the argument that there are transcen-
dental structures on which the relativist depends even while denying 
them. 40 The best way to evaluate conflicting positions, perhaps the 
only way to allow for communication among them, is by immanent 
critique, the refutation of an alternative position on its own terms and 
on the basis of internal inconsistencies. If it can be shown that a 
proposition cannot be refuted without self-contradiction and without 
also necessarily presupposing the proposition to be refuted, then that 
proposition is necessarily true. Transcendental reflections of this kind 
represent the first step toward establishing a legitimate and coherent 
totality rather than the totalitarianism of an arbitrary standpoint. 
One must clearly distinguish between those who make absolute 
claims blindly and irrationally and refuse to acknowledge the validity 
of immanent critique and those who arrive at their positions by exhib-
iting the self-cancellation of alternative positions. 41 Through the nega-
tion of untenable positions it is possible to apply a priori principles to 
shed light on complex political and judicial issues. In conjunction with 
the project of German idealism can be seen increased reflection on the 
philosophy of right, the creation of a coherent university system, the 
abolition of torture, arguments against the death penalty, and the 
development of new freedoms. 42 Within a Nietzschean framework, 
on the other hand, one cannot ground one's arguments against injus-
tice; particular interests are no longer subordinate to transcendent 
truths, and justice is reduced to law or power. Early twentieth-century 
philosophers immersed in various forms of historicism and relativism 
did not recognize that their negation of all absolute principles gave 
irrational absolutists the right to assert whatever positions they de-
sired. 43 Weimar was polarized intellectually by cultural and philo-
sophical skeptics, ready to dismantle any hierarchy of intellectual 
positions, and extremists, who asserted the absolute rightness of their 
positions in such a way that they were incapable of considering alter-
natives. It is between the denial of absolute norms and the assertion of 
arbitrary absolutes that the technique of immanent critique, aided by 
the figure of self-cancellation, seeks to mediate. 
Gottfried Benn did not map out an immanent critique of relativ-
ism; he did, however, present an intuitive affirmation of stasis, of 
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that which transcends the contingencies of the present. It is Benn's 
strength to have recognized the need for that which partially tran-
scends history and to have expressed this need so eloquently, but his 
weakness to have associated this transcendence with what is irratio-
nal, hermetic, and undialectical-a topic to be explored in the next 
chapter. 
8. Critique 
There is little doubt of the formal precision of the poems analyzed, the 
richness of their intellectual-historical allusions, or the importance of 
Benn for a study of the concept of stillness in twentieth-century Ger-
many. What remains to be considered is the tenability of Benn's con-
cept of stasis. 1 My critique will focus on three partly overlapping 
issues: first, the nonspecificity of Benn's position, which relates to his 
formalism and decisionism; second, the subjectivism of his poetry, 
which culminates in the self-contradictory concept of the monologue 
poem; and third, his cultivated indifference, which in effect supports 
positions that he nominally opposes. Nevertheless, Benn's concept of 
stasis is not without an element of truth. 
Formalism 
Under stasis can be understood those insights that are valid indepen-
dent of changing historical circumstances. The content Benn gives to 
this transcendent moment, however, is purely formal and aesthetic; it 
has little to do with justice or goodness and is politically and ethically 
indeterminate. Stasis is merely the formal act of asserting an aesthetic 
construct: "Innerhalb des allgemeinen europaischen Nihilismus, in-
nerhalb des Nihilismus aller Werte, erblicke ich keine andere Tran-
scendenz als die Transcendenz der schopferischen Lust" (CW, 4:235). 
The position by which Benn distances himself from national socialism 
does not in principle differ from the national socialist position itself: 
each negates the historical present for its chaos and lack of meaning; 
each appears justified by the fact alone that it promises a transcen-
dence of this emptiness. There are of course countless and significant 
differences between Hitler's unjust, collective formalism and Benn's 
seemingly innocuous, asocial formalism, but they share two signifi-
cant elements: formal appeal in a world of disorientation; and arbi-
trariness vis-a-vis content. 2 In late Weimar when there were compet-
ing parties, Benn actively worked for the freedom of the intellect; as 
soon as the National Socialists had an exclusive hold on power, he 
argued that all writers should serve the state. 3 National socialism 
received legitimacy by virtue of its position as the embodiment of 
totality. National socialist values appeared valid not because they were 
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true, but because belief in them gave the individual a sense of order 
and stability. 4 Carrying a seed of truth (the need to pass beyond mere 
disorientation), Benn's elevation of stasis, not unlike national social-
ism itself, 5 remained decisionistic. 6 Interestingly, one of the intellectu-
al fathers of national socialism, 7 Moeller van den Bruck, likewise em-
braced a concept of Statik (278) and, also like Benn, elevated the spatial 
over the temporal (238-39)-yet Moeller's stasis is identified neither 
with what is universal nor with what is unique, but rather with what 
is national and German. The contrast points to the dangers of a con-
cept of stasis that is nebulously articulated and whose validity is based 
solely on experience or appeal. 
It is not the moment of transcendence, itself a formal advance over 
chaos and relativism, that is the problem; rather, it is the lack of a 
measure by which to judge the validity of that transcendence. By 
affirming a merely formal alternative, Benn did not pass beyond his 
position of 1933, when his criticism of the critics of the Third Reich 
suggests there are in principle no valid standards by which to con-
demn the supposed injustice of the new state: "es gab niemals eine 
Qualitat, die aufserhalb des Historischen stand" (CW, 1:445). He dog-
matically asserts the reduction of transcendence to history: "eine abso-
lute Qualitat gab es nie ... Im Grunde hat immer nur die Geschichte 
gedacht" (CW, 1:445). For an author-the Benn of 1933-who argues 
that the legitimacy of a position is its historical development, norms 
can play no significant role. Nor can they play a significant role for an 
author-the Benn of the 1940s-who views form as the only possible 
transcendence. 
In his static poems Benn calls on us-much as does Heidegger in 
Sein und Zeit-to experience the stillness of our own selves. 8 Heideg-
ger's famous call of conscience is characterized by Schweigen: "Dem 
angerufenen Selbst wird 'nichts' zu-gerufen, sondern es ist aufgerufen 
zu ihm selbst, das heifst zu seinem eigensten Seinkonnen" (273). But 
this call of conscience, much like Benn's plea for a stable self in the 
poem "Reisen," is purely formal, empty of ethical guidelines. Benn's 
absolute, like Heidegger's, is devoid of specific content. One is re-
minded of the anecdote that a student of Heidegger's once exclaimed 
"ich bin unheimlich entschlossen-ich weifs nur noch nicht, wozu!" 
Benn goes so far as to celebrate this elimination of content; it allows 
him to escape the dynamism of Heideggerian Entschlossenheit and 
reassert stasis. Though it is important that ethical relativism and injus-
tice be met with a stable (or static) position, it is equally important that 
the position be grounded. The merely formal affirmation of a position 
can be shared by the power positivist and the aesthetic poet. In Tri-
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umph des Willens Hitler calls his movement "einen ruhenden Pol [in 
der] Flut der Erscheinungen," echoing a Heraclitean rhetoric that is 
also the basis of Benn's "Wer allein ist-."9 
If we recognize, with Benn, "eine Absolutheit des Formalen" (GW, 
1:213), then any political position can be aestheticized and made beau-
tiful. Benn's national socialism cannot be reduced to the mistaken 
belief that art would be autonomous under the Nazis-though this is a 
significant element; his infatuation with the movement relates as well 
to their aestheticization of politics. 10 If form is the only significant 
criterion, there is no compelling reason not to affirm the National 
Socialists' attractive displays of power and transcendence of chaos. 11 
Benn's submission to national socialism's aestheticized politics is from 
this perspective not surprising. Fascist propaganda envelops itself in a 
rhythmic, almost hypnotic, frame: marches, flags, uniforms, daily 
rituals, celebrations, and so forth. The efficacy of Hitler's speeches 
appears to derive from tone, gesture, emphasis-from form more 
than from content. 12 The magical force of such rhetoric is not unlike 
that of a merely formal poetry. 13 The viewer, not grasping any clear 
content, is nonetheless unable to resist its allure. Writing in 1949, 
Benn still held to the supremacy of form over substance: "Stil ist der 
Wahrheit iiberlegen, er tragt in sich den Beweis der Existenz" (GW, 
4:159). According to the same logic, the historical atrocities of national 
socialism are superior to whatever normative theories might have 
helped us avoid such atrocities. 
One can of course stress the differences between Benn and national 
socialism, as I did in an earlier chapter, but such an approach, by 
itself, would be misleading. In his provocative article "NS-Literatur 
und Modernitat," Uwe-K. Ketelsen raises the question whether na-
tional socialism and modernism might not share certain common 
features. Discussing national socialist drama, for example, Ketelsen 
notes a basic, recurring structure whereby the hero, through an act of 
pure will, creates meaning in a situation viewed as meaningless or 
absurd. The thrust behind the hero's development is a purely deci-
sionistic one: what is important is not the content but the simple 
affirmation of meaning, the will to live despite the chaos of the world. 
Ketelsen notes that this structure also pervades much of modern lit-
erature. The situation, one could argue, is the legacy of Nietzschean 
relativism and Heideggerian Entschlossenheit, which operate with the 
concepts of perspectival disorientation and decisionistic resolve. That 
perspectivism and decisionism have catalysts in the widespread eco-
nomic, political, and social ruptures of the early twentieth century 
reinforces the suspicion that the issue has more than merely intellec-
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tual roots and is not unique to Benn, to national socialism, or even to 
Germany. 
It is in this context as well that one might consider the formalism 
prominent among writers attempting to cope with the upheavals 
of twentieth-century Germany. Theodore Ziolkowski has argued in 
"Form und Protest" that writers of the inner emigration viewed the 
historical present as a time of chaos to which they countered the 
formal stillness, symmetrical order, and traditionalism of the sonnet. 
What one finds in Benn's early embrace of national socialism (the will 
to form, the dissolution of chaos, a new law) is what authors of the 
opposition saw in poetry. Rudolf Hagelstange writes, for example, 
concerning the sonnet: "In ihrer strengen Form . . . manifestierte sich 
schon auBerlich der Unwille gegen das Formlose, der Wille zu neuem 
Gesetz ... das Sonett, gegen den Ungeist kreiert, wurde geradezu 
zu einer Modeform des Widerstandes" ("Die Form," 36). Through 
poetry, which is, according to Hagelstange, itself timeless, one can 
overcome temporal chaos. The theme of his sonnets, he writes, is "die 
Uberwindung des zeitlichen Chaos <lurch Besinnung auf iiber= und 
auBerzeitliche Krafte des Menschen" (36). 14 Cornelia Jungrichter has 
shown, in response to Ziolkowski, that the sonnet form was used for 
the transmission of Nazi as well as anti-Nazi content. 15 While her 
claim does not diminish the correctness of Ziolkowski's analysis of the 
intentions of the oppositional poets, it does raise questions as to the 
sufficiency and validity of mere form as protest. Moreover, it rein-
forces Ketelsen's claim that formalism and decisionism are modern 
phenomena that envelop national socialism as well as much of avant-
garde art. Adding to the data, one might note that the turn from 
Weimar to the Third Reich was viewed by many contemporaries as one 
from chaos to order. 16 In a tribute to Stefan George prepared during 
the period when he heralded national socialism, Benn himself ad-
dressed the proximity of aesthetic form to political order: "Sagen Sie 
fur Form immer Zucht oder Ordnung oder Disziplin oder ... Anord-
nungsnotwendigkeit, alle diese Worte, die uns so gelaufig wurden, 
weil in ihrem Namen auch die geschichtliche Bewegung sich zu pra-
gen versucht, das ist Georgesches Gebiet" (GW, 1:473). 
Benn's formalism plays a role on the finite level of his poetic images 
as well. In "Statische Gedichte" Benn would counter Nietzsche's dy-
namic perspectivism with the more stable Renaissance notion of per-
spective.17 But the concept and potential uses of perspective are as 
unstable as perspectivism itself. The artist who works with perspec-
tive may adopt a conventional technique and place in the foreground 
what is essential, letting what is insignificant recede, or may instead, 
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following a religious tradition, create a work in which the background 
is highlighted: the painter draws a sacred path to the holy. Thus, in a 
broader sense, one's personal perspective still plays a role. Moreover, 
the illusionist potential of perspective must be considered: artists such 
as the fifteenth-century Paolo Uccello, the eighteenth-century Gio-
vanni Piranesi, or the contemporary M. C. Escher employ perspective 
in order to trick viewers and undermine their orientation; this leads to 
a coupling of linear perspective and perspectivism. Paintings that 
draw attention to their formal devices, to their own deception func-
tion, stress the distinction between three-dimensional and two-di-
mensional art. While sculpture has a certain independence, painting 
depends on a viewer; indeed, painting depends on the deception of 
the viewer (the canvas is two-dimensional) even as it purports to 
capture reality. The formal stress within painting that leads to this self-
reflexive perspectivism would seem to mirror Benn's own stress on 
formalism in the realm of poetry. Hegel's description of the subordina-
tion of content to form in painting, "die subjektive Kunst des Machens 
[wird] zur Hauptsache" (15:35), applies to Benn within the sphere of 
poetry: what is arbitrary and contingent, the poet's subjective affirma-
tion of form, is etemalized at the expense of substance. 18 Benn's at-
tempt to counter Nietzsche by way of the formal structure of perspec-
tive is misguided; the truth of perspective is perspectivism. 
Beyond the issue of pure formalism as it relates to twentieth-century 
art and national socialist politics is the distinct, but related, issue of 
Benn's inability to counter national socialism in a philosophically co-
herent manner. In "Statische Gedichte" he suggests that since all 
positions are illusory, to take any position is to err. The only valid 
position is one of indifference. But because indifference is itself just 
another illusory position, an equally legitimate stance would be the 
active nihilism of destruction. With his formalist position Benn cannot 
argue against the power positivism of national socialism. Moreover, 
viewed on a metalevel, Benn's indifference is the reverse side of power 
positivism: it is the result of his longing for independence. Power 
positivism would claim its independence from existing reality by ac-
tively and arbitrarily negating its institutions. Like the Cynics of the 
Greek and Roman worlds, with whom Benn has much in common, 
the poet can only watch as his political "partners" destroy a world 
whose validity he would agree is, after all, only relative. 
As I suggested earlier, Benn was engaged with problems resulting 
from the contemporary world's loss of an absolute value system. 19 His 
poetry represents the search for an aesthetic absolute that would 
overcome nihilism and assume the role left vacant by the loss of 
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religious faith and philosophical truth. Artists represent for Benn "die 
letzten Reste eines Menschen, der noch an <las Absolute glaubt und in 
ihm lebt" (GW, 1:520). The poet places "gegen den allgemeinen Nihi-
lismus der Werte eine neue Transzendenz" (GW, 1:500). Benn's effort 
to found the absolute in the stillness of art may be mistaken in a sense 
that transcends the problems of his own formalism: if nihilism is the 
inability to ground values, then it is difficult to see how art can over-
come nihilism. Art can provide us with insights into the consequences 
of nihilism; it can also provide a temporary and illusory, if also prolep-
tic, stilling of its effects. Moreover, art can dramatize the need for 
truth and suggest directions for seeking it. But art cannot, without 
itself becoming philosophy, ground values, or justify the claim that it 
can ground values. In fact, without becoming philosophy, art cannot 
even legitimate its own existence. What is needed in the wake of the 
political and ethical consequences of decisionism is not aestheticism, 
but the rehabilitation of transcendental arguments, which alone can 
ground a priori norms. 20 One cannot demand that a poet provide 
us with ethical norms, but one can criticize-from an ethical stand-
point-a poet who views aesthetics as the only valid location of 
norms. One cannot criticize an author for finding comfort in aestheti-
cism, yet one can criticize an author who views aestheticism as the 
only answer to contemporary ills and terrors and so works against the 
possibility of any substantive content or of the unity of form and 
content. 21 
Subjectivism 
One of the most central issues since the breakdown of German ideal-
ism is intersubjectivity, the concern not with subject-object but with 
subject-subject relations. Benn's poems tend to ignore this aspect of 
postidealist philosophy and culture: their focus is not subject-subject 
relations, but the poet's grappling with objective being. The second 
stanza of "Wer allein ist-" with its mockery of intersubjective rela-
tions and its celebration of the artist's consciousness underlines this 
point. Moreover, the addressee of a Benn poem is frequently the 
mirror image of the poetic self, as, for example, in "Trunkene Flut" or 
"Statische Gedichte." The poems redound to assurances rather than 
dialectical structures or processes of reflection. In addition, they re-
main, in Benn's own words, essentially private, "monologisch" (GW, 
1:547). The poem is not directed to its listeners as much as it revolves 
silently within itself. Consistent with the elevation of stasis, the poem 
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is to have no effect. The denial of a recipient seems to guarantee this 
structure. Benn himself speaks of "das Gedicht an niemanden gerich-
tet" (GW, 1:524). Much of what the poet would claim to know must 
remain a mystery, and so it is no surprise that in a recent dissertation 
Regina Weber suggests that Benn owes a great deal to the tradition of 
gnosticism. 22 Though Benn may justly assert that contemporary dis-
course is overwhelmingly shallow, 23 his private and hermetic mysti-
cism, which even in his own eyes should pass over into silence, 24 
hardly answers this problem. 25 Not only does one recognize here a 
counterproductive hermeticism, Benn's elevation of the self frees him 
from en~aging other views and shades him from political and social 
context. 6 
The subjectivism of the poet and the apparent substantiality of what 
abides collapse into one. The denial of content even in the service of 
objectivity reinforces, behind its own back, the subjective impulse. 
Because it is not possible to determine the good or the just, the poet 
surreptitiously enjoys the status of being identical with the highest 
position available to humankind, and does so without having to con-
sider alternatives or argue for the validity of such a stance. There is a 
striking similarity not only between the formalism of national social-
ism and Benn's view of poetry, but also between his monologue po-
etry and his earlier view of national socialism as "monistisch, antidia-
lektisch" (GW, 1:214). The other, which Benn cannot define but can 
only circumscribe ("hiniiberlangen in jenes andere-in was?"),27 is so 
vague and empty as to be a merely subjective projection. 28 Benn's 
loyalty to objective truth and his unwillingness to define this truth are 
one with his subjectivism. 
Benn's claim to be able to draw ethical consequences from art ("eine 
neue ethische Realitiit" [GW, 4:161)) deviates from a view of ethics as 
knowledge of the good. For him, aesthetic creation usurps traditional 
ethics: "alle ethischen Kategorien miinden fur den Dichter in die 
Kategorie der individuellen Vollendung" (GW, 4:221). The poet's affir-
mation of stasis as an ethical category remains locked within a private 
ethics and is as such the negation of ethics. Moreover, if art has no 
purpose (and ideally no effect), the ethics of art becomes an ethics of 
indifference, indeed an ethics that would cancel itself as soon as it 
made a plea on its own behalf. "Statische Gedichte" is in part a victim 
of this problem. The contradiction in Benn's attempt to communicate 
the truth of isolated subjectivity illustrates, in a performative rather 
than propositional manner, that subjectivity is after all not the highest 
truth. 29 Our knowledge of Benn's monologic efforts presupposes a 
dialogic sphere of explication. 30 
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Indifference 
Having briefly discussed the formalism and subjectivism of Benn's 
poetry, I turn now to his revisions of the tradition and the conse-
quences of these revisions for politics. Benn employs the language of 
mysticism in poems like "Trunkene Flut" or "Reisen" but empties his 
rhetoric of all religious content. Not only does he advocate an unhal-
lowed mysticism, he, unlike the Middle and Late Stoics, abandons 
social responsibility and the sage's ideal of friendship. In his ninth 
letter Seneca explicitly criticizes the suggestion that the wise man 
attain tranquillity of mind by removing himself from all contact with 
the world; repose and service to society are reciprocally beneficial. 31 
Seneca stresses, not withdrawal, but integration and friendship. 32 The 
Middle and Late Stoics argued that a proper peace of mind enables the 
self to act in harmony with society: tranquillitas animi leads to integra-
tion and responsibility, not isolation or insensitivity.33 Not only does 
Benn deviate from the fullness of religious mysticism and the inter-
subjective ideals of Stoicism, his idealist leanings take idealism into 
a new arena. In a poem like "Wer allein ist-" he embraces the abso-
lute sphere of idealist art. He seems to distinguish-as many of his 
contemporaries do not-between an instrumental, technical reason, 
which he mistrusts or even detests, 34 and a higher reason that repre-
sents the basic irrefutability of thought. 35 For the legitimacy of his 
claims, however, Benn can appeal, only irrationally, to his artistic 
mission, his selection as poet and seer. His assertions are not ground-
ed in anything beyond his own subjectivity and isolation ("Wer allein 
ist, ist auch im Geheimnis") or his self-proclaimed tragic suffering, 
and these are hardly valid criteria for aesthetic truth. Undifferentiated 
unity, the unconscious, even suffering are prominent in idealist aes-
thetics, but they are normally superseded by self-reflection and at-
tempts at legitimation that bring art into the sphere of philosophy-
as, for example, in the work of Holderlin. 36 Benn's elevation of 
thought, on the other hand, falls back into a kind of dogmatism; its 
validity derives not from the consistency and immanence of its claims, 
but rather from its origins and rhetoric alone. 
In the sphere of politics Benn's position is equally problematic. The 
origins of his embrace of Statik, as the comparison with Rosenberg 
showed, are clearly political; but a stasis that passes over into formal-
ism and the negation of position-taking loses its political thrust and 
credibility. Though stasis, viewed as the negation of contemporary 
history, functions as a critical concept, when viewed in the light of the 
idea that history cannot or should not be changed, it has a fatalist 
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dimension that renders its critical import impotent. Benn's reception 
reinforces this point. The poet's popularity after the war appears to 
have derived in part from his declaration of the futility of political 
action-including, of course, resistance-and his legitimation of pas-
sivity and neutral observation. The Benn of "Statische Gedichte," no 
different from the Benn of 1933, disparages the mundaneness of ev-
eryday, empirical politics and is unaffected by acts of injustice. 
Resistance is not normally judged by virtue of external success, yet 
here a fundamental, not a contingent, error is at play. The elevation of 
stasis occurs less in conflict with the world than alongside it. Stasis is, 
as we have said, on the one hand, eternal truth-and with this, a 
standard by which one can resist the expedient instrumentalization of 
humanity; yet it is also stillness and withdrawal, and as such it repre-
sents the ineffectiveness of interiority. While it does not follow that 
reflection on ahistorical norms must lead to a turn away from reality (it 
could of course, and should, ultimately lead to a desire for the realiza-
tion of these norms), it can be shown that writers of the inner emigra-
tion, among them Benn, did in fact often denigrate the importance of 
history in relation to the transcendent other. They proposed a totality 
that excluded history. 37 
Benn, wanting to assert independence above all, stresses, even 
more than his contemporaries, the difference between his sphere and 
the sphere of the world. However, in distancing himself from all 
ideologies or Richtungen, he effectively sides with the power of the 
majority. To counter the arbitrary totalitarianism of a single Weltan-
schauung by suggesting, as he does in "Statische Gedichte," that one 
embrace no Weltanschauung, is self-defeating. The "beautiful soul" 
that would not be tarnished by action is blemished by its refusal to act 
and thus by its support of ruling opinion.38 Benn's separation of the 
private and the public, along with his elevation of the former, might be 
viewed as the culmination of a religious concept whose roots go back 
to Luther's reading of Romans 13 and his doctrine of two realms. 
Luther's positions are echoed in the passivity with which much of the 
German population met the conservative restoration of the nineteenth 
century and the instrumental authoritarianism of the twentieth. 39 The 
concept of two realms is directly apparent in the title of Benn's own 
Doppelleben. In becoming an acknowledged advocate of Luther's doc-
trine, 40 Benn fails to recognize that his stillness serves the purposes, 
not of negation and resistance, but of affirmation and consent. 
Benn's sense, as a physician, that objective truth is restricted to the 
natural sciences appears to have led him to the claim, quite common 
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in the modem world, that ethical positions are singularly subjective 
and the domain of the individual's personal interest. 41 In the face of 
this dissolving attitude, technical structures have become more and 
more universal, bringing the world to the brink of self-destruction; in 
such a world the need for universal, rather than private, values be-
comes ever more severe.42 Benn's concept of stasis, however, remains 
subjective and restricted; it is an ideal of indifference and emptiness, 
not one of engagement. The synthesis of opposites that Benn invokes 
in his static poetry does not contain the particularity of life and so fails 
on its own terms. His ideology of aesthetic stillness cannot counter 
nihilism, and his quietism cannot stem political movements informed 
by unjust goals. His insight, however, into the need for stable and 
transcendent positions-what he calls Statik-should not be lost in an 
age of continuing crisis, nor should his rhetorically powerful and 
intellectually informed artistic invocations of this idea. 
9. Theoretical Postscript 
As mentioned in the Introduction, I call these readings "aesthetic" in 
derivation of a definition of art as the sensuous appearance of truth. 
Consequently, I have been attentive above all to two dimensions: first, 
the formal presentation of the poems, including the ways in which 
content is a function of form and vice versa; and second, the coher-
ence and validity of the ideas expressed in the works. Further, in order 
to unravel the poems, I have found it necessary to focus on intellectu-
al-historical allusions. An intellectual-historical moment is also pres-
ent in my attempt to situate Benn's poems in the context of inner 
emigration as well as within the history of the idea of Ruhe. 
The ill repute that intellectual history still suffers in the eyes of 
many literary critics stems, first, from the fact that often, rather than 
employing the intellectual-historical method to shed light on a literary 
work, scholars have pointed to texts as documentary proof of particu-
lar historical developments. Intellectual history often fails to account 
for the text as an aesthetic construct. To counteract this, I have traced 
the meanings of Benn's formulations from within the poems them-
selves, and only by way of the poems have I drawn attention to exter-
nal factors. In pursuing the meanings of cryptic passages one does 
need to move beyond the poems. It is one of the critic's tasks to enrich 
the reader's understanding of a poem by unraveling allusions and in 
the process demonstrating how the poem uses traditional images or 
motifs in either new or traditional ways. Without a knowledge of 
Greek mythology, one cannot begin to grasp "Trunkene Flut." With-
out a knowledge of Greek philosophy or the German literary tradition, 
one remains blind to the rich dimensions of "Wer allein ist-." A 
knowledge of Aristotle, Seneca, and Meister Eckhart, to name only 
three pronounced influences, has the same function in our readings of 
"Statische Gedichte" and "Reisen." Our understanding of the intellec-
tual-historical allusions in these poems has influenced our under-
standing of not only the content but also the formal structures of these 
works. Intellectual history, used as a tool of close reading, has become 
anything but an exercise in external criticism. 
A second objection to the intellectual-historical focus stems from 
a more sociologically oriented reading process, which argues that 
artistic structures should be viewed first and foremost by way of 
their sociological genesis: texts are products of particular historical 
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and class settings and corresponding ideological mind-sets. To this I 
would counter that literary works do have a genesis, but this is true 
only in the most trivial sense; all intellectual endeavors have a genesis. 
With this nothing is said about a work's literary or philosophical value. 
Historical conditions help us grasp what authors may have meant to 
say and why they said what they said or in what ways their positions 
are (or are not) representative of their times, but the focus on origins 
does not help us recognize whether what the author said is valid, that 
is, whether the ideas in the work are true. Historical conditions thus 
do little to help us evaluate the text's aesthetic worth. The aesthetic 
dimension, what one understands by the literary structures and the 
philosophical value of the work-which alone determine its universal-
ity or lack of universality-is reduced to a genealogical one. Benn's 
definitive embrace of static poetry is in part a development of his 
earlier metaphysical and historical cynicism, in part the consequence 
of his increasing elevation of form, in part an attempt to justify with-
drawal in the face of national socialist calamities. It would be errone-
ous to declare that Benn's assertion of ahistorical truth is false because 
it developed as a result of these biographical and historical factors. 
Validity is not determined by genesis. One must distinguish between 
the external conditions-be they historical, psychological, technologi-
cal, or whatever-that lead to the conception of an idea or the comple-
tion of a work, and the far more important conditions under which a 
statement can be true or false, its philosophical presuppositions. 1 To 
criticize Benn's particular ahistoricism one needs to do more than 
point to its genesis in a particular historical setting. In my critique of 
Benn, therefore, I have been primarily attentive not to the sphere of 
discovery but to the sphere of validity, the philosophical coherence of 
Benn's poetic statements. 
My response to the sociologically oriented criticism of intellectual 
history thus brings me to my aesthetic orientation, and with it my 
stress on the coherence of the texts' ideas rather than on the condi-
tions of their genesis. 2 In adopting this approach, I attempt to avoid a 
third and final problem with the intellectual-historical method: the 
frequent description of ideas in their intellectual-historical sequence 
without a philosophical analysis of their validity. 
In focusing on philosophical coherence, I do not mean to deny that 
art has in part the function to sketch multivalent positions, to portray 
ambiguities. What is important is the level at which these ambiguities 
are portrayed and the extent to which they become linguistic corol-
laries of a more complex unity. Not all statements in a literary work 
aspire to universality, and there are many ambiguities that do not lead 
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to overarching philosophical contradictions: for example, the identity 
of the Schopfergestalt in "Trunkene Flut," our reading of the valley in 
"Statische Gedichte," or the connotations of Grenze in the poem "Rei-
sen." Though we can make arguments in favor of one reading or 
another, these ambiguities are not completely resolved. The poem 
evokes in each case a multiplicity of possibilities, a multiplicity of 
meanings, and they must be read together-that is, within a higher, 
more complex unity. 3 The philosophical tenability of a text's statement 
does not rise or fall on the ambiguity of such finite passages. If, 
however, the statement of a literary work were that all positions are 
necessarily illusory, necessarily untenable, then the work's own claim 
that this is so, would be untenable-and so the work, in its claim, 
would cancel itself. 4 Such a work may be formally interesting but in 
the long run aesthetically weak. If a text deals with complex philo-
sophical issues yet resolves them without itself becoming a contradic-
tory work, then it has met, from a philosophical standpoint, a stan-
dard of excellence; the remaining task for the critic is to consider the 
value of the text's formal structures and emotional import. There are 
of course works that remain contradictory on the level of their general 
statements. The existence of ontological contradictions cannot be de-
nied. To praise a work, however, precisely because it does not resolve 
contradictions would be to abandon the law of noncontradiction, 
without which all thought is arbitrary and all evaluation reduced to 
external conditions of power. Some texts tackle great and complex 
problems but fail to resolve them. Such works can be masterful, and 
their very nonresolution may give them a certain dramatic impetus; 
yet one should recognize that their excellence derives from the effort 
to push contradictions to their conclusion, not from the fact that they 
fail to resolve them. Much of Benn's writing belongs in this category: it 
is complex not only on the level of its finite images and allusions, but 
also on the general level of its wrestling with abstract philosophical 
issues. 
The literature on Benn and politics tends to focus either on the 
historical details of Benn's brief declaration for national socialism or on 
the psychological and historical background that led him to find this 
movement attractive. Historical and genetic work along these lines is 
valuable in its own right; yet by itself it fails to illuminate the literary 
elements of Benn's poetic works, and it cannot evaluate his positions. 
Critics who would uncover the political deficiencies in Benn's artistic 
creations must be able to ground their positions or enter into an 
immanent critique-that is, accept Benn's position in order to demon-
strate its internal inadequacies. 
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It is ironic that skepticism toward transcendental norms has result-
ed in a shift in literary criticism toward psychoanalytic, sociological, 
and historical studies, and that many of these studies purport to be 
rigorous in their critique of ideology, when in fact their very abandon-
ment of absolute norms makes their critique, and the foundation of 
that critique, arbitrary. The problem of ldeologiekritik is one of enlight-
enment. Are the measures used to criticize other positions themselves 
grounded? If not, then the critique is ungrounded, and its claim to 
truth-that is, its claim for the falsity of alternative positions-itself 
ultimately ideological. 
Even the critic who argues that he or she is merely uncovering an 
author's naive and mistaken belief in a priori norms, cannot, without 
adopting an absolute position, consider the author's position invalid. 
If one were to oppose Benn by asserting that ahistoricism is in princi-
ple false (all positions are conditioned, there are no absolute truths), 
then this very assertion must be conditioned and in principle false. 
Any global negation of ahistoricism is itself ahistorical and thus self-
canceling. 5 
Evaluation is essential to the practice of literary criticism. Today 
there may seem little danger that informed critics will simply adopt 
the attitudes of the authors they are analyzing. Nonetheless, the fig-
ure by which authors become authorities for the private metaphysics 
of the critic occasionally recurs when the author becomes an authority 
on the dissolution of truth. The practice is a bit more subtle, but for 
that no less invalid. Because the author asserts that there is no truth-
or that if there were any truth we couldn't know it-or that if there 
were truth, and we could know it, we still couldn't communicate it-
the critic is unaware of having adopted a truth statement in siding 
with the author (whom the critic really shouldn't be able to under-
stand, even if the author had something to say). Given, then, the need 
for evaluation, the need for critics to distance themselves from authors 
and weigh their positions, and the apparent lack of a grounded posi-
tion from which this evaluation is to take place, immanent critique 
becomes an essential tool of the literary critic. 
In the light of this situation, I have made an effort to sketch in my 
evaluation of Benn such positions as the following: 
An author who asserts that there are no absolute truths cannot 
even recognize the truth of this statement; such a position is 
contradictory, self-canceling, untenable. 
An external critique of the content of a position from a stance 
that does not ground itself is structurally similar, in its formal-
ism and decisionism, to the position criticized. 
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An embrace of stillness and stasis whose legitimacy derives 
merely from experience is philosophically no different from the 
elevation of a position insofar as it is based on nature. 
An elevation of form at the expense of content leaves one with 
no compelling reason not to accept an aestheticization of politics 
engineered with unjust goals in mind. 
A monologic art is a contradiction in terms. Not only can one not 
argue for this position without contradicting oneself, the truth of 
such art is silence. 
The artist who embraces withdrawal in order to be free of the 
political sphere remains within the political sphere insofar as the 
lack of voice becomes implicit consent for the ruling opinion. 
A true absolute is not exclusive and so contains within it a con-
cern for the realization of norms in history. 
10. Summary 
This study opened with an analysis of "Trunkene Flut," a Dionysian 
work in which only by reading against the grain could we recognize 
the poem's hidden Apollinian moments, closure and stillness. Next to 
be considered was "Wer allein ist-," one of Benn's most famous 
affirmations of aesthetic stillness. Varying a series of motifs that reach 
back to the pre-Socratics, Benn views stillness as the essence of abso-
lute art. In "Statische Gedichte" he associates the poet with the sage: 
only a person who avoids distractions and exhibits arn(!al;{a and 
avraQXEta can find true peace of mind. Stillness is also an epistemo-
logical ideal. Benn's perspectivism, unlike Nietzsche's, suggests that 
only from a position of stability or stasis can one recognize the inad-
equacies of everyday disorientation and envisage the absolute. In 
"Reisen" Benn allies himself with specific aspects of the mystic and 
Stoic traditions, even as he deviates from their most hallowed reli-
gious and intersubjective ideals. The expansive Dionysian transcen-
dence of "Trunkene Flut" becomes in this later work a tranquil, self-
enclosed transcendence. 
The four spheres in which Ruhe has traditionally played a role-
religion, aesthetics, psychology, and politics-are all evident in Benn. 
In a religious context Benn alludes to the Aristotelian elevation of 
motionlessness and the Christian veneration of repose; in each case, 
however, he alters the specifically religious moment. The poet as-
sumes the role of Aristotle's unmoved mover and usurps Christ both 
as the model sufferer and as the figure whose quietude and repose are 
exemplary for humanity. Abandoning an earlier commitment to dyna-
mism and dissonance, Benn adopts an aesthetic ideal that harks 
back-even in its difference-to the stillness of German Klassik. Stasis 
serves the poet's personal goal of endurance amidst chaos and pain, 
but Benn, unlike the Stoics, restricts harmonic repose to the purely 
private sphere. By embracing stasis over Bewegung, he adds a new 
dimension to the concept of political Ruhe, while at the same time 
perpetuating nonprogressive structures visible throughout the histo-
ry of German quietude and interiority. 
We viewed Benn's poems within the context of that complex phe-
nomenon known as the inner emigration, which was discussed pri-
marily as an elevation of stillness and transhistorical truth that at-
tempted to counter the national socialist valuation of the expedient, 
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the momentary, and the powerful. National socialism can be viewed 
as a form of relativism that enables arbitrary acts of tyranny. Writers of 
the inner emigration, among them Benn, recognized this structure 
but-for various reasons-did not develop their insights beyond the 
moment of abstract reflection. 
Rather than grounding my critique of Benn's concept of stasis (along 
with his earlier support of national socialism) on the fact that my 
views of life and literature are different from his and that he has failed 
to meet an externally imposed standard, I have attempted to demon-
strate that many of his ideas conflict with their own presuppositions 
and so cancel themselves. These philosophical weaknesses do not 
erase the value of Benn's static poetry; his evocations of wholeness 
and harmony, of abiding values and genuine selfhood, demand admi-
ration even as he tries, unsuccessfully, to overcome nihilism and reach 
the universal through decisionistic and formalist means alone. 
My response to Benn's poems is, in summary, ambivalent. The four 
works analyzed here are excellently crafted texts, rich with hidden 
meanings both in their formal structures and in their multifarious 
intellectual-historical allusions. The poems contain individual insights 
of transhistorical relevance, which the references to av6.µvrJau; and 
the allusions to earlier thinkers cleverly reinforce. Benn's answer to 
nihilism, which culminates in the concept of the static poem, is, how-
ever, insufficient to its own purpose and internally contradictory. 
Nonetheless, I take this yearning for stasis to be an intuitively correct 
desire for transcendence and an understandable longing to carve a 
space for himself beyond the world of disorientation and injustice. 
Just as Benn's inner emigration is in part admirable, in part insuffi-
cient, so too his embrace of stasis-and, given a definition of art that 





1. Rilke would also lend himself to a monograph on stillness. Though Ril-
ke and Benn share a positive reception of stillness, two points of difference 
might be noted. First, Rilke consistently affirms a dynamic stillness, and 
with this, transformation and change (see especially his Sonette an Orpheus), 
whereas Benn increasingly elevates stasis and does so in part at the expense 
of dynamism. Second, Rilke associates Ruhe with a condition desirable for 
humankind but ultimately beyond our reach (hence his many references to 
plants and his affirmation of a religious tradition that attributes stillness to 
divinity); this contrasts with Benn's suggestion that humans, in particular 
the poet and the sage, do indeed attain stillness. 
2. For general commentary on Benn's concept of Statik see especially Stein-
hagen, Statische Gedichte, and Theo Meyer, 76-91. Less helpful, though not 
completely without insight, is the dissertation by Reichel. 
3. Of the four poems I analyze, only the two middle works, "Wer allein 
ist-" and "Statische Gedichte," were actually published in the collection Sta-
tische Gedichte. 
4. See Steinhagen, Statische Gedichte, 244-45. 
5. Critics, restricting the origins of Statik to the natural sciences, have over-
looked the technical usage of the term in Weimar legal philosophy-for ex-
ample, in Kelsen, where Statik and Dynamik designate, respectively, "Die 
Geltung der Staatsordnung" and "Die Entstehung der Staatsordnung." 
There are thus precedents for Benn's association of Statik with what is syn-
chronic or ahistorical, even if, as in his reformulation of the scientific conno-
tations of Statik, he gives the word a new dimension. 
6. The one exception is my discussion of the political connotations of Sta-
tik, which leads to a revision of our understanding of Benn's relationship to 
inner emigration. 
7. Since readers of this book are likely to know German, I have not bur-
dened the text with translations of quoted passages. For anyone interested in 
teaching these poems in English, translations of two of the four are available 
as follows: "Wer allein ist-" (R, 113-14; S, 213-15, 276-77); and "Reisen" 
(R, 118-19; S, 247, 283-84). Individual stanzas of "Statische Gedichte" have 
been translated in the secondary literature, but I have yet to see a complete 
translation. "Trunkene Flut" has, to my knowledge, never been translated. 
8. Besides selecting the works for their illustration of Benn's developing 
conception of stasis, the density of their intellectual-historical allusions, and 
their varied, though equally elegant, formal structures, I have endeavored to 
choose examples from among poems that are often reprinted and thus fre-
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quently taught, even if the poems selected are perhaps less often taught 
than Benn's more dissonant works. 
9. For detailed information on the interesting prehistory of Ruhe, see my 
earlier study Dynamic Stillness. 
10. Hillebrand introduces a representative selection of Benn criticism by 
stating, "Die meisten Beitrage gehen literaturimmanent vor" (5). Among the 
sociological readings, Schri:ider's studies from 1978 and 1986 are especially 
perceptive. In his recommendation for future scholarship Wodtke notes that 
"Benns Zusammenhang mit den abendlandischen Geistestraditionen" has 
been neglected (Gottfried Benn, 106). The few noteworthy contributions to 
Benn criticism from this vantage point are Brode, "Studien" of 1972 and 
1973, and Wodtke, "Die Antike." Homeyer also approaches Benn by way of 
his relationship to intellectual history, though her contribution brings fewer 
particular insights. 
11. It is this concern with logical coherence as an element of beauty that 
will lead me to include an excursus on national socialism and transcendental 
norms, as I approach, and attempt to ground, my critique of Benn. 
Chapter 2 
1. See, e.g., GW, 2:300. 
2. The poet aligns himself with Nietzsche's anti-Hegelian view, according 
to which the lyricist transcends subjectivity: "Das 'Ich' des Lyrikers tont also 
aus dem Abgrunde des Seins: seine 'Subjektivitat' im Sinne der neueren 
Asthetiker ist eine Einbildung ... Insofern aber das Subjekt Ki.instler ist, ist 
es bereits von seinem individuellen Willen erli:ist und gleichsam Medium 
geworden, durch das hindurch eine wahrhaft seiende Subjekt seine Erli:i-
sung im Scheine feiert" (1:37, 40). 
3. The passage is clearly influenced by Lucien Levy-Bruhl's Fonctions men-
tales dans les societes inferieures, a work Benn knew in German translation and 
from which he quotes in his contemporary "Zur Problematik des Dichteri-
schen" (GW, 1:76-77). 
4. In the dominant myths, it is Hermes and not Demeter who descends 
into Hades to rescue Persephone. The reference "steigt Demeter" could thus 
be symbolic: with the literal ascension of Persephone, Demeter, representing 
the sphere of the earth, symbolically ascends; the earth blossoms. It could 
also signify, as with other instances later in the poem, Benn's desire to alter 
the chronological and spatial components of myth, a desire whose source 
and telos is a sense of undivided unity. A precedent for this would be the fre-
quent overlapping of Demeter and Persephone in traditional mythology. Cf. 
Rohde, 1:211-12. However, the matter is probably much simpler. There is an 
older and lesser-known version of the myth (represented in the forty-first 
Orphic hymn and in the myth of Dysaules) according to which Demeter her-
self descends into Hades to retrieve Persephone. Ovid alludes to this tradi-
tion, without himself following it, both in Metamorphoses (5:533) and in Fasti 
(4:612). Cf. Maiten, 533, and Kerenyi, 422. 
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5. Benn describes Dionysus as being "umschwii.rmt von Mii.naden in 
Fuchspelz und gehornt" (GW, 1:20). 
6. See especially Reinhold Grimm, Gottfried Benn, 41-49. 
7. The poet may want us, at least at this point, to think of both Prome-
theus and Christ. In Benn's poem "Die Dii.nin" the two figures are explicitly 
viewed as parallel (GW, 3:103-6). Cf. Lohner, 158. 
8. See also "Gedichte": "Am Steingeroll der groBen Weltruine, dem 01-
berg, wo die tiefste Seele litt ... " (GW, 3:196). 
9. Cf. Benn's comments on Prometheus's suffering in a letter to Kathe von 
Porada from 7 September 1933: "Europa ist der Erdteil der Abgriinde u der 
Schatten, denken Sie doch, daB im hellsten Griechenland Prometheus an 
den Felsen muBte u. wie er litt!" (T, 138). 
10. For Benn the most significant symbol of mankind is the suffering indi-
vidual, and it is primarily the poet's extreme suffering that allows him to 
identify with the gods. See especially "Dennoch die Schwerter halten" (GW, 
3:182) and "Gedichte" (GW, 3:196). See also Benn's quotation of Balzac, "Wer 
Dichtung sagt, sagt Leid" (GW, 1:307). 
11. See Rohde's Psyche, 2:3 and 2:32-35, a text with which Benn was famil-
iar (GW, 2:133). 
12. The pertinent passage in "Pallas" reads: "Pallas ... sieht Apollon, den 
Gefahrten der Szene, und ihr fa.Ht die Bemerkung des Proteus ein, des Be-
herrschers der Meerkii.lber, daB an dieser Stelle nicht weit vor, nach Gotter-
stunden gerechnet, ein anderer stehen wiirde, um die Auferstehung der To-
ten zu verkiinden" (GW, 1:368). 
13. The poet will identify with Odysseus's entreaty of the dead once again 
in "Quartii.r" (GW, 3:185-87). 
14. Benn's poem also echoes Rimbaud's famous poem of 1871, "Le bateau 
ivre," with its intertwining of the imagery of intoxication, water, unity, and 
death, its dissolution of the finite, and its exploratory, almost random, vision 
of unreal images and spaces (Rimbaud, 128-31). 
15. See Brode, "Studien ... II," 296-98. Brode, however, doesn't recog-
nize the significance of die Mutter for Benn before 1930. 
16. On the complexity of the relationship between sacrifice and self-preser-
vation see Heimann. 
17. The only difference is that "fleckt" appears in the opening lines as part 
of a compound: "trance- und traumgefleckt." 
18. On the increasing erasure of the finite verb in Benn's lyrics-first, as an 
effort to avoid logical propositions, and second, as an attempt to convey sta-
sis-see Seidler. 
19. See, for example, Proclus, The Elements of Theology, props. 33 and 146; 
Pseudo-Dionysus, Divine Names, 4:8-9 = 704D-705B, and 4:14 = 712D-
713A; Cusanus, De possest, especially 18:1-24:22; and more recently, Goethe, 
"Wenn im Unendlichen dasselbe" (1:367), and Schiller, "Die Worte des Glau-
bens" (Gedichte, 157). Consider also Benn's own stress on circularity in his 
later definition of "Statische Metaphysik" (GW, 2:158). 
20. To borrow from Krieger's expanded definition of the figure of ekphrasis 
or the imitation in literature of a work of plastic art, we can say that Benn's 
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poem "takes on the 'still' elements of plastic form which we normally attri-
bute to the spatial arts" (6). 
21. Nemerov plays on this ambiguity frequently; see, for example, 6, 22, 
97, 137, 216, 231, and 440. 
22. The poet, as a suffering figure in the age of art, is representative of 
modern humanity in the same way that Christ was representative of hu-
manity in the age of religion. See the informative discussion of Benn's imita-
tio (or usurpatio) Christi in Schroder, Benn und die Deutschen, 39-57. 
23. See Lohner, 212. 
24. See, for example, Schiller, "Das Ideal und das Leben" (Gedichte, 135-
40) or Holderlin, "An den Aether" (1:204-5). 
25. In Nietzsche's anomalous, though influential, reading of the Greek 
gods, Apollo is associated with the world of dreams (1:21-24). 
26. In this context consider Benn's affirmation of the stillness in moving 
things: "Die Woge, die auf u nieder geht, veranderlich u. doch identisch, 
Sansaras Rad, das sich dreht, doch nicht bewegt, sind tiefere Symbole" 
(Oelze no. 110 [6 December 1936]). 
27. Wodtke sees three stages in Benn's poetic development, in each of 
which a certain mythological figure, together with the cluster of ideas he 
represents, predominates: first, Dionysus; second, Orpheus; third, Apollo. 
"Trunkene Flut," though primarily Dionysian, clearly moves in the direc-
tion of the Orphic motif of revival, and even in the direction of Apollinian 
closure. 
Chapter 3 
1. See Theo Meyer, 327. 
2. Nietzsche writes in Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen that 
Heraclitus's world "zeigt nirgends ein Verharren, eine Unzerstorbarkeit, ein 
Bollwerk im Strome" (3:369). 
3. Cf. GW, 4:185. The original can be found in Diels and Kranz, 154, no. 
12. 
4. Cf. similarly GW, 3:161. With his stress on the poet's (almost heroic) 
ability to stand amidst the flow (and confusion) of everyday life, Benn reem-
ploys-without adopting its clear religious and ethical implications-a sig-
nificant Baroque motif. See, for example, Gryphius, Catharina van Georgien, I, 
813, and IV, 527. For a general discussion of the frequency of Baroque ele-
ments in the opposition poetry of the inner emigration see Hoffmann, Oppo-
sition Poetry, 165-66. 
5. On geology as the transformation of history in Benn see Allemann, es-
pecially 36-44. 
6. Cf. Benn's own statement in Doppelleben: "Kunst ... hebt die Zeit und 
die Geschichte auf" (GW, 4:129). 
7. Benn links Statik with emotionlessness when he speaks of a "Wieder-
kehr ... zum Statischen u. Affektlosen" (Oelze no. 188 [3 November 1940]). 
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8. In "Konnen Dichter die Welt andern?" Benn states: "Kunstwerke sind 
phanomenal, historisch unwirksam, praktisch folgenlos. Das ist ihre Grolse" 
(GW, 4:215). Not only does the artist not desire an effect (the artist is not 
bound by an external telos), the lack of an effect is art's greatness (art has, in 
principle, even for the viewer, no purpose). 
9. On similarities between Rilke's Malte and Benn's Ronne see Theo Mey-
er, 193. 
10. For a comparison of the two poems see Brackert. 
11. Earlier titles for Goethe's "Selige Sehnsucht" were "Selbstopfer" and 
"Vollendung" (2:582). Both concepts are present in Benn's poem, though in 
ways extraordinarily different from their use in Goethe's poem. 
12. For a different realization of the concept that great artworks are "all 
eye," see Rilke's well-known poem "Archai:scher Torso Apollos," which con-
cludes with the lines: "denn da ist keine Stelle, / die dich nicht sieht. Du 
mu/st dein Leben andern." 
13. On Benn's proximity to romanticism in other respects see Reichel, "Die 
'Statischen Gedichte,'" 148-49. 
14. In the context of his affirmation of anti-Faustian or static poetry Benn 
likes to quote from Goethe's sonnet "Natur und Kunst," with its affirmation 
of "Beschrankung" and "Gesetz" and its assertion: "Vergebens werden un-
gebundene Geister/ Nach der Vollendung reiner Hohe streben" (1:245). See 
Benn's letters to Peter Schifferli of 23 November 1947 (DD, 93) and to Armin 
Mohler of 26 November 1949 (B, 182). 
15. "Aber da eine letzte Grenze vorhanden, so ist es vollendet von (und 
nach) allen Seiten, einer wohlgerundeten Kugel Maise vergleichbar, von der 
Mitte her iiberall gleichgewichtig" (Diels and Kranz, 23$, no. 8). 
16. Benn's embrace of stasis has a philosophical dimension that relates to 
contemporary as much as to classical philosophy. His position functions as a 
critique of an early twentieth-century German philosophy developed in the 
wake of Nietzsche that recognizes only motion and flux, while denying the 
existence of an absolute or its symbolic corollary stillness. The following pas-
sages from Semi Meyer's Geistige Wirklichkeit might serve as an illustration: 
"Die Welt ist nicht innerlich ruhig und nur an der Oberflache bewegt, son-
dern Bewegung ist ihr innerstes Wesen, ihr ganzes Sein, ihre ganze, volle 
und auch ihre letzte Wirklichkeit. Ruhe ist das Nichts, nur Bewegung und 
Regung ist etwas" (7); "Der immer noch beliebten Bewertung des Dauern-
den oder gar des Ewigen ist mit aller Entschiedenheit und Kraft zu wider-
sprechen. Wir sind Geschopfe der Zeitlichkeit und haben im Uberzeitlichen 
nichts zu suchen ... Alles Leben ist im Fluls und nichts hat darin Platz, was 
nicht im Strom des Werdens und Wandels sich bewahrt. Das aber kann 
nichts Unveriinderliches. Der Geist geh6rt dem Leben an, und iiber dem 
Leben kann es schon gewils fiir den Menschen nichts geben" (258-59). (For 
the context of these passages, see Meyer, 1-9 and 253-60.) Interesting in 
their contrast to Benn's delineation of stillness and stasis are two additional 
points: Meyer's assertion of an all-pervasive causality ("Wirkung in sich 
selbst ist undenkbar" [3]), along with his corollary denial of any stable Ruhe; 
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and his explicitly anti-Greek (anti-Platonic in the critique of ideal forms, anti-
Aristotelian in the denial of an unmoved mover) and anti-Asian rhetoric (6-
8, 254-58). Meyer's study was among the works Benn owned at the time of 
his death. I am grateful to Ilse Benn for letting me copy this list in the sum-
mer of 1984. 
17. See, for example, Herder, 8:65; Schiller, Werke, 20:472; Holderlin, 3:126; 
and Richter, 5:78. 
18. "Es gelten nur die abgeschlossenen Gebilde, die Statuen, die Friese, 
der Schild des Achill, diese sind ohne Ideen, sagen nur sich selbst und sind 
vollendet" (GW, 1:368-69). Cf. GW, 4:434-37. 
Chapter 4 
1. In a sketch Benn had used the term "Entwicklungfeindschaft" (SW, 
1:477)--a word he later eliminated, one assumes, because it suggests emo-
tion and negation rather than indifference. 
2. There is an interesting biographical corollary to this position. Benn 
writes in 1946: "Fur Kinder interessiere ich mich ja nicht, auch nicht mal fiir 
die meiner Tochter" (T, 109). 
3. Cf. "Clemenceau": "'nichts ist wahr. Alles ist wahr. / Das ist der Weis-
heit letzter Schluls'" (GW, 3:442). 
4. Benn's withdrawal, viewed as a negation of historical disintegration, ex-
hibits similarities with the Stoic world view. Hegel writes: "Denn wenn die 
Realitat der Welt verlorengegangen wie in der romischen Welt, der reale 
Geist, das Leben im abstrakten Allgemeinen verschwunden, muls das Be-
wulstsein, <lessen reale Allgemeinheit zerst6rt ist, in seine Einzelheit zu-
n:ickgehen und in seinen Gedanken sich selbst erhalten ... Es liegt hierin 
die Bestimmung der abstrakten Freiheit, der abstrakten Unabhangigkeit" 
(19:293-94). Hegel goes on to criticize this elevation of the private as internal-
ly contradictory, as a formal morality void of content, and as a harmony that 
is exclusive and therefore not truly harmonic. He concludes with words that 
could also apply, mutatis mutandis, to Benn: "Es liegt also darin, nicht dais der 
Zustand der Welt ein verniinftiger, ein rechtlicher sei, sondern nur das Sub-
jekt als solches soil seine Freiheit in sich behaupten ... Die edlen Romer ha-
ben daher nur das Negative bewiesen, diese Gleichgiiltigkeit gegen Leben, 
gegen alles Aulserliche; sie haben nur auf subjektive oder negative Weise 
grols sein konnen, in Weise eines Privatmannes" (19:294, 296). (Cf. 17:266-
69.) That there are more and less intersubjective variants of Stoicism need 
not concern us here. 
5. Many of Benn's quietistic statements could be compared with thoughts 
expressed in the Tao Te Ching: for example, the elevation of not-doing (3), 
nonaction (43, 48), nondesire (64), and nothingness (38); the evocation of se-
renity (9) and of calm (64), as well as of a center (5, 19, 29, 53); and the em-
brace of the unchanging (25) and the unmoved (26). 
6. A very different reception of the sage and of Asian wisdom is present in 
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Brecht, one of the twentieth century's most outspoken critics of Ruhe. In 
his "Legende von der Entstehung des Buches Taoteking auf dem Weg des 
Laotse in die Emigration," Brecht writes on behalf of Lao-tzu: "Dais das 
weiche Wasser in Bewegung / Mit der Zeit den machtigen Stein besiegt. / Du 
verstehst, das Harte unterliegt" (9:660). Also in contrast to Benn is the stress 
in Brecht's poem on the communication and mediation of wisdom. 
7. The relativist position involves a contradiction between the statement's 
form-with its claim to truth-and its content-with its erasure of truth. 
Later in this study I will present a fuller discussion of such contradictions 
and a critique of Benn's doctrine of stasis. Here one might simply reflect on 
the aesthetic merit of a position whose form and content-in this broader 
sense-fail to harmonize. 
8. For Benn's interest in this doctrine see, e.g., GW, 1:343, 2:163, 2:240, and 
2:282. 
9. See Pliny, Historia Natura/is, 35:160. Benn was of course familiar with 
this tradition; see "V. Jahrhundert" (GW, 3:201). 
10. See Nietzsche, 2:135, 221-22, 599, 647, 860-61; 3:441, 705-6, 903; and 
elsewhere. Cf. Oelze no. 2 (27 January 1933). 
11. Benn cites these concepts in his essay "Sein und Werden" (GW, 4:253). 
12. "Mit dem Worte 'das Unhistorische' bezeichne ich die Kunst und Kraft 
vergessen zu konnen und sich in einen begrenzten Horizont einzuschliefsen; 
'iiberhistorisch' nenne ich die Machte, die den Blick von dem Werden ablen-
ken, hin zu dem, was dem Dasein den Charakter des Ewigen und Gleichbe-
deutenden gibt, zu Kunst und Religion" (Nietzsche, 1:281). 
13. I refer, of course, to the science and art of linear perspective, first de-
veloped in Florence in the fifteenth century. 
14. See Theo Meyer, 85. 
15. Cf. Manyoni, 226. 
16. The negation of life, including flux and suffering, via art and stillness 
brings Benn in close proximity to Schopenhauer: see Schopenhauer, espe-
cially 2:468-92, 504-8; 4:670-89, 706__:43. A great deal has been written on 
Nietzsche and Benn, but the nineteenth-century writer who appears to have 
the most in common with Benn is Schopenhauer. Many of the positions 
Benn shares with Nietzsche derive from Schopenhauer, and the positions he 
adopts in countering Nietzsche bring him back to Schopenhauer. All three 
thinkers privilege art, question historical optimism, and scorn eudemonism, 
but only Schopenhauer and Benn associate aesthetic experience with tran-
scendence and a rejection of the dynamism and superficiality of life. In 
Benn, as earlier in Schopenhauer, we see the abandonment of will, action, 
and experience in favor of artistic contemplation; an evocation of the mysti-
cal nunc stans; the adoption of quietism; the elevation of nothingness; and an 
earnest reception of Oriental literature and philosophy. Surprisingly, there is 
no comprehensive study of Schopenhauer and Benn. 
17. For example, GW, 1:83, 1:360, and 4:308; Oelze no. 43 (16 September 
1935) and no. 45 (7 October 1935). 
18. See, e.g., GW, 2:139. 
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19. The one other use of "sinken lassen" in Benn with which I am familiar 
underscores this reading, even as it views inward movement more dynami-
cally (as would be appropriate for a text written closer to the genesis of 
"Trunkene Flut"). In "Zur Problematik des Dichterischen" Benn writes: "Oafs 
er [the poet] dies alles hinter sich liifst, die Perspektive seiner Herkunft und 
Verantwortung weiterriickt bis dahin, wo die logischen Systeme ganz ver-
gehn, sich tiefer sinken liifst in einer Art Riickfallfieber und Sturzgeburt nach 
innen" (GW, 1:76). 
20. The poem, however, does reach its readers. The idea of a monologic 
art is self-canceling and must pass over into either silence or communication. 
In this general direction cf. Reichel, Kunstlermoral, 59, 68; and Gerth, 243-44. 
Chapter 5 
1. See Fick, 87. 
2. "Reisen" shares a general critique of travel-as well as the specific impli-
cation that in traveling one is a slave to bodily, not intellectual, needs-with 
Opitz's "Sta Viator!" The latter poem, like "Reisen," begins with two rhetori-
cal questions: "lhr blinden Sterblichen, was zieht ihr und verreist / Nach bei-
den Indien? Was wagt ihr Seel und Geist I Fur ihren Knecht, den Leib?" The 
gold the travelers seek is in their own hands: "lhr pfliigt die wilde See, 
vergesset euer Land, / Sucht Gold, das eisem macht, und habt es bei der 
Hand." The poet concludes, again like Benn, with a form of the verb bleiben: 
"Hierher, Mensch! Die Natur, die Erde rufet dir. / Wohin? Nach Gute? Bleib! 
Warum? Du hast es hier!" There are, of course, significant differences be-
tween the two poems. In brief, Opitz embraces not the self but the wider in-
tersubjective sphere of "euer Land"; he appeals not to a nebulous Sie but to a 
specific audience, the traveler; he suggests a definite goal for the traveler, 
"das Gute"; and he concludes with an imperative, not a syntactically es-
tranged infinitive. 
3. See also DW, 1:171, 193; 2:77; 3:21; and 5:254. I have selected the follow-
ing example because it echoes not only Aquinas's important argument from 
physical motion but also the Aristotelian concept of the unmoved mover that 
will concern us later. The reception of this Aristotelian notion was wide-
spread in German mysticism. See, for example, Suso, 388. For examples of 
Suso's and Tauler's use of the terms "wftste" and "wastenunge" see Suso, 
245, and Tauler, 406. 
4. What reinforces the suspected association with Eckhart is the fact that 
Eckhart elevates subjectivity and solitude, as does Benn in this poem, to an 
extraordinary degree: "Sehet, der mensche, der also ein sun ist, der nimet 
bewegunge und wiirkunge und allez, das er nimet,-daz nimet er allez in 
sinem eigene ... suln des menschen werk leben, so miiezen sie genomen 
werden von sinem eigene, niht von vremden dingen noch uzer im, sunder 
in im" (DW, 2:383-84). 
5. Eckhart's and Silesius's views on stillness reach back to the philosophy 
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of Epicurus and the Bible. Epicurus's follower Lucretius, for example, writes 
that to receive the divine, we must be like the gods-that is, we must pos-
sess a tranquillity of spirit (5:1198-1203; 6:43-78). In the Judaeo-Christian tra-
dition the individual who wants to receive the divine in his or her soul must 
be "still before the Lord and wait patiently for him" (Ps. 37:7); cf. Ps. 62:1; 
Isa. 30:15; Lam. 3:26. 
6. Though Geneva would have proffered a more precise allusion to Calvin-
ism, it might have evoked too many competing, and for the poem perhaps 
unproductive, associations. In this context it may be worthwhile to note that 
Benn's mother came from Switzerland and that his father was a Protestant 
minister. 
7. Melin and Zorach trace images of Cuba in German literature. Though 
they do not mention Benn, they do discuss Cuba as a travel destination for 
seekers of the exotic life. For a general discussion of the travel theme in 
Benn, see Bielefeld. 
8. One might quote here Benn himself: "Es darf nichts zufiillig sein in 
einem Gedicht" (GW, 1:524). 
9. My reading of Zurich represents in part the outcome of a lively and 
helpful discussion, at the 1987 Kentucky Foreign Language Conference, fol-
lowing a paper I gave entitled "Gottfried Benn's Poem 'Reisen' in Its Intellec-
tual-Historical Context." 
10. The contrast presupposes a literal reading of the second stanza of "Sta-
tische Gedichte," that is, as an affirmation of idyllic existence. 
11. Streets are presented in German, French, English, and Dutch. Note 
Benn's selection of the most elegant possibilities-for example, boulevards. 
Lido is Italian for "seashore" or "beach." 
12. There appears to be an allusion here-by way of "Bahnhofstralsen," 
and especially "Fifth Avenues" -to materialism. Travel and materialism are 
not infrequently linked. Cf. Linda Schulte-Sasse, 41-42. 
13. Cf. the force of the above passage with the much simpler lines in "Me-
lancholie": "Du mulst aus deiner Gegend alles holen, / denn auch von Rei-
sen kommst du leer zuriick" (GW, 3:303). 
14. Cf. GW, 1:371. 
15. For passages besides those that follow, see Seneca's Letters, nos. 2, 54, 
55, 56, and De tranquillitate animi, 2:10-15 and 12. Benn discusses Seneca in 
Oelze no. 146 (6 July 1938) and elsewhere. See also Marcus Aurelius's Medita-
tions (1:16; 2:7; 4:3; 12:8), with which Benn was also familiar (GW, 1:19, and 
Oelze no. 189 [24 November 1940]); and Lipsius, De constantia, 1:2-3 (in Op-
era, 4:527-30). Partly because of Lipsius's influence, Baroque writers viewed 
travel as a false escape from psychological (and ethical) turmoil. In addition 
to Opitz's "Sta Viator'" see, for example, Gryphius's Papinian (I, 135-36). 
16. The translations of Seneca given in the text are those of Robin Camp-
bell. "Animum debes mutare, non caelum ... Quid terrarum iuvare novitas 
potest? Quid cognitio urbium aut locorum? In inritum cedit ista iactatio. 
Quaeris quare te fuga ista non adiuvet? Tecum fugis. Onus animi deponen-
dum est; non ante tibi ullus placebit locus" (Epistolae, no. 28). 
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17. "Quid per se peregrinatio prodesse cuiquam potuit? ... Non iudicium 
dedit, non discussit errorem, sed ut puerum ignota mirantem ad breve tern-
pus rerum aliqua novitate detinuit. Ceterum inconstantia mentis, quae max-
ime aegra est, lacessit, mobiliorem levioremque reddit ipsa iactatio. Itaque, 
quae petierant cupidissime loca, cupidius deserunt et avium modo transvo-
lant citiusque quam venerant, abeunt" (Seneca, Epistolae, no. 104). 
18. Despite Benn's repeated insistence on pure form, there is in this poem 
a definite theme. In fact, even his purely formal poems attempt to thematize 
their formality in the same way that his specifically static poems thematize 
stillness. On the tension between Benn's poetics and his poetry, see Vahland; 
Schroder, Benn und die Deutschen, 58-72; and Willems, who sees in Benn's po-
ems of the 1950s a decided break with esoteric formalism and a movement 
toward the representation of everyday reality. 
19. Cf. Theo Meyer, 340. 
20. The poet's choice of vergeblich is genuine, not ironic. There is no evi-
dence of a causal connection between fahren and erfahren, not even in the 
sense-and here vergeblich would be ironic-that travel teaches the trav-
eler the purposelessness of travel and so becomes, in a paradoxical sense, 
purposeful. 
21. Cf. also Benn's "Totenrede fur Klabund," where the poet suggests that 
self-fulfillment and truth lie "jenseits jeder Empirie" (GW, 1:408). 
22. See Stifter, Nachsommer, 708-10. A delimiting of travel-at least from 
the perspective of space devoted to its description-is similarly at work in 
Stifter's "Heidedorf," a story in part about the development of a poetic con-
sciousness. As additional evidence for the proximity of Stifter and Benn on 
travel, see the Major's recognition in Brigitta that travel leads nowhere; the 
narrator writes: "er sei jetzt endlich gesonnen, au£ einem einzigen winzigen 
Punkte dieser Erdkugel kleben zu bleiben, und kein anderes Staubchen 
mehr auf seinen FuB gelangen zu !assen, als <las der Heimat, in welcher er 
nunmehr ein Ziel gefunden habe, das er sonst vergeblich auf der ganzen 
Welt gesucht hatte" (4). 
23. Cf. J. P. Stern, especially 119-22. 
24. See Stifter, Nachsommer, 13 and 339-49. In Stifter, as later in Benn, we 
see a psychological corollary to aesthetic stillness, although for Stifter psy-
chological tranquillity necessarily involves moral and social dimensions; see 
228, 477, 660-63, and 680-82. 
25. See Maurach, 209. 
26. "Num quid tam turbidum fieri potest quam forum? lbi quoque licet 
quiete vivere, si necesse sit" (Seneca, Epistolae, no. 28). 
27. A biographically oriented reading along the lines of Schroder's study of 
Benn from 1978 would find support for a reading of "Grenze" as a form of 
Abwehr. 
28. In distancing himself from Goethe, Benn nears the position of Scho-
penhauer, who cites Goethe's "Prometheus" as an illustration of total "Beja-
hung des Willens zum Leben" and contrasts it with a view closer to his own 
metaphysical position, namely the quietistic "Verneinung des Willens zum 
Leben"; see Schopenhauer, 2:358-59. 
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29. By focusing on the much earlier "Heinrich Mann. Ein Untergang," 
Schroder shows that Benn's view of Prometheus deviates from tradition 
insofar as Prometheus becomes for Benn an asocial figure; what Prome-
theus does, he does for himself, not humankind (see Benn. Poesie, 41). This 
of course brings the creator Prometheus in line with Benn's own view of the 
artist. 
30. See Physics, 8, and Metaphysics, 12. A central passage reads: "There is, 
then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is 
motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore 
the first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which 
moves it. And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is 
something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, 
and actuality" (Metaphysics, 12:7). The concept also plays a role in the fifth 
chapter of Bonaventure's Itinerarium Mentis in Deum (18). 
31. If Benn did not take the concept of an unmoved mover from Aristotle 
or the Christian mystics, he may have been thinking of Plato, for whom the 
circular, self-sufficient union of rest and motion is a less central, if none-
theless distinct, concept. In the Timaeus Plato explains that God "made the 
universe a circle moving in a circle, one and solitary, yet by reason of its ex-
cellence able to converse with itself, and needing no other friendship or ac-
quaintance" (34b). In Plato we also find the connection between self-motion 
and thought, a connection important for Benn not only in "Reisen" but in 
"Wer allein ist-" and "Statische Gedichte" as well: "Now of all motions that 
is the best which is produced in a thing by itself, for it is most akin to the 
motion of thought and of the universe" (Timaeus, 89a). Benn implies that it is 
not in travel but in self-sufficient repose that one finds the wondrous. This, 
too, harks back to the Platonic view. In the Laws Plato addresses the concept 
of immobile centers around which there are circles of motion and which, to-
gether, are "a source of all sorts of marvels" (893d). Plato equates the highest 
form of motion, that which moves itself, with the soul (896a). Because the in-
dividual self mirrors the soul as universal cause, it recognizes its unity with 
other selves. For Benn, on the other hand, the poetic Ich is not primarily 
equivalent but unique-not like, but unlike, other selves. Its frontier is a bar-
rier. In Benn's framework the poetic self replaces, rather than identifies with, 
the divine soul(s). Instead of employing self-movement as proof of divine 
existence (or of transcendental truth), Benn invokes the concept to legitimate 
his unique poetic enterprise. 
32. The image of poetic divinity alludes not only to classical antiquity; by 
way of its references to "Manna" and German mysticism, "Reisen" is also 
connected to the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Consider the German version of 
the opening of Genesis: "Am Anfang schuf Gott Himmel und Erde. Und die 
Erde war wiist und leer, und es war finster au£ der Tiefe; und der Geist 
Gottes schwebte auf dem Wasser. Und Gott sprach: Es werde Licht! Und es 
ward Licht." One hears in these words the key concepts of "Reisen": Wiiste, 
Leere, Tiefe, followed by God's act of creation. Out of chaos and emptiness 
God creates "L-ich-t." Benn, skeptical of religious faith along with enlighten-
ment and intersubjective truth, creates instead only an "Ich." The poet forms 
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himself, that is, his identity, in his works and creates his works for himself. 
The poem would fulfill itself not in shedding light but in erasing the objectiv-
ity of its own message. In the nihilistic Weinhaus Wolf, Benn writes with an-
other clear allusion to, and inversion of, the Biblical passage quoted above: 
"Der Geist liegt schweigend iiber den Wassern" (GW, 2:150). 
33. Brode ("Studien ... I") traces the meaning of circular metaphors 
throughout Benn's poetry. See also Casper. 
34. The intellectual-historical allusions are thus revealed to be more than 
ornamental; they are a substantive element of a world view that Benn culti-
vates in contrast to a modernity concerned only with what is current and im-
mediate, a modernity obsessed with external travel and superficialities, a 
modernity denied access to the golden bough: "Der Oberlieferungslose, der 
Nichtgeist, der Moderne federt in den Welten herum, alles . . . zu bereisen, 
zu berieseln, zu beriechen" (GW, 4:256). 
35. For Spengler's discussion of the Greek principle of limit, see especially 
119-22; on the contrast of Apollinian Statik and Faustian Dynamik and-apro-
pos of "Reisen" -on the Apollinian Physik der Niihe versus the Faustian Phy-
sik der Ferne, see 234-35, 389, 489-92, and 533-34. On Benn's general recep-
tion of Spengler see especially Brode, "Studien ... I," 749-63. 
Chapter 6 
1. Owing either to his activities in 1933 or to the obliqueness of his verse, 
Benn is normally not included among discussions of the inner emigration. 
Ritchie's recent study of German literature between 1933 and 1945 illustrates 
this point. The one notable exception to this direction is Willems (10-12, 15-
22). 
2. See Alter, Gottfried Benn. Also of interest in this respect, if somewhat 
less detailed, is Steinhagen, "Gottfried Benn 1933." 
3. Alter's claim is at least partially convincing, but he tends to downplay 
in contrast Benn's genuine enthusiasm for the "metaphysical" content of 
national socialism, and he is hard pressed to explain away, in the light of 
his own claims, Benn's attack on Geistesfreiheit in "Der neue Staat und die 
Intellektuellen." 
4. See Jens, 189-228 and 290-94. Cf. Alter, Gottfried Benn, and Steinhagen, 
"Gottfried Benn 1933." 
5. For an account of "National Socialism as Temptation," not just to Benn 
but to intellectuals in general, see Fritz Stern. 
6. The allusion is to Der preuftische Stil. 
7. For a differentiated discussion of connections between Benn's elevation 
of form, his belief in biological Zuchtung, and his affirmation of fascism, see 
Fischer. 
8. Benn aligns the metaphysical with what is antirational: "Bis vor kurzem 
war der Mensch ein Vernunftswesen und sein Hirn der Yater aller Dinge, 
heute ist er ein metaphysisches Wesen, abhangig und von Ursprung und 
Natur umrahmt" (GW, 1:215). In his "Antwort an die literarischen Emigran-
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ten" he contrasts "metaphysisch" with both "aufklarerisch" and "humani-
stisch" (GW, 4:241). 
9. On decisionism see especially Krockow. 
10. Cf. Alter, Gottfried Benn, 85. 
11. This view, clearly espoused in "Die Eigengesetzlichkeit der Kunst" and 
"Die Dichtung braucht inneren Spielraum," differs from Benn's earlier state-
ments in "Der neue Staat und die Intellektuellen." 
12. The main trigger appears to have been the night of the long knives; see 
B, 58, and Oelze no. 101 (24 July 1934). However, the treatment accorded 
Benn by the National Socialists, above all Borries von Miinchhausen, was 
also decisive. For general orientation see Wodtke, Gottfried Benn, 52-71; for 
detailed documentation see Alter, "Gottfried Benn." 
13. My analysis of Benn's initial immersion in and later abandonment of 
national socialism focuses on his evaluation of the movement's intellectual 
content. Similarly, my critique will be directed at his ideas rather than any 
biographical reasons for his adoption of these ideas. However, I do not want 
to deny that Benn's affirmation of national socialism and his turn away from 
it may have been informed by biographical-that is, political and historical-
rather than purely intellectual and philosophical reasons. During the first 
year after Hitler assumed power, the Nazis were uncertain how to deal with 
expressionism and with surviving expressionists such as Benn. As long as 
the Nazis tolerated Benn, he supported them. When they abandoned their 
tolerance (or ambivalence) toward the movement and began to attack Benn, 
the poet fled into the army, a move he inappropriately and absurdly termed 
"eine aristokratische Form der Emigrierung" (B, 62). Circumstantial evidence 
could lead one to conclude that Benn provided the appropriate philosophical 
underpinnings for his actions ex post facto, depending on his personal 
situation. For historical purposes this biographical dimension and the pos-
sibility of opportunism deserve consideration; however, as I will suggest 
below, it is of more universal interest to undermine not mere opportunism 
but the philosophical defense Benn attempts for his position, whatever its 
motivation. 
14. B, 61. Cf. Oelze no. 19 (30 January 1935), and GW, 4:259. 
15. Cf. Hoffmann, Opposition Poetry and "Opposition," 136. 
16. Benn's poems represent of course the author's internal working 
through of his position vis-a-vis national socialism. Owing to his having 
been expelled from the Reichschriftumskammer in March 1938, his poems, dis-
tributed privately in the 1940s, were published only after the fall of national 
socialism. They were thus not part of the actual resistance. Benn's situation 
was not unique: much of the critical literature of the time was unpublished, 
including, for example, the important literary diaries of the day. 
17. The most recent and comprehensive review of the various definitions 
and evaluations of the concept "inner emigration" is Schnell, Literarische In-
nere Emigration, 1-15. The best approach to the problem today would seem to 
be the analysis of individual works by individual authors in the light of the 
form, level, purpose, or effectiveness of opposition. 
18. The two writers' correspondence is reprinted in Arnold, 1:247-68. For 
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Mann, see especially 253; for ThieB, see especially 248, 258, and 259. 
19. Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 371 (in Werke, 3:323). In "Antwort 
an die literarischen Emigranten" Benn employs the very same structure 
of argument by experience, rather than reason, in his defense of national 
socialism. 
20. In this direction see also Loewy, 27-31; Brekle, 32-38; and Hoffmann, 
"Opposition." 
21. Cf. Reinhold Grimm, "Im Dickicht," 411. 
22. Benn's break with national socialism is clearer in his essays: "Ziichtung 
II" (1940), "Kunst und drittes Reich" (1941), and "Zurn Thema Geschichte" 
(ca. 1942-43). 
23. See chapter 8 below. 
24. See Schwerte, 8-9 and 148-90. 
25. On the national socialist reception of Faust see, besides Schwerte, 
Belgum. 
26. Ironically, the national socialist Benn contributed to the nazification of 
Faust; see GW, 1:222. 
27. Of some interest in this context is Hitler's alleged remark: "Ich liebe 
Goethe nicht. Aber um des einen Wortes willen bin ich bereit, ihm vieles 
nachzusehen: 'Im Anfang war die Tat'" (Rauschning, 211). Cf. Heyse, 349. 
28. Benn owned an edition from 1933. 
29. For a statement of Rosenberg's impact, one might consider the words 
of Goebbels, speaking in the presence of Hitler in 1937: ''Alfred Rosenberg 
hat in seinen Werken in hervorragendem Maise die Weltanschauung des Na-
tionalsozialismus wissenschaftlich und intuitiv begriinden und festigen ge-
holfen ... Erst eine spatere Zeit wird voll zu ermessen vermogen, wie tie£ 
der EinfluB dieses Mannes auf die geistige und weltanschauliche Gestaltung 
des nationalsozialistischen Reiches ist" (Hartle, 45). The fact that Rosenberg's 
power within the regime was often contested does not fundamentally dimin-
ish his influence on national socialist ideology. For a thorough evaluation of 
Rosenberg's influence, see Baumgartner; also Hutchinson, especially 35-62 
and 314-42. 
30. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from Rosenberg stem from Der 
Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts. 
31. "Griechische Schonheit ist also stets ein statisches, nicht dynamisches 
Wesen" (Rosenberg, 305). 
32. Another dimension of the Rosenberg-Benn comparison is Rosenberg's 
elevation of Meister Eckhart as the precursor of a Nordic racial religion char-
acterized by dynamism (see 216-59, especially 252), whereas for Benn, Eck-
hart is the model, as we saw in "Reisen," for a life of individual enclosure 
and stillness. The contrast, however, is complicated by Rosenberg's elevation 
of the solitude, seclusion, and privacy of the soul (for example, 232-35 and 
252), indicating a common element in the two men's reception of Eckhart: 
the elevation of subjectivity over intersubjectivity. 
33. Cf. Rosenberg, 271-72. 
34. See especially Rosenberg, 315-22 and 405-52. 
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35. Rosenberg, Letzte Aufzeichnungen, 70. 
36. For references to Lao-tzu see, for example, GW, 2:240, 4:68, and 4:254; 
Oelze no. 156 (11 December 1938) and no. 301 (19 February 1946); and T, 213. 
37. Bayerdorfer takes the tension between the formal and political dimen-
sions of poetry to be "die lyrikgeschichtliche Signatur seit der Weimarer Re-
publik" (453). 
38. See, for example, GW, 1:248, 442, 444, 446, 450; 4:397. On the impor-
tance of the concept Bewegung within national socialism cf. Klemperer, 237-
42; Berning (1960), 88; and Berning (1961), 182. 
39. Besides Rosenberg, other national socialist philosophers elevated the 
concepts of motion and dynamism and viewed them as specifically German. 
In his thoroughgoing polemic against philosophical rationalism and univer-
salism, Anti-Cartesianismus, Franz Bohm includes a section entitled "Die 
Dynamik deutscher Philosophie" (158-74), in which he elevates activism, 
dynamism, and productive unrest. Benn's citations of Stoicism and Schopen-
hauer along with his elevation of inactivity might be contrasted with the 
following quotation from Bohm: "Deshalb 'beruhigt' auch keine deutsche 
Philosophie wie der Rationalismus der Stoa, Descartes oder Spinoza, die 
Systemdialektik Hegels oder der voluntaristische Nihilismus Schopenhauers 
beruhigen. Die Erkenntnis als 'Quietiv' des Willens stammt nicht aus Be-
reitschaft zum Mitvollzug der Wirklichkeit, sondern umgekehrt aus intellek-
tueller Weigerung, das Schicksal der Wirklichkeit zu teilen" (163). In this 
context one might also note the following comments from Rauschning's Ge-
spriiche mit Hitler: "Der Mensch ist zum Handeln da. Nur als ein handelndes 
Wesen erfiillt er seine natiirliche Bestimmung. Kontemplative Naturen, re-
trospektiv wie alle Geistigen, sind Tote, die den Sinn des Lebens verfehlen. 
Gerade wir Deutschen, die wir solange in Gedanken und Traumen aus-
schweiften, mulsten zu der grolsen Wahrheit zuriickfinden, dais nur die Tat 
und die ewige Bewegung dem menschlichen Leben Sinn geben. Jede Tat ist 
sinnvoll, selbst das Verbrechen. Jede Passivitat, jedes Beharren ist dagegen 
sinnlos, sie sind lebensfeindlich. Somit gibt es das gottliche Recht, das Be-
harrende zu vernichten" (211). 
40. For discussions of national socialist poetry see Bormann, Fredsted, 
Gamm, GeiB!er, Hartung, Ketelsen ("Nationalsozialismus und Drittes 
Reich"), and Loewy. 
41. Kober, 17. 
42. Liederbuch der NSDAP, 9. 
43. See, for example, Langenbucher, 191. 
44. One can include here Benn himself, who in "Der neue Staat und die 
Intellektuellen" heralded "eine Jugend ... von verwandelter geschichtlicher 
Art ... grolse, innerlich gefiihrte Jugend" (GW, 1:447, 449). 
45. The film's audience was reportedly well over twenty million; see Baird, 
511. 
46. Bohme, 360. 
47. Willems draws attention to similarities between Benn and the poets 
of the inner emigration by discussing Benn's thematization of nature and 
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his neoclassical attention to form (17-21). The argument has some validity, 
though the two elements can also be discussed in the light of national social-
ist poetry. 
48. For related themes in Hagelstange's sonnets see especially Venezia-
nisches Credo, 27, 34, and 38. 
49. The negation of universal truth, as we will see in the next chapter, runs 
throughout Rosenberg's Mythus, but see especially 22-23, 78-79, 117-37, 285-
89, 390, 539, and 681-701. 
50. In one of his more interesting sonnets Hagelstange works with a simi-
lar dualism; see Venezianisches Credo, 24. 
51. Cf. Chick. 
52. This is not to discount other factors that contributed to Benn's nonemi-
gration, not the least of which was the author's initial infatuation with na-
zism. His reasons for not emigrating are spelled out in Doppelleben: first, the 
concept of emigration was not known in Germany at the time; second, Hitler 
came to power legally; third, no one took the national socialist program seri-
ously (GW, 4:69-71). De Mendelssohn discusses some of the problems in 
Benn's reasoning; see 260-73. 
53. Hoffmann, "Opposition," 131. 
54. Fundamental on this issue is Schroder, Benn. Poesie. 
55. This is not to suggest that one cannot-by way of Hermann Broch's ac-
count of partial value systems-read l'art pour l'art primarily (and indepen-
dently of Benn) as a means of stabilization, the restriction of all significance 
to a finite, isolated sphere. 
56. See "Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten," in which Benn fails to 
recognize motivations for emigration and nonemigration that transcend loy-
alty and endurance-such as, for example, adherence to principles of justice. 
57. Cf. Roche, Dynamic Stillness, 163-71. 
58. The classic formulation of the literature of inner emigration as reflec-
tion on what is eternal and timeless, and thus as flight into what is neces-
sarily empty, is Schonauer: "Die Literatur der sogenannten inneren Emigra-
tion war Flucht. Flucht in die Idylle oder in die sogenannten einfachen und 
zeitlos menschlichen Verhiiltnisse, Flucht in den Traditionalismus, in die 
forcierte Betonung des alten Wahren und Unvergiinglichen, Flucht in das 
Bewiihrte und damit Problemlose, Flucht nicht zuletzt vor der Trivialitiit und 
der Barbarei in das Schone, Edie und Ewige" (127). The position has been 
upheld, with only slight modification, in the most extensive treatment of 
inner emigration to date; see Schnell, Literarische Innere Emigration-and 
Schnell, "lnnere Emigration." 
59. Cf. Roche, Dynamic Stillness, especially 121-23 and 249-50. 
60. If Buchner and Heine, as I argued in Dynamic Stillness, turn to the his-
torical in recognizing that the truth of the eternal principles symbolized in 
stillness is their realization, the writers of the inner emigration turn back to 
the stillness of classicism by recognizing that history advances only insofar as 
it is guide.d by those eternal norms, which the idea of stillness represents and 
which the modern world seems to have lost sight of. 
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Chapter 7 
1. See Eykman. 
2. Lothar Kahn's detailed study on attempts between 1918 and 1933 "jen-
seits der Historisierung zu einem neuen Absolutum vorzustoBen" (752) pre-
supposes this insight. 
3. See, above all, Broch's essayistic reflections in Die Schlafwandler. Benn's 
"Verlorenes lch" is in certain respects not dissimilar; see GW, 3:215-16. 
4. See Kaufmann, especially 4-18, 40-46, 78, 225-27, 284-306, and 417. 
5. By focusing on the ideas that contributed to national socialism, I do not 
mean to minimize complementary accounts that focus on such matters as 
politics, economics, sociology, or even psychology. I am dealing here with 
merely one aspect of a highly complex configuration. 
6. Cf. Nietzsche, Werke, 3:314 and 751. 
7. Cf. ibid., 2:589 and 3:919. 
8. Cf. ibid., 3:441. 
9. Nietzsche's immediate tolerance exhibits itself in statements such as the 
following from Also sprach Zarathustra: "'Das-ist nun mein Weg-wo ist der 
eure?' so antwortete ich denen, welche mich 'nach dem Wege' fragten. Den 
Weg namlich-den gibt es nicht!" (emphasis in the original, Werke, 2:443). 
Cf. 2:697. The self-cancellation of this position is sometimes hinted at, but 
the consequences are never drawn; see 2:36 and 586. 
10. Followers of Nietzsche-for example, Nehamas (see especially 36, 49, 
72-73)-tend to separate perspectivism, the idea that no position can be ulti-
mately grounded but that one can argue for the validity of one position over 
another, from relativism, the idea that all positions are equally valid. The dis-
tinction may be heuristically useful, but it is philosophically unsound. If, as 
in perspectivism, no position can be grounded, then my defense of a posi-
tion leads to an infinite regress and is as such ultimately arbitrary and in-
valid; relativism is the consequence. If, as in relativism, all positions are 
equally valid, then I am of course free to assert the validity of my position at 
the expense of another. My exclusion of the other position is necessarily 
valid; relativism passes over into perspectivism. I use the terms, therefore, 
interchangeably. 
11. Cf. Nietzsche, Werke, 3:424, as well as Zarathustra's encounters with 
the soothsayer and the shadow. 
12. During his brief declaration for the national socialist regime, Benn, rec-
ognizing no absolute content, was willing to support those who would de-
cide what is valid and what is invalid life. His essay "Geist und Seele kiinf-
tiger Geschlechter" is at one with the tenets of what would eventually lead 
to the national socialist programs of forced sterilization and euthanasia. 
13. My argument is not that history plays no role in the development or 
justification of norms, but that history alone cannot ground norms. It would 
be useful to recognize three levels of norms. First, some positions, such as 
the arbitrary advantage of the more powerful-evidenced, for example, in 
slavery-are categorically wrong; they are self-contradictory. The establish-
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ment of norms against injustice follows from reason. Second, some norms, 
though not absolutely valid, are compatible with reason and can be viewed 
as necessary under specific historical conditions. For example, it is necessary 
that laws limiting the consumption of water be introduced in a society that 
has a restricted supply of usable water. Third, some norms cannot be de-
duced from reason or history; they are decisionistic. It does not matter what 
the norm is, merely that there be a norm-for example, whether one drives 
on the right or the left: either is appropriate, but in a particular culture it 
must be one or the other. Cf. Hegel, 7:34-46. Benn's mistake was in part his 
abandonment of rational and historical norms in favor of decisionistic stasis. 
14. Zur Genealogie der Moral obviously lends support to such a comparison. 
15. See Nietzsche, Werke, 3:557-58, and cf. 2:645-47. 
16. The need for a defense of nonrelativism has not vanished despite the 
paradigmatic refutation of relativism by Socrates/Plato; this should be espe-
cially evident to students of literary criticism. See, most recently, Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith. Smith views her relativism, not as a claim or an argument, 
but rather as a style or taste; nonetheless, she does present arguments and 
does seek to avoid contradictions (183). Her position, despite its sophistica-
tion, strikes me as no less vulnerable than other forms of relativism. First, if, 
according to her own metaclaims, she cannot ground relativism or even as-
sert the untenability of objectivism, then her objections to objectivism are 
self-erasing. Since objectivism is as tenable as relativism (despite Smith's per-
sonal preference for the latter), and since objectivism denies the truth of rela-
tivism, it follows that relativism is untenable. Second, if, as Smith argues 
(e.g., 151), there are no fixed truths, then it is only consequential that this 
very claim pass over into another claim-but not another relativistic claim, 
for that would mean the fixity, or absoluteness, of relativism; the self-reflex-
ive truth of relativism is, rather, its own relativity. 
17. Recognition of pragmatic contradictions is central to the transcendental 
pragmatics of Apel and Kuhlmann, as well as to the outstanding work on 
objective idealism being done by Hosle, Jermann, and Wandschneider. 
18. Not all Nietzsche scholars are blind to this quandary. Consider, for ex-
ample, the question Bernd Magnus raises: "If all theories are perspectives, is 
not the theory which states that all theories are perspectives also (merely) a 
perspective?" (196-97). Unfortunately, Magnus and others fail to pursue 
Nietzsche's claim to its logical conclusion, that is, to its own self-refutation. 
The critic who comes closest is Nehamas, who admits that "it is possible that 
some views are not interpretations" (66). However, the claim that there may 
be absolute truth is a contradiction in terms (it renders nonhypothetical truth 
hypothetical); the logically consistent position would assert that if absolute 
truth is possible, it is not only possible but necessary. An absolute position is 
either apodictically negative-Le., impossible-or apodictically positive-
i.e., necessary. Similarly, Nehamas admits that Nietzsche cannot, without 
contradicting himself, abandon unconditional values unconditionally (224)-
yet conditional unconditional values are again contradictory. For a fuller dis-
cussion of the absolute with reference to both the Miinchhausen trilemma 
and the question of modality see Hosle's essay on "Begriindungsfragen." 
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19. It is in the structure of negative metaphysical propositions that when 
they become self-reflexive, they cancel themselves. Positive propositions do 
not suffer the same incoherence (this is succinctly illustrated in the self-re-
flexive consequences of the statement "This sentence is true" versus the 
proposition "This sentence is false"). Moreover, what appears circular in a 
positive metaphysical assertion is often transcendental, that is, universally 
necessary, thus presuppositionless and, therefore, not circular. The point is 
missed in R. H. Grimm's discussion of self-referentiality. 
20. For a fuller discussion, with bibliographical references, see Roche, 
"Plato." 
21. Plato, Republic, 361a. 
22. It almost goes without saying that my critique of Nietzsche's meta-
physical and epistemological framework does not erase the validity of certain 
individual insights. Systematic regress and material progress are in practice 
compatible. Nietzsche's cultural criticism, his psychological perceptions, and 
the rhetorical force of his arguments should not be underestimated, even as 
one attempts to counter his metatheoretical stance. 
23. It is an unphilosophic practice to measure the validity of an idea by its 
genesis or consequences; it is, by the way, a particularly Nietzschean tech-
nique: see especially Zur Genealogie der Moral, also 2:596-98 and 3:779. Rosen-
berg follows Nietzsche in both respects. 
24. The philosophical argument suggesting the passage from relativism to 
arbitrary absolutism has a psychological corollary, namely the decisionistic 
desire for stabilization, which may help explain Benn's initial infatuation 
with nazism. In this direction cf. Schroder, Benn. Poesie. 
25. The most recent account of Rosenberg is Nova, who justly includes a 
chapter on Rosenberg's "Nonuniversalism" (169-78). However, Nova does 
not delve into the philosophical import of Rosenberg's nonuniversalism, and 
he states: "Any objective, logical refutation of the Myth is impossible" (xv). 
Such a position not only fails to counter Rosenberg, it confirms, as we will 
see, the metaposition from which Rosenberg derives the legitimacy of his 
own claims. 
26. Attacks on reason and universal truth were widespread in other na-
tional socialist philosophers as well. See, for example, Heyse, 250-51 and 
306-7; Beck, Im Kampf, 34-39 and 45-49; Beck, Deutsche Vollendung, 65-71, 
509-13, 527, and 574-76; Bergmann, 7-15; Krieck, 1:37-38, 2:7-10, 3:7-20, and 
3:123-31; and Bohm, 12-56. If Rauschning is to be believed, not only other 
philosophers, but Hitler himself shared Rosenberg's relativism. Hitler is re-
ported to have said: "Es gibt keine Wahrheit, weder im moralischen noch 
wissenschaftlichen Sinne. Der Gedanke einer freien, voraussetzungslosen 
Wissenschaft konnte nur im Zeitalter des Liberalismus auftauchen. Er ist ab-
surd" (Rauschning, 210). 
27. Cf. Rosenberg, Mythus, 79 and 289. 
28. See Hegel, 5:44. For why the assertion is well grounded see Wand-
schneider, "Absolutheit." 
29. See Moeller van den Bruck (especially 311 and 323) for a similar denial 
of the universal, followed by the claim that because each nation necessarily 
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fails to understand and respect the next, it is free to fight for itself at the ex-
pense of others. 
30. Nature is to be understood in this context as the negation of what, in 
philosophy and law, is called "natural right." For an incisive analysis of natu-
ral right as a misnomer see Hegel, 10:311-12. 
31. See especially "Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten" (CW, 4:239-
48). 
32. Whisker discusses Nietzsche's impact on Rosenberg but fails to treat 
the important theme of relativism. Instead, he focuses on Nietzsche's attacks 
on Christianity and Christian ethics, the concept of will to power, the over-
man, and the philosopher's evaluation of war and heroism (14-31). 
33. In an unfortunately long-forgotten document of the German exile, 
which is also one of the earliest and most prophetic, Helmuth Plessner 
draws similar consequences, suggesting that after the abjuration of reason, 
the most radical and consistent counterposition is the elevation of nature (or 
race) and mere power; see especially 16-17, 88, 131-41, and 179-82. The con-
cern with universals, which many consider a characteristic element of inner 
emigration, was not restricted to the authors writing in Germany against na-
tional socialism. In this context one might also consider Oderbruck's promi-
nent reference to "das Ewige Recht" in Zuckmayer, Des Teufels General, 153. 
34. Cf. Rosenberg, Mythus, 119. 
35. Cf. the position of Friedrich Alfred Beck and Josef Wagner in the 
"Hochschule fur Politik der NSDAP": "Nationalsozialismus ist keine theore-
tische Idee, sondern eine biologische und geistige Grundlehre, eine Lebens-
tatsache und Lebensaufgabe von unmittelbarer, nicht weiter erklarbarer, 
sondern zu verwirklichender unerbittlicher Notwendigkeit. Nationalsozialis-
mus ist keines Beweises fahig und bedarf keines Beweises" (Poliakov and 
Wulf, 45). 
36. See the influential studies by Jellinek and Kelsen. 
37. For further analysis see Hosle and Vitzthum. 
38. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany avoids this self-can-
celing structure with its declaration that the elimination of articles 1 and 20 is 
inadmissible: see Art.. 79, par. 3. This represents an advance over Weimar, 
and also over the U.S. Constitution, which in principle allows for the 
cancellation of its most basic, noncontingent points (even if such changes 
depend on state, rather than merely congressional, approval). 
39. While not directly referring to the constitution, Benn nonetheless rec-
ognized in 1933, even as he sided with the movement, that national social-
ism was directed "gegen eine Gesellschaft, die iiberhaupt keine Mafsstabe 
mehr schafft, kein transzendentes Recht mehr errichtet" (CW, 1:444). Such a 
society, according to Benn, loses its right to exist; it gets what it deserves: 
"und verdient denn eine solche Gesellschaft etwas anderes als Joch und 
neues Gesetz?" (ibid.). 
40. Recent attempts to overcome the so-called false dichotomy between 
objectivism and relativism-as, for example, in Bernstein, Kolb, and Mar-
golis--are, I believe, less persuasive than other accounts, such as those of 
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Kuhlmann and Hosle, that argue for first principles. However, to go into this 
matter in further detail would be to write another book, one only remotely 
related to Benn. My point in this chapter is simply that Benn was correct to 
strive for an absolute, for stasis, though his methods, as I will attempt to 
show in the next chapter, were inappropriate to his task. 
41. Since a valid absolute philosophy asserts itself not directly but rather 
by exhibiting contradictions in alternative positions, such a philosophy is tol-
erant in a truer sense than is a perspectival one, for it is willing to weigh 
counterpositions; it takes their claims to truth seriously and recognizes only 
immanent critique. 
42. It is perhaps not irrelevant to mention in this context that the resis-
tance movement against Hitler was in part informed by the categories of 
transcendental idealism. One thinks of Adam von Trott zu Solz, a member of 
the Stauffenberg circle, whose dissertation of 1932 explored international 
justice from the perspective of Hegel's Philosophic des Rechts; or of Hans 
Scholl and Kurt Huber, central figures in the resistance group known as 
"The White Rose"-the former was a careful reader of Plato, the latter a con-
sequent Kantian. See Scholl, 21, and Leber, 44-46. 
43. Already Socrates argues in the Euthydemus that the lack of objective 
norms leads not only to skepticism but beyond skepticism to subjectivism: 
"no one speaks falsely" (286e). Cf. Theaetetus, 1616-e. 
Chapter 8 
1. My critique of Benn not only draws on the poems discussed above but 
also considers his essayistic reflections insofar as they shed light on the con-
cept Statik. Not every point of critique will apply directly to the poems. Wil-
lems has, I think, done a great service for future Benn criticism by cogently 
arguing that there is far more wisdom in Benn's poetry than in his theoretical 
reflections; see Willems 28-52. 
2. The student of German literature will recognize a connection here to 
Thomas Mann, specifically his reflections on music and German history in 
Doktor Faustus. 
3. Cf. Steinhagen, "Gottfried Benn 1933," 41-44. 
4. Also in this direction see Stollmann, "Gottfried Benn," especially 292 
and 294-95. 
5. See Wandschneider, "Die dialektische Notwendigkeit." 
6. It is in this context no coincidence that national socialism gave little 
weight to substantive primary virtues such as goodness or justice, but rather 
worked with the secondary virtues of loyalty, courage, self-sacrifice, etc. 
7. See especially Petzold, but also, to an extent, Fritz Stern, Politics, 183-
266. 
8. The general proximity of Benn to Heidegger is implied in Hillebrand's 
clear but uncritical treatment of both thinkers. 
9. The passage stems from Hitler's closing address: "Das deutsche Volk ist 
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gliicklich in dem Bewulstsein, dais die ewige Flut der Erscheinungen nun 
mehr endgiiltig abgelost wurde von einem ruhenden Pol" (Der Triumph des 
Willens). 
10. The phrase, which stems from Walter Benjamin (I, 2:469), has been giv-
en material substance in Stollmann, Asthetisierung der Politik. 
11. Most interpreters of Benn find his association with nazism an aberra-
tion. In some senses it is, but in others, his affirmation of the movement ap-
pears to have been, if not necessary, at least consequential. Cf. Wellershoff, 
155-97. 
12. This is not to deny an abstract content of nationalism and militarism-
i.e., a content informed by the formal virtues of loyalty and courage-nor is 
it to dispute the existence of a submerged content informed by injustice. 
13. The one thematically significant difference is the national socialist ele-
vation of will, action, and effect as opposed to Benn's elevation of indiffer-
ence and withdrawal. Whether the two structures collapse politically will be 
addressed below. 
14. An obvious difference between Benn and the sonnet writers of the in-
ner emigration is that Benn embraces less a conventional than an innovative 
and unique concept of form. 
15. Jungrichter, Ideologie und Tradition: Studien zur nationalsozialistischen 
Sonettdichtung. 
16. Carl Schmitt is the most notable example. The idea is also visible in 
Nazi poetry; for example, in Heinrich Anacker, "'Hitler, der Fels im Chaos'" 
(13), or Will Vesper, "Der Grundstein" (in Kober, 12-13). 
17. Cf. Oelze no. 2 (27 January 1933). 
18. The different aims of Benn and perspectival painters (or even the 
weighty differences between Uccello, Piranesi, and Escher) do not argue 
against this point. The absolutization of form lends itself, in its association 
with subjectivity, to diverse purposes. 
19. I do not mean here or elsewhere to reduce Benn's poetry to this mo-
ment. Nonetheless, the search for an absolute is central, and it is closely in-
tertwined with the poet's elevation of stasis. 
20. Propositions such as those above may strike the contemporary reader 
as anachronistic, perhaps even naive. I have tried, however, in my excursus 
on transcendental norms, to argue that the law of noncontradiction is the 
only tenable standard on which to base ethical norms. The reader familiar 
with recent discussions in Germany on reflexive foundationalism, as evi-
denced in the excellent work by Apel, Kuhlmann, and Hosle, will not find 
my position quite so surprising. 
21. In this respect Benn differs from most writers of the inner emigration, 
a large number of whom embrace a Christian world view. One thinks of Ber-
gengruen, Schneider, Schroder, Haushofer, and others. Cf. especially Baden 
and Klieneberger, but also Hoffmann, Opposition Poetry. 
22. Weber, Gottfried Benn: Zwischen Christentum und Gnosis. 
23. For an excellent unmasking of what Heidegger would call Gerede, see 
GW, 3:294. Cf. GW, 3:299. 
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24. See GW, 1:577, 2:151, 2:224, and 3:296; Oelze no. 88 (28 July 1936) and 
no. 308 (27 May 1946). The self-cancellation of the monologue poem is not 
unrelated to Mallarme's paradoxical reflections in his "Crise de vers"; see es-
pecially 363-64 and 366-67. 
25. In addition, Benn's claim that unintelligible art is no more alienating 
than injustice, senseless war, or the blind accumulation of power can hardly 
be viewed as a legitimate argument for unintelligible art; see GW, 1:314. 
26. Cf. Ryan, 25-26. 
27. GW, 3:331. For Benn, the gods' silence is a recurring topos; see espe-
cially GW, 3:104, 113, and 464. 
28. Hegel is helpful in deciphering this structure: "Das Sein reduziert sich 
somit von selbst auf das bloBe Aufler mir, und es soll auch ausdriicklich nur 
das Negative meiner bedeuten, in welcher Negation in der Tat mir nichts 
iibrigbleibt als Ich selbst,-es heiBt leeres Stroh dreschen, jenes Negative 
meiner, das AuBer oder Uber mir, fur eine behauptete oder wenigstens ge-
glaubte, anerkannte Objektivitat ausgeben zu wollen, denn es ist damit nur 
ein Negatives ausgesprochen, und zwar ausdriicklich <lurch mich" (emphasis 
in the original, 16:348-49). Cf. 12:27, 16:180-83, and 18:168. 
29. It would be interesting to reflect on whether it was partly Benn's mono-
logic disregard for reception aesthetics that led him to affirm poetic form and 
closure as in principle static and final, whereas for most of modernity poetic 
closure is a contradiction in terms. 
30. This structure is also implicit in Benn's later concept of "das sich um-
grenzende Ich." The limit functions from both sides: each side has its being 
by virtue of the limit, by virtue of its not being other, yet the limit is common 
to both; it connects as well as separates. On the dialectical structure of the 
category "Grenze" see Hegel, 5:131-39. 
31. See especially Seneca, De tranquillitate animi, 3:1-8; 4:1-8; 17:3. 
32. See especially letter no. 9, and De tranquillitate animi, 7:1-4; also the fol-
lowing passage from letter no. 48: "You should live for the other person if 
you wish to live for yourself" ["alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere"]. 
33. See Roche, Dynamic Stillness, 163-71. 
34. See especially "Das moderne lch" (GW, 1:7-22) and "Verlorenes lch" 
(GW, 3:215-16). 
35. See especially "Wer allein ist-." On the relevance of this distinction 
see Roche, "Plato." 
36. In particular, Holderlin's Hyperion and the late hymns-for example, 
"Der Rhein" (2:142-48). 
37. Benn's stance vis-a-vis totality is contradictory. He often embraces it in 
his poetic works but then separates an intellectual totality from the otherness 
of reality, thus undermining the concept of totality. At times he explicitly 
censures the drive for totality and synthesis; see, for example, GW, 2:212 and 
4:164. 
38. In addition, the poet's position is not as stable as the poet would like, 
for the majority position inevitably shifts with time. 
39. Cf. Roche, Dynamic Stillness, 178-244, especially 187. 
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40. See also B, 61. 
41. Cf. Apel, who sees from this perspective not a contradiction, but a 
complementarity, between scientific objectivity (or analytic philosophy) and 
moral subjectivity (or existentialism). Benn appears to have captured this po-
sition in both a poetic and a representative way. For a clear expository ex-
pression of this dualism see Oelze no. 2 (27 January 1933). 
42. Cf. Apel, especially 359. 
Chapter 9 
1. For this reason I would disagree with Jochen Schulte-Sasse's claim, 
which he shares with numerous practitioners (see, for example, Schnell, Li-
terarische Innere Emigration, 55), that critics should focus on the historical con-
ditions of a work (see especially 62 and 70-72). Though such an enterprise is 
legitimate (my own discussion of "Statik and Inner Emigration" presupposes 
its validity), it is not an enterprise that reveals the value of the artwork as art, 
and it should not, therefore, be viewed as the essence of literary criticism. 
2. By using the term aesthetic in the setting of an explicitly objective-idealist 
framework, I hope to avoid any confusion with the use of aesthetic as that 
which is merely formal. 
3. A classic illustration of this point would be Ramacandra's Rasikaraiijana, 
a Sanskrit text from 1524: read one way it is an ascetic work; read another 
way it is an erotic work. The reader is not free to choose one reading or the 
other; the work reveals in its formal dimensions the speculative unity of the 
ascetic and the erotic, a unity familiar within the Christian tradition as well. 
Cf. Wintemitz, 3:150-51. 
4. One might want to counter this criticism by suggesting that all positions 
are contradictory and that the demonstration of a contradiction says nothing 
about the truth value of a particular stance. With Nietzsche and his modern 
adherents, one could then claim that contradictions are to be endured or em-
braced, not overcome. Such a stance, however, is untenable. If one substi-
tutes, self-reflexively, for each a in the expression a Anon-a the entire expres-
sion a Anon-a, then the result is the negation of a Anon-a-that is, the truth 
of the statement that contradictions are to be endured is its own falsity: 
(aAnon-a)Anon-(aAnon-a). See Hosle, Wahrheit und Geschichte, 282. 
5. The critique applies, for example, to Jochen Schulte-Sasse, whose posi-
tion was cited above in another context. 
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